“The admissibility of real evidence in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” by Wells, Jerome
 
 
“The admissibility of real evidence in the light of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996” 
 
by 
 
Jerome Wells 
 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
 
for the degree of  
 
Doctor of Laws 
 
at the 
 
University of South Africa 
Supervisor: Professor SS Terblanche 
 
(November 2013)   
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I declare that “The admissibility of real evidence in the light of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” is my own work and that 
all the resources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and 
acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
___________________________ 
J O WELLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First and foremost, praises and thanks to God Almighty for His faithfulness 
throughout my life. 
I also acknowledge the role played by the following persons in the completion 
of this thesis: 
I am deeply indebted to my promoter, Professor SS Terblanche, who provided 
me with every bit of guidance, assistance, encouragement and expertise. 
I am extremely grateful to my wife, Ruth, my two boys, Yannic and Logan, and 
parents, Thomas and Naomi for their love, prayers, caring and sacrifices. 
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father Thomas Wells, whose 
role in my life was and remains immense.
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 3 
3. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 4 
3.1 Compelled evidence and the privilege against self-incrimination ............................................. 4 
3.2 Self-incrimination and pointing-out ........................................................................................... 6 
3.3 Section 37: Self-incrimination distinguished from evidence of bodily features ...................... 10 
4.    RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES ............................................................................................. 11 
4.1 Literature study ........................................................................................................................ 12 
4.2 Comparative legal study .......................................................................................................... 12 
4.2.1 Appropriateness of method ........................................................................................ 12 
4.2.2 Countries chosen for comparison ............................................................................... 13 
5.    THE NATURE OF REAL EVIDENCE: ATTEMPTING A DEFINITION ..................................................... 13 
5.1 Non-bodily evidence ................................................................................................................ 14 
5.2 Bodily evidence ........................................................................................................................ 14 
5.3 Derivative evidence ................................................................................................................. 15 
6.    LIMITATIONS TO THIS STUDY ......................................................................................................... 15 
7.   SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... 16 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
1.    INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 17 
2. RATIONALES FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE .................................................................................. 18 
2.1 The Deterrence rationale ......................................................................................................... 19 
2.1.1 Origin of the deterrence rationale .............................................................................. 19 
2.1.2 Objectives of deterrence ............................................................................................ 20 
2.1.3 Real evidence and the deterrence rationale .............................................................. 21 
2.1.4 Weaknesses of the deterrence principle .................................................................... 22 
 2.2 Remedial imperative ................................................................................................................ 27 
2.2.1 Objectives of remedial imperative.............................................................................. 27 
2.2.2 Due process principle .................................................................................................. 28 
2.2.3 The principle of self-correction ................................................................................... 29 
2.2.4 Real evidence and the remedial imperative ............................................................... 29 
ii 
 
2.3 Judicial integrity ....................................................................................................................... 30 
 2.3.1 Origin of judicial integrity rationale ............................................................................ 30 
 2.3.2 Objectives of judicial integrity rationale ..................................................................... 31 
 2.3.3 Real evidence and the judicial integrity rationale ...................................................... 33 
3. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 34 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED REAL EVIDENCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 35 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ................................................................................................................. 37 
2.1 Threshold burden ..................................................................................................................... 37 
2.2 Trial-within-a-trial .................................................................................................................... 39 
3. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... 40 
 3.1 Beneficiary of exclusionary remedy ......................................................................................... 41 
  3.1.1 The “suspect” and section 35 rights ........................................................................... 42 
  3.1.2 Definition of the word “suspect”  ............................................................................... 44 
  3.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 45 
 3.2 Connection requirement.......................................................................................................... 46 
 3.3 So-called standing requirement ............................................................................................... 49 
 3.4 Violation of the right ................................................................................................................ 51 
  3.4.1 Legitimate expectation of privacy .............................................................................. 52 
  3.4.2 Limitation .................................................................................................................... 53 
4. SUBSTANTIVE PHASE ...................................................................................................................... 57 
 4.1 The first leg of the test in section 35(5): trial fairness ............................................................. 58 
  4.1.1 The nature of the evidence ......................................................................................... 59 
  4.1.2 Discoverability analysis ............................................................................................... 61 
 4.2  Second leg of test in section 35(5): detriment to the administration of justice...................... 61 
  4.2.1 Seriousness of the constitutional infringement ......................................................... 62 
  4.2.2 The integrity of the administration of justice ............................................................. 64 
5. PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF REAL EVIDENCE .............................................. 66 
 5.1 Conscription analysis ............................................................................................................... 67 
 5.2 Discoverability analysis ............................................................................................................ 69 
  5.2.1 Discoverability doctrine .............................................................................................. 69 
  5.2.2 Independent source doctrine ..................................................................................... 70 
iii 
 
  5.2.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 71 
 5.3 Real evidence obtained through compulsion .......................................................................... 71 
  5.3.1 Objective reasonableness of a right ........................................................................... 72 
  5.3.2 Law of general application .......................................................................................... 73 
6. SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 75 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE UNDER SECTION 
24(2) OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 77 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ................................................................................................................. 81 
 2.1 Pre-trail motion ........................................................................................................................ 81 
 2.2 Threshold burden ..................................................................................................................... 82 
3. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... 83 
 3.1 Beneficiary of the exclusionary remedy .................................................................................. 84 
  3.1.1 The meaning of detention .......................................................................................... 84 
  3.1.2 Physical and psychological detention ......................................................................... 85 
  3.1.3 Detention for investigative purposes ......................................................................... 87 
 3.2 Standing requirement .............................................................................................................. 88 
 3.3 Evidence “obtained in a manner”  ........................................................................................... 90 
4. ADMISSON OF THE EVIDENCE BRINGS THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE INTO DISREPUTE ....... 94 
 4.1 Seriousness of the breach ........................................................................................................ 96 
  4.1.1 The presence or absence of good faith ...................................................................... 97 
  4.1.2 The meaning of good faith .......................................................................................... 99 
  4.1.3 Test for good faith .................................................................................................... 100 
5. IMPACT ON THE CHARTER PROTECTED INTEREST OF THE ACCUSED .......................................... 101 
 5.1 Nature of the evidence .......................................................................................................... 102 
  5.1.1 Bodily evidence ......................................................................................................... 103 
  5.1.2 Non-bodily physical evidence ................................................................................... 103 
  5.1.3 Derivative evidence .................................................................................................. 104 
 5.2 Discoverability analysis .......................................................................................................... 105 
 5.3 Nature of the right ................................................................................................................. 107 
  5.3.1 Right of privacy ......................................................................................................... 107 
  5.3.2 Limitation of rights .................................................................................................... 110 
6. SOCIETY’S INTEREST IN ADJUDICATION OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS ......................................... 118 
iv 
 
 6.1 Reliability................................................................................................................................ 118 
 6.2 Importance to prosecution .................................................................................................... 119 
 6.3 The seriousness of the offence .............................................................................................. 119 
7. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 122 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 124 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ............................................................................................................... 128 
 2.1 Motion to suppress ................................................................................................................ 128 
 2.2 Onus ........................................................................................................................................ 129 
3. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE .................................................................................. 129 
 3.1 Standing doctrine ................................................................................................................... 129 
  3.1.1 Reasonable expectation of privacy ........................................................................... 130 
  3.1.2 Evidence obtained through infringement to third party rights ................................ 135 
  3.1.3 Seizure under Fourth Amendment ........................................................................... 137 
 3.2 The Objective Justification Doctrine ...................................................................................... 140 
 3.3 Attenuated taint doctrine ...................................................................................................... 142 
  3.3.1 Nature of the causal connection ............................................................................... 142 
  3.3.2 The relationship between the purposes of the rule that was violated and 
suppression ............................................................................................................................ 145 
 3.4 The Inevitable Discovery doctrine ......................................................................................... 146 
 3.5 The Independent Source Doctrine ......................................................................................... 148 
 3.6 The Good Faith doctrine ........................................................................................................ 150 
  3.6.1 Nature of the Good faith exception .......................................................................... 150
  3.6.2 Cost-benefit analysis ................................................................................................. 153 
4. REAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH COMPULSION .................................................................. 156 
 4.1 So-called reasonable balancing test ...................................................................................... 156 
 4.2 Physical penetration of the body ........................................................................................... 158 
5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 161 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN NAMIBIA 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 164 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS ............................................................................................................... 166 
v 
 
 2.1 Trial-within-a-trial procedure ................................................................................................ 166 
 2.2 Onus ....................................................................................................................................... 168 
3. STANDING REQUIREMENT ........................................................................................................... 171 
 3.1 Aggrieved Person ................................................................................................................... 172 
 3.2 Interested Person................................................................................................................... 173 
 3.3 Suspects ................................................................................................................................. 174 
4. UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE ............................................................................. 175 
 4.1 Nature of Exclusionary Rule ................................................................................................... 175 
 4.2 Exclusionary Test.................................................................................................................... 176 
              4.2.1 Nature of irregularity: fair trial requirement ................................................................ 177 
              4.2.2 Effect on verdict: bring administration of justice into disrepute .................................. 178 
5. REAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH COMPULSION .................................................................. 179 
 5.1 Establishing meaning in the wording ..................................................................................... 180 
 5.2 Values-test ............................................................................................................................. 181 
  5.2.1 Public opinion as indicator of contemporary values ................................................ 183 
  5.2.2 Exception to the value test: Absolute rights ............................................................. 185 
  5.2.3 Proportionality test ................................................................................................... 186 
 5.3 Requirements of Article 22 .................................................................................................... 191 
6. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 193 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 196 
2. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 197 
 2.1 Rationale of the exclusionary rule ......................................................................................... 197 
 2.2 Procedural matters ................................................................................................................ 199 
  2.2.1 Procedure under section 35(5)  ................................................................................ 199 
  2.2.2 The threshold onus ................................................................................................... 200 
 2.3 Threshold requirement .......................................................................................................... 201 
  2.3.1 Beneficiaries .............................................................................................................. 202 
  2.3.2 Connection requirement .......................................................................................... 204 
  2.3.3 Standing threshold requirement .............................................................................. 205 
  2.3.4 Violation of the right ................................................................................................. 207 
 2.4 Substantive phase .................................................................................................................. 214 
  2.4.1 The first leg of the test in section 35(5): trial fairness .............................................. 215 
vi 
 
  2.4.2 The second leg of the test in section 35(5): Admission would be detrimental to the  
    Administration of justice ........................................................................................... 222 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 228 
 3.1 How should the court interpret section 35(5)  ...................................................................... 229 
  3.1.1 Procedural phase ...................................................................................................... 229 
  3.1.2 Substantive phase ..................................................................................................... 230 
 3.2 Proposed amendments to section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 ......................... 232 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 List of cases ................................................................................................................................... 234 
 Books ............................................................................................................................................ 248 
 Journal articles .............................................................................................................................. 251 
 Legislation ..................................................................................................................................... 258 
 Theses and dissertations .............................................................................................................. 258 
 Reports ......................................................................................................................................... 259
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the constitutionalisation of South Africa the courts applied the English common law 
to determine the admissibility of improperly or illegally obtained evidence. The English 
common law employed a strict inclusionary approach which was formulated as follows: “It 
matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible.”1 In essence 
relevance was the test and the courts were not concerned with how the evidence was 
obtained.2 Facts are considered relevant if from their existence inferences may properly be 
drawn as to the existence of the fact in issue.3  The result was that all relevant evidence was 
admissible and irrelevant evidence inadmissible, but with the notable exception that the 
courts had a discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the strict rules of evidence would 
operate unfairly against the accused.4     
In 1994 South Africa became a constitutional democracy with the interim Constitution5 as 
the supreme law. In the Bill of Rights were guaranteed rights, which overlapped with some 
of the common law procedural and evidentiary rights of a criminally charged person. For 
example, the right to be informed of the rights to remain silent, to be presumed innocent, 
not to incriminate oneself and not testify during trial, and the right to a fair trial.6 The 
interim Constitution did not expressively govern the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence.7 Notwithstanding, the courts extended an exclusionary remedy to the 
victims of fundamental rights violations, in the evidence gathering process.8 However, as 
could be expected, the courts did not immediately agree on the legal basis for the exclusion 
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.9 Nevertheless, unconstitutionally obtained 
                                                          
1
 R v Leatham 1861 Cox CC 498 at 501; quoted in Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 184;  
  Langenhoven Ongrondwetlik verkreë getuienis at 17.   
2
 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 716. 
3
 R v Mpanza 1915 AD 348 at 352-353. 
4
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 205-206; see also S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407  
  (SCA) at para 22. 
5
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
6
 See respectively, sections 25(2)(a), 25(2)(d), 25(3), 25(3)(c). 
7
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 208. 
8
 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 104. 
9
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 209. 
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evidence was excluded when courts relied on the “appropriate relief” provision contained in 
section 7(4) of the interim Constitution,10 invoked the common-law discretion to meet the 
demand of constitutional due process-11 and in some cases, the courts applied the strict 
exclusionary rule in respect of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.12   
In respect of the admissibility of evidence the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 brought a marked departure from the earlier position in that it contains a provision 
requiring the exclusion of evidence in the case of rights infringement. This provision is 
section 35(5) – in essence a remedy to protect a person’s fundamental rights in a criminal 
trial against the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. All common law and 
statutory provisions which used to regulate the admissibility of evidence must now also be 
tested against the provisions of section 35(5). Moreover, judgments delivered under the 
interim Constitution must be distinguished from those decided under section 35(5).13 
Section 35(5) reads as follows:14 
“Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.” 
Since the final Constitution is markedly different from the interim Constitution, it is only 
logical to question the impact of section 35(5) on the law of evidence. This question has 
prompted much writing and discussion.15 All the issues relating to this question have not yet 
been resolved, and perhaps none more so than specifically the question to what extent 
current arguments are still influenced by the common-law position. One such issue, in 
respect of which the final word has definitely not been spoken, relates to the admissibility of 
real evidence. Our common law certainly distinguished real evidence from testimonial 
evidence, but the current position remains unclear and largely unexplored.  
                                                          
10
 S v Melani 1995 (2) SACR 141 (E). 
11
 S v Motloutsi 1996 (1) SACR 78 (C). 
12
 S v Mathebula 1997 (1) SACR 10 (W); Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 209. 
13
 S v Huma (2) 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W). 
14
 See, in general, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 214. 
15
 See, in general, Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence; Langenhoven Ongrondwetlik verkreë  
   getuienis; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence; Ally Constitutional exclusion. 
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Our courts have delivered divergent judgments on the application and interpretation of 
section 35(5). Legal certainty will only be achieved when the Constitutional Court rules on all 
its aspects, whereas to date the Constitutional Court has not yet attended to section 35(5). 
The purpose of this study is to determine as closely as possible as to what is the current 
position and what the situation should ideally be within a constitutional democracy. This is 
where this study found its origin and what it focuses on. Throughout this study, it has been 
deemed important to set out the legal position with respect to testimonial evidence, before 
it is possible to distinguish the position with respect to real evidence. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 When applying the common law, no person may be compelled to give evidence 
incriminating himself.16 It is not a mere compulsion but testimonial compulsion that forms 
the crux of this rule. Based on this principle, the courts used to distinguish between real and 
testimonial evidence. The following questions arise: (i) Can a clear distinction be made 
between real evidence and testimonial or communicative statements? (ii) to what extent 
has the common law rule survived in the constitutional era - both with respect to its 
exclusionary and inclusionary aspects? (iii) could compelled real evidence be self-
incriminating at all? and (iv) the constitutionality of section 37 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977. 
Unconstitutionally obtained evidence must be excluded under section 35(5), if admission 
will result in an unfair trial or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. A 
review of the section 35(5) case law reveals that in certain decisions, the evidence was 
excluded, whereas in others, the evidence was ruled admissible, without a clear distinction 
between the circumstances of the relevant cases. The question arises whether such 
different decisions are consistent and predictable?  
The main research focus of this thesis, is to discuss the questions mentioned as above and 
finding the answers to them. 
 
                                                          
16
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 881; R v Camane 1925 AD 575. 
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3. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
3.1 Compelled evidence and the privilege against self-incrimination 
By the early 1900s,17 when determining the admissibility of evidence, the South African 
courts were still employing the English common law principle that no one could be 
compelled to give evidence incriminating himself.18 If the accused was forced to incriminate 
himself such evidence would be excluded, regardless of whether the compulsion took place 
before or during the trial. This principle applied to all evidence and as a result, even real 
evidence obtained against the accused in an unlawful manner would be excluded.19 The 
reliability of the evidence made no difference. For example, the court in Maleleke20 ruled 
that real evidence obtained through compulsion was to be inadmissible. The finding was not 
based on a general principle that improperly obtained evidence was inadmissible.21 The 
Court treated the case through the privilege against self-incrimination, because of the way 
in which the evidence was obtained.22 The reason for the exclusion of such evidence being 
that it compelled an accused to convict himself, that it might open the door to abuse, as 
well as that it offended the public’s sense of natural justice and fair play.23  
The Appellate Division in Camane24 confirmed the common law principle that no one could 
be compelled to give evidence incriminating the individual either before or during the trial. 
However, the privilege against self-incrimination extended only to testimonial compulsion.  
The Court concluded that an accused may be compelled in court to show “his features, his 
complexion, his stature, mutilations, or marks on his body.” The Court observed that 
evidence of this nature would be obtained whilst the accused was passive and thus not 
                                                          
17
 Roe v William Harvey 1769 (98) ER 305; Ibrahim v Rex 1914 AC 599; Rex v Voisin 1918 (1) KB 531; see also  
   Wigmore Evidence at sections 2250, 2263 and 1150; Phipson Evidence at 263; Taylor Evidence at 267. 
18
 R v Camane 1925 AD 575. 
19
 R v Goopurshad 1914 (35) NLR 87;  R v Gama 1916 EDL 34; R v Maleleke 1925 TPD 491; R v B 1933 OPD 139. 
20
 R v Maleleke 1925 TPD 491. 
21
 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 716-717. 
22
 R v Maleleke 1925 TPD 491; see also R v Goorpurshad 1914 (35) (NLR) 89: The court excluded fingerprints  
   obtained through compulsion. See also Du Toit et al Criminal Procedure at 3-3: “The common law distinction 
   between testimonial communications and non testimonial ascertainment of bodily features (the 
   establishment of real evidence as it were) was not appreciated in earlier South African decisions”;  
   Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 134. 
23
 R v Maleleke 1925 TPD 491 at 534.  
24
 R v Camane 1925 AD 570. 
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testimonial compulsion.25 The Court reasoned that the kernel of the privilege against self-
incrimination was not merely compulsion, but testimonial compulsion.   
The question whether compelled real evidence could be self-incriminating at all was 
considered in Matemba.26  In casu, the prosecution tendered the palm print of the accused, 
which was obtained without his consent. This evidence was employed to prove that the 
accused was the person who had left his palm print on the windowsill, which identified him 
as the person who had broken into the premises. The court a quo excluded the evidence on 
the grounds that an accused person could not be compelled to furnish evidence against 
himself in the absence of a statutory authorisation. Real evidence obtained in this manner 
could not be used against an accused person. The Appellate Division held that the reasoning 
of the court a quo obscured the real issues and was not an accurate exposition of the law. 
The legality of the methods used to obtain the evidence is one matter and the question of 
admissibility is another. These questions should be kept separate and not joined as the 
court a quo did when it said that an accused person could not be compelled to furnish 
evidence against himself. The Appellate Division concluded that there was nothing illegal in 
the way the evidence was obtained. The Court reasoned that it was unnecessary to decide 
the question of legality as section 2 of Act 39 of 1926 authorised a peace officer to take the 
palm prints of an arrested person.  
The Court considered whether evidence obtained through compulsion was admissible. 
Evidence obtained through compulsion could, under the English common law, be excluded 
in terms of two separate and distinct principles. The first was the maxim nemo tenetur se 
ipsum prodere (or accusare) and the second the rule which excluded an extra-judicial 
confession by an accused person, unless such confession was freely and voluntarily made.27 
The nemo tenetur maxim forbade an attempt to extract from an accused’s lips an admission 
of his guilt. Again the Court concluded that privilege against self-incrimination extended to  
testimonial compulsion. The Court referred with approval to Camane and agreed that the 
mere giving of a fingerprint specimen did not make the accused a compellable witness 
against himself.28 The forced taking of a fingerprint did not constitute testimony about his 
                                                          
25
 R v Camane 1925 AD 570 at 585. 
26
 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75. 
27
 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75 at 80-81. 
28
 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75 at 82; see, in general, Du Toit et al Criminal 
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body, but of his body. If the evidence obtained did not amount to a communication, written 
or oral statement, upon which reliance was to be placed, as involving knowledge of the facts 
and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him was not a 
testimonial one.29 The Court concluded that the common law privilege against self-
incrimination applied to testimonial utterances only, and did not extend to real evidence.   
The Court found that the second principle, the confession rule, prescribed the exclusion of 
confessions, specifically statements not freely and voluntarily made. The rationale for the 
exclusion of compelled confessions was the untrustworthiness of such evidence. The Court 
noted that an accused person was passive when a palm print was being taken. He is not 
compelled to give evidence or to confess any more than he is being compelled to give 
evidence or to confess when his photograph is being taken or when he is put upon an 
identification parade or when he is made to show a scar in court. Therefore the Court 
concluded, neither the maxim nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere nor the confession-rule ruled 
out palm prints taken against a person’s will.30  
3.2   Self-incrimination and pointing-out   
Since Matemba, the courts more readily included real evidence obtained by improper 
means. This reasoning was used to justify admission of evidence of a thing or place pointed 
out by the accused, even when coerced.31 
The Appellate Division in Sheehama,32 however rejected this reasoning. In the present case 
the Court had to decide whether the evidence regarding “a pointing out” was admissible, if 
it was obtained involuntary and by force. The Court confirmed the difference between 
actions and statements. Evidence of a thing or place pointed-out, even if the pointing-out 
was coerced, was admissible.33 On the other hand a confession or admission obtained 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    procedure at 3-8. 
29
 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75 at 82. 
30
 Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75 at 82-83.   
31
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 135; R v Samhando 1943 AD 608 at 611-615; S v 
   Tsotsobe 1983 (1) SA 856 (A) at 864-865; S v Shezi 1985 (3) SA 900 (A) at 906-907; S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 
860 (A) at 877. 
32
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A). 
33
 S v Ismail (1) 1965 (1) SA 446 (N) at 450; S v Shezi 1985 (3) SA 900 (A) at 906-907; S v   
   Tsotsobe 1983 (1) SA 856 (A) at 864-865; R v Duetsimi 1950 (3) SA 674 (A) at 677. 
7 
 
through coercion was inadmissible.34 The Court proceeded to review existing case law on 
this point and noted as follows, The Appellate Division, in Samhando,35 included evidence of 
a pointing out which formed part of an admission that was obtained through force. The 
pointing out in Samhando resulted in the discovery of the deceased blood spattered 
clothing. The Court included this evidence based on the so-called “theory of confirmation by 
subsequently discovered facts” which originated in England. This principle was an exception 
to the general rule that statements by an accused should be free and voluntary. The 
reasoning was that the justification for exclusion –the unreliability of the evidence – 
vanishes if the admissions can be proved to be true by other evidence.36 The fact or thing 
discovered as a result of coercion (so called “element of discovery”) provided the guarantee 
of truth and reliability. The Court in Sheehama emphasised that the Samhando exception 
was not applicable to the facts of Sheehama because the appellant did not point out 
anything that was not already in the public domain.37 
The Appellate Division distinguished Duetsimi38 from Samhando when the court held that 
evidence of a pointing out is inadmissible, if the pointing out formed part of an inadmissible 
confession.39 In Duetsimi evidence connected with a crime was not discovered as a result of 
a pointing out but as a result of information given by the accused in a statement. The 
confession was ruled inadmissible because it was not made in the presence of a peace 
officer and not because it was obtained involuntarily or by force. The effect of Duetsimi was 
neutralised by the successive amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act.40 Evidence of a 
pointing out that was inadmissible if obtained in similar circumstances to Duetsimi was, in 
terms of the amendments, made admissible. The question arose whether section 245(2) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955 made admissible evidence of a pointing out obtained by 
                                                          
34
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 877; see also R v Samhando 1943 AD 608 at 611-615; S v Shezi 1985 (3)  
    SA 900 (A) at 906-907. 
35 R v Samhando 1943 AD 608. 
36
 R v Samhando 1943 AD 608 at 613. 
37 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 877-878. 
38 R v Duetsimi 1950 (3) SA 674 (A).  
39 R v Duetsimi 1950 (3) SA 674 (A) at 677: “It seems to be clear that all the pointing out was part of a single  
    course of conduct, and if it was an elaboration of an inadmissible confession the whole of it should have 
     been excluded.” 
40 Section 274 of Act of 1917 was superseded by section 42 of Act 29 of 1955 which in turn was superseded by  
    section 245(2) of Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 which has since been superseded by section 218(2) of  
    the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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force. In Ismail41 and cases following it,42 the High Court stated that section 245(2) 
confirmed Samhando, and further extended its (Samhando’s) impact to situations where 
pointing outs form part of an inadmissible confession.43 
 The Court in Sheehama disagreed that evidence of a forced pointing out is admissible.  The 
Court reasoned as follows.  
Firstly, the court ruled that a pointing out is in principle an admission. The Court reasoned 
that a pointing out was in essence a “communication by conduct”- a statement by the 
person making a pointing out.  The Court noted that this was consistent with the reasoning 
adopted in Camane44 when the court stated that an accused cannot be forced to point out 
evidence against his will. The court in Sheehama concluded that Camane is authority that 
evidence obtained by means of a forced pointing out is inadmissible.45 The Court argued 
further that it  was possible that a pointing out under certain circumstances could be an 
extra-curial admission by the accused  and as such must in terms of the common law and 
section 219A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, be freely and voluntarily obtained.  
Secondly the Court considered the provisions of section 218(2) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977. The Court held that section 218(2) provided that evidence of a pointing out could 
be admissible if it forms part of an inadmissible statement and not that it must be 
admitted.46 The section does not provide the court with any form of discretion to exclude or 
include evidence of a pointing out, but that the court could exclude evidence of a pointing 
out on material grounds of inadmissibility. In other words, if evidence of a pointing out 
would otherwise be inadmissible it will not be admissible because it forms part of an 
inadmissible confession. The Court ruled that evidence of a pointing out was therefore 
inadmissible if obtained through force. This was the case also when the pointing out formed 
part of an inadmissible confession or admission. 47 
                                                          
41 S v Ismail (1) 1965 (1) SA 446 (N). 
42 S v Shezi 1985 (3) SA 900 (A); S v Tsotsobe 1983 (1) SA 856 (A).   
43 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 878-879. 
44
 R v Camane 1925 AD 570 at 575: “Now, evidence may be oral or written, or it may even be by signs or  
    gestures. If a man accused of theft leads an investigator to the spot where the stolen property is found, and  
    points to it, that is as much evidence as if he said ‘There it is’. And he cannot be forced to do that.”  
45 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 879. 
46
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 880. 
47 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 880-881. 
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Finally, the Court concluded that decisions that advocated that pointing outs do not amount 
to an extra-curial admission and that the evidence of a forced pointing out is admissible, 
were clearly wrong.48 The Court rejected the previous decisions not only on legal grounds 
but also normative considerations. In respect of the latter the Court stated that there 
existed a fundamental objection to the admissibility of evidence obtained through coerced 
pointings out.49 Evidence of a pointing out was therefore inadmissible if obtained through 
force. The Court by ruling that the pointing out is a “communication by conduct” attempted 
to bridge the gap between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence.  
January50 is a case which followed on Sheehama and which took the Sheehama 
development further. The question considered in January is whether proof of an involuntary 
pointing out by the accused is admissible in a criminal trial if something relevant to the 
charge is discovered as a result thereof. 51 In Sheehama nothing was discovered as a result 
of the involuntary pointing out and the Court accordingly refrained from expressing a view 
on the admissibility of evidence of a pointing out covered by the Samhando exception.52 The 
Court in January stated that it was difficult to reconcile the reasoning in Sheehama with the 
recognition of the Samhando exception, unless section 219A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 preserved the common law as set out in Samhando or that a provision in the Criminal 
Procedure Act rendered admissible an involuntary admission leading to the discovery of a 
relevant thing. The Court proceeded to consider whether the ruling in Duetsimi is still 
applicable53 - namely that evidence of a pointing out is inadmissible if the pointing out is 
part of a single course of conduct and if it was an elaboration of an inadmissible confession. 
The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the decision in Samhando was clearly 
wrong. The Court arrived at its decision without referring to any provision in the 
Constitution. The Court accepted that Samhando correctly gave effect to the English law of 
evidence – insofar as an involuntary pointing out was concerned - and that the law did not 
change before 31 May 1961.54  The Court considered the meaning of section 219A. Section 
                                                          
48 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 880. 
49
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A) at 880. 
50
 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 806. 
51 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 802. 
52 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 805. 
53
 R v Duetsimi 1950 (3) SA 674 (A) at 677. 
54
 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 806. 
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219A had no precursor in the 191755 and 195556 Acts, nor did the initial 1977 Act57 as 
originally enacted contain a similar section. Section 219A stated that evidence of an extra-
judicial admission by an accused is admissible in evidence against him provided that it is 
proved to have been voluntarily made. Based on the words of the section, evidence of an 
involuntary admission is inadmissible and linguistically the subsection permits no 
exception.58 The Court concluded that section 219A (1) does not preserve the Samhando 
exception. Proof of a pointing out by an accused which is involuntary by reason of 
something said or done by a person in authority, is inadmissible in a criminal trial even if 
something relevant to the charge is discovered as a result thereof.59 The Court further 
reasoned that its decision was also based on policy. The Court noted that in the last century 
there had been a marked shift in the justification for excluding evidence of involuntary 
confessions and admissions- and it is now firmly established in English law that an important 
reason was one of policy.60  The involuntary statements were inadmissible because in a 
civilised society it is vital that persons in custody or charged with offences should not be 
subjected to ill-treatment or improper pressure in order to extract confessions.61   
3.3 Section 37: Self-incrimination distinguished from evidence of bodily features 
At common law no person may be compelled to produce evidence that incriminates himself, 
either before or during the trial.62 It is not mere compulsion but testimonial compulsion that 
forms the kernel of the rule. Therefore, the person might be compelled to furnish autoptic 
evidence, where he is passive and required to produce such things as his physical features. 
Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 authorise the police to ascertain prints and 
bodily appearance against the will of an accused. These provisions are reinforced by section 
225 which, inter alia, determines that evidence shall not be inadmissible by reason only of 
the fact that the evidence in question was not obtained in accordance with section 37,63 and 
                                                          
55 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 1917. 
56 Criminal Procedure Act, 1955.  
57 Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.  
58 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 806-807. 
59 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 807-808. 
60
 January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 807; Referring to Wong Kam-ming v  
   The Queen [1980] AC 247 (PC) 261. 
61
 S v Khumalo 1992 SACR 411 (N); January; Prokureur-Generaal, Natal v Khumalo 1994 (2) SACR 801; see also S 
   v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 23. 
62
 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 731. 
63 Section 225 (1). 
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that the admissibility of such evidence is not affected by the fact that it was taken or 
ascertained against the wish or will of the accused concerned.64  
Early South African decisions suggested that the effect of section 37 was to exclude the 
common law maxim nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare from the ascertainment of bodily 
features.65 The maxim does not infringe this rule - no person may be compelled to supply 
evidence that incriminates him, either before or during the trial - because at common law 
the maxim was applicable neither to procedures relating to the ascertainment of bodily 
features nor to the taking of blood samples.66 It follows that section 37 should not be 
interpreted in the light of the common-law privilege against self-incrimination which is 
embodied in the maxim.67 The privilege against self-incrimination was limited to testimonial 
utterances or communications and did not extend to real evidence emanating from an 
accused. In essence a distinction was made between being obliged to make a statement 
against interest and the ascertainment of bodily features.68  
 
4.      RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES 
The literature study and comparative legal methods are used in this thesis to answer the 
problem question. Both research designs (literature study and comparative legal method) 
are sufficient for doctoral studies in law.69 The research methods are appropriate to address 
the gap presented in the research questions. 
 
                                                          
64 Section 225 (2). 
65 See, in general, Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 3-2.  
66
 See generally Seetal v Pravitha 1983 (3) SA 827 (D) 830 (H) and 846 (H)–847 (C) where Schmerber v California 
    384 US 757 (1966) was cited with apparent approval by Didcott J. 
67
 Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 3-2 to 3-3: “The common-law ambit of the privilege against self- 
    incrimination is confined to communications, whereas Chapter 3 deals with the ascertainment of an  
    accused's bodily or physical features or conditions which are not obtained as a result of a communication 
    emanating from the accused.”; see also Nkosi v Barlow 1984 (3) SA 148 (T) at 154; S v Duna 1984 (2) SA 591 
    (C) at 595G–H and 596B; S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) at 562d–e. 
68
 S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) at 562d–e. 
69
 Bryant The portable dissertation at 61-94 and 100-108; Hofstee Constructing a good dissertation at 112,117-
118,120-122; see in general Roberts The dissertation journey at 110-111; Badenhorst  Dissertation writing at 
155; Venter et al Regsnavorsing at 221; Mouton  Master’s and Doctoral studies at 49 and 86.  
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4.1 Literature study 
The purpose of the literature study is to gain a proper understanding and provide an 
overview of the scholarship on the field of study.70 Although literature study is not a suitable 
dissertation research design for purposes of producing anything substantially new, it is 
commonly used in the legal field because it can produce a new perspective on what has 
gone before.71 Sources used for the current student are legislation and case law, and 
secondary literature such as books, journals and dissertations.72 The literature was analysed, 
interpreted and the findings used in the development of the arguments. 
4.2 Comparative legal study 
4.2.1 Appropriateness of method 
The comparative method is generally used to resolve specific legal problems. Comparative 
method involves the comparison of different legal systems with the purpose to find 
solutions or new legal developments or to compare similar legal rules or problems.73 Venter 
argues that it is virtually impossible to imagine work of a jurisprudential nature without a 
comparative basis.74 The appropriateness of a comparative analysis is confirmed in 
Bernstein75 when the Court noted its usefulness especially where foreign courts have 
grappled with the same issues confronting our courts.  The Court also warned that it would 
be folly to ignore interpretations of similar provisions especially if a constitutional provision 
is manifestly modelled on a particular provision in another country’s constitution. 
In this thesis the legal system of South Africa is compared with some foreign jurisdictions. 
The purpose is to identify an appropriate guide for the exclusionary test in section 35(5) and 
concepts with comparable meanings. In order to achieve such an end it was necessary to 
obtain information on the content of the applicable foreign legal rules; to analyse the legal 
                                                          
70
 Hofstee Constructing a good dissertation at 121. 
71
 Hofstee Constructing a good dissertation at 121-122; Bryant The portable dissertation at 62. 
72
 Hofstee Constructing a good dissertation at 121. 
73
 Venter et al Regsnavorsing at 209-213. 
74
 Bryant The portable dissertation at 61-94, 108; Hofstee Constructing a good dissertation at 112, 120-122; see 
in general Roberts The dissertation journey at 110-111; Badenhorst  Dissertation Writing at 155;  Venter  et al 
Regsnavorsing at 221. 
75
 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
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rules in order to understand their full impact in their own legal system; to distinguish the 
similarities and differences existing between the legal rules in South Africa and those of the 
foreign systems were considered.  
4.2.2 Countries chosen for comparison 
This study compares the exclusionary provisions and the laws related to exclusions in the 
legal systems of South Africa, Canada, United States of America and Namibia. These 
countries’ legal systems share a common legal-historic past in that its evidentiary rules and 
procedures are directly or indirectly traced to the English common law. They all form part of 
the so-called Anglo-American law of evidence family and employ adversarial trial 
proceedings. All these countries abandoned parliamentary sovereignty at some stage in 
their history, and adopted a written constitution as the supreme law. To a greater or lesser 
degree, they thereby distanced themselves from the common law inclusionary approach. 
Canada employ an exclusionary rule expressly provided for in its Constitution, whereas 
Namibia and the United States of America apply a judicially created exclusionary rule.76   
The study considers case law in South Africa, Canada, United States of America and Namibia 
as available on 30 November 2013. 
 
5 THE NATURE OF REAL  EVIDENCE: ATTEMPTING A DEFINITION  
The central focus of this thesis is to explore how the courts in South Africa should approach 
the admissibility of real evidence unconstitutionally obtained. Real evidence consists of 
things (objects), which upon proper identification becomes, of itself, evidence.77 Examples 
of real evidence are a knife, photograph, voice recording, letter or even the appearance of a 
                                                          
76
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 31. 
77
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 395 referring to definition in S v M 2002 (2) SACR  
    411 (SCA); Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant The law of evidence in Canada at 17; see also Nokes 1949 TLQR 57   
at 59 and 64: “Though definition proves elusive, it is suggested that real evidence might  be described as (1) 
the physical appearance and demeanour of witnesses when in court, and of other persons and animals 
present in the court or its precincts for examination by the tribunal; (2) material objects, other than those 
deemed to be documents, produced for such examination; and (3) any place, property or thing which is 
lawfully examined by the tribunal out of court.”;  Zeffertt and Paizes  Law of evidence at 849: “The evidence 
is usually intended for the court to look at, but it may also listen, smell, taste or feel. The judge is entitled to  
   rely upon his or her own perceptions and to draw such inferences as may reasonably be drawn without the  
   need for expert qualifications.”; Schutte 2000 SACJ 57; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 299; S v Mthembu  
   2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 22. 
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witness in the witness box.  In most cases real evidence should be supplemented by the 
testimony of witnesses to be of assistance to the court.78 Sopinka et al argue that in its 
widest sense real evidence includes any evidence where the court acts as a witness through 
the use of its own senses to make observations and draw conclusions rather than relying on 
the testimony of a witness.79  
Real evidence can, for the purposes of this thesis, be further sub-divided into non-bodily 
objects; bodily features; and derivative real evidence. 
5.1 Non-bodily real evidence  
Non-bodily real evidence could be in the form of a weapon,80 money,81 photographic 
image,82 letters,83 motor vehicles and metal boxes.84  
5.2  Bodily evidence 
Bodily evidence (or autoptic evidence) emanates from the body of the accused or any third 
party and includes evidence derived from a sample of blood,85 hair samples, fingerprints and 
bodyprints,86 voice samples,87 buccal and DNA samples88 and even a bullet surgically 
removed from the body of a suspect.89 In Gaqa90 the court reasoned that while a bullet is 
clearly not a mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature of the respondent's body, a police 
officer may nevertheless take the necessary steps to determine whether a person’s body 
shows the bullet – which constitutes a condition or appearance under section 37(1)(c) of the 
                                                          
78
 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 849; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 396. 
79
 Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant The law of evidence in Canada at 17;  Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence  at  
    849; Schutte 2000 SACJ 57; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 299; S v Mthembu  2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at  
    para 22. 
80
 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA); see also S v Madiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D). 
81
 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 78; S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA). 
82 Section 37(d) of Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
83
 S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA) at para 31. 
84
 S v Mthembu  2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 21. 
85
 S v Orrie 2004 (1) SACR 162 (C). 
86
 S v Huma (2) 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W); see also sections 36B and 36C of Criminal Procedure Act, as amended      
by the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 6 of 2010. 
87
 Levack v Regional Magistrate, Wynberg 2003 (1) SACR 187 (SCA). 
88 See the proposed amendments in terms of the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill [B9- 
2013]. 
89
 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C); see also Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 
   2004 (1) SACR 149 (D). 
90 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C). 
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Criminal Procedure Act.91 Section 37 permits an official to take such steps as he may deem 
necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any person has any mark, characteristic 
or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance.   
5.3 Derivative real evidence  
Derivative real evidence is evidence discovered as a result of information gleaned from 
compelled self-incriminating statement which includes a statement by conduct92 obtained in 
violation of a fundamental right.93 The Supreme Court of Appeal in a number of cases 
considered the aspect of derivative evidence. In Tandwa94 the court held that the money 
discovered by the police was derivative evidence because it was procured as a result of 
information provided in a coerced testimonial communication made by the accused whose 
rights were violated by the deliberate and flagrant conduct of the police. Similarly in 
Mthembu95 the court held that the evidence (a Toyota Hilux and a metal box) was derivative 
real evidence because the evidence was discovered as a result of information in a 
testimonial communication which was precipitated by torture and assaults. In Pillay96 the 
money discovered in the ceiling of the accused was considered derivative evidence. In casu 
the police raided the accused’s house. When the police entered the house they informed 
the accused that they intended to use her and the members of the family as witnesses. This 
induced the accused to make the statement that led to the discovery of the money. The 
Court held that the money was derivative evidence because it was discovered because of 
statements made by the accused; statements which were obtained in violation of the 
accused’s rights to privacy, to silence and not to incriminate herself. 
 
6         LIMITATIONS TO THIS STUDY 
This thesis is limited to a detailed analysis of the admissibility of real evidence and does not 
address issues related to testimonial evidence only. Reference is made to concepts such as 
                                                          
91
 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 658. 
92
 S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A). 
93
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 241-242; S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA); Zeffertt  
   and Paizes Law of evidence at 729. 
94
 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA). 
95
 S v Mthembu  2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA). 
96
 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA). 
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the common law, testimonial evidence and the privilege against self-incrimination, however, 
the referencing is only briefly mentioned. The common law analysis is specifically limited to 
the distinction between testimonial and real evidence. Similarly reference is made of 
sections 36, 35(3) of the Constitution, as well as section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977. The discussion of these sections in the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act 
is not comprehensive. The provisions is only included in the context of determining the 
question to the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. It follows that the 
recent legislative amendments introduced by the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) 
Amendment Act 6 of 2010,97 dealing with the procedural aspects relevant to the 
ascertainment and custody of evidence, falls beyond the ambit of this thesis.   
 
7        SUMMARY  
The overarching issue addressed in this thesis is the impact of fundamental rights on the law 
of evidence. The focal point is to explore whether the common law distinction between real 
and testimonial evidence is applied or should be applied when evaluating the admissibility 
of real evidence under section 35(5) of the Constitution. The focus is on real evidence 
because testimonial evidence has been the subject of substantial research already, while 
real evidence is still in the process of development.98   
The scope, application and interpretation of section 35(5) are explored with the view to 
determine factors relevant to a determination of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence 
only. This is done firstly by considering the rationale for the exclusionary rule in general, and 
then to consider in detail what the current legal position is regarding the exclusion or 
otherwise of real evidence that has been obtained in an unconstitutional manner in the 
chosen jurisdictions: South Africa (Ch 3), Canada (Ch 4), the United States of America (Ch 5) 
and Namibia (Ch 6). The final chapter (Ch 7) contains the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
                                                          
97 Section 2 inserted ss 36A, 36B and s 36C into the Act; and section 3 of Act 6 of 2010 amended the existing 
section 37 of the Act.  
98
 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence; Langenhoven Ongrondwetlik verkreë getuienis; 
    Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence; Ally Constitutional exclusion; S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at  
   para 22. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a general consensus that the exclusionary rule’s1 function is to provide a legal 
framework for determining the circumstances under which unconstitutionally or illegally 
obtained evidence, may be excluded in criminal proceedings.2 The exclusionary rule is not 
considered a remedy of the particular accused, but it seeks to discourage the 
unconstitutional obtainment of evidence.3    
Evidence obtained by law enforcement authorities, by means which violate rules or 
principles established by the constitution, other statutes or the courts of any jurisdiction 
will, because of the exclusionary rule, generally be inadmissible in a court of law.4 However, 
as noted in Chapter 1, South African courts delivered diverse judgments concerning the 
appropriate application of the exclusionary rule as specified in section 35(5) of the 
Constitution.5  
The uniform application of the exclusionary rule requires agreement about the foundational 
rationale of the exclusionary rule.6 In other words, the proper scope of the exclusionary rule 
can be settled only after a clear understanding of its rationale.7 In the absence of a settled 
rationale for the exclusionary rule our courts will be plagued by uncertainty in terms of its 
scope. This problem contributes to an uncertain legal framework for determining the 
circumstances under which unconstitutionally obtained evidence, could be excluded in 
                                                          
1 In this thesis “exclusionary rule” means a rule which excludes real, documentary and oral evidence  
   unconstitutionally obtained by evidence gatherers responsible for the prevention, detection, investigation  
   and prosecution of crime. This definition is derived from Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173 at 175. 
2 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); Heffernan and Lovely 1991 University of Michigan JL Reform 311; Shanks 
1983 Tulane LR 648; Canon 1982 South Texas LJ 559 at 571; Schlesinger and Wilson 1980 Duquesne LR 225 at  
   226 . 
3 Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 30. 
4 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984); Brinegar 1981 Vanderbilt LR 213; US v Calandra 
414 US 338 (1974); Oaks 1970; University of Chicago LR 665.  
5 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA); S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA); S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 
(SCA); S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N). 
6 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 33. 
7 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 19; Schlesinger and Wilson 1980 Duquesne LR 225 at 226. 
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criminal proceedings. The result is the indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule 
and the potential erosion of the integrity of the legal system.  
Extensive research has been done in South Africa and beyond our borders on the rationale 
for the exclusionary rule.8 It is unnecessary to repeat such research in detail, but I refer to 
several of these authorities in order to determine how court decisions on the admissibility 
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence are affected in South Africa, by the rationale used 
by the court for exclusion. The final purpose of this determination is to establish how the 
admissibility of real evidence is affected.  
  
2.   RATIONALES FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The applicable rationale determines the scope and impact of the exclusionary rule and 
provides the justification as to why relevant real evidence is in certain instances excluded or 
included.9 I use the descriptor “rationale” to include principles, purposes, objectives, aims, 
and theoretical or philosophical underpinnings of exclusion.  
During the period of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 the courts 
developed an exclusionary remedy in criminal trials.10 The exclusionary remedy was brought 
about by a combination of the deterrence rationale, remedial imperative and judicial 
integrity rationale, which are the main rationales put forward by various commentators.11  
Since the introduction of section 35(5) in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 the South African courts employed one or more of the rationales for excluding 
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence.  
The effect of each rationale invariably creates a different end result. The rationale of the 
remedial imperative, or corrective justice, proceeds from the premise that an unfair 
advantage achieved by the prosecution, by rights infringements, must be undone by the 
                                                          
8 Ally Constitutional exclusion; Langenhoven Ongrondwetlik verkreë getuienis; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe 
Principles of evidence; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence; Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173.  
9 Ally Constitutional exclusion; Mellifont The derivative imperative at 17. 
9 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 16.  
10 See Chapter 1 at para 1.  
11 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 84; S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA); Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 30;  
   Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 189-194; Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 
668; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 712.  
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removal of the effects of any such advantage.12 The objective of the deterrent rationale is to 
deter the future unconstitutional conduct of state agents. Emphasis is therefore laid on the 
disciplinary function of the courts.13 Deterrence should not be viewed in a narrow sense - 
meaning the exclusionary rule does not inflict punishment on police who violate 
fundamental rights (immediate deterrence). Deterrence should instead be viewed in the 
light of the exclusionary rule’s “educative” role and ultimate preventive effect.14 The 
educative function is performed when courts in its judgments fashion public opinion, rather 
than expressing it. The exclusionary rule prevents constitutional breaches because it 
provides an incentive for compliance.15 The aim of the judicial integrity rationale, is to 
dissociate the courts (protect its integrity) from the constitutional rights violations against 
the accused during criminal investigations.16 
It is evident that there is some overlap between the rationales.17 The rationales in essence 
share a concern about rights protection and because thereof, should not necessarily always 
be divided into completely separate compartments. 
 2.1     The Deterrence Rationale 
 Supporters of this rationale argue that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
police misconduct.  Deterrence is achieved because the police will not act unconstitutionally 
or illegally, if they cannot get any benefit from that action. Put differently, if the 
unconstitutional conduct does not assist the police, they will refrain from such conduct.  
2.1.1 Origin of the deterrence rationale 
The historical development of the deterrence rationale can be traced back to the United 
States Supreme Court judgment of Elkins.18 The Court held that it was the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule to deter (to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only 
                                                          
12 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 39-40; see also Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173. 
13 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 42. 
14 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 189. 
15 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 190. 
16 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 182 fn 65; Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173 at 190. 
17 Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173 at 190: The author argues that deterrence is largely a by-product of the  
     judicial integrity rationale.  
18 Elkins v US 364 US 206 (1960). 
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effectively available way) by removing the incentive to disregard it.19 The Supreme Court has 
in subsequent cases affirmed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter.20  
2.1.2 Objectives of deterrence  
The deterrence rationale encompasses two different objectives.21 First it seeks to discipline 
police officers who obtained evidence unconstitutionally, by excluding that evidence.22 The 
second is to deter future misconduct by police in the evidence gathering phase.23 Although 
there might be a theoretical difference between the objectives of the rationale it is argued 
that they are inextricably linked: it is the discipline that creates the deterrence.24  
South African legal commentators differ on the importance of the deterrence rationale. 
Naudé argues that the exclusionary rule is mainly there to prevent or deter the violation of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.25 This, he claims, will ensure that the police and 
prosecution will act with due regard of a person’s civil liberties and ensure adherence to due 
processes. The rationale will also ensure that the courts act according to their constitutional 
duty and contribute to upholding of constitutional principles which govern the criminal 
justice system.26 Ally argues that in order for exclusion to serve as an effective deterrent, a 
constitutional violation must necessarily lead to exclusion, which leaves no room for 
discretion. However, since section 35(5) leaves a court with discretion when considering 
whether exclusion would be unfair or detrimental to the administration of justice, he 
concludes, this rationale is not determinative of the admissibility assessment under section 
35(5).27  
Section 35(5) should be interpreted with all three of the primary rationales in mind. Factual 
circumstances may arise which require aspects of section 35(5) to be interpreted with a 
                                                          
19 Elkins v US 364 US 206 (1960) at 217-220; Shanks 1983 Tulane LR 648 at 679.    
20 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) at 920: “By refusing to admit evidence gained 
as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instil in those particular investigating officers, or in their 
future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of the accused.”; see in general Heffernan 
1989 Wisconsin LR 1193-1254. 
21 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 712. 
22 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 41; see also Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 712.  
23 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 42. 
24 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 42. 
25 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 181. 
26 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 181; see also S v Melani 1996 (1) SACR 141(E); S v Malefo 1998 (1) SACR 127 (WLD). 
27 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 41. 
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deterrence foremost in mind. Deterrence would not however be the only basis upon which 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be excluded: the discretionary test in section 
35(5) is still the starting point.28 Thus regardless of deterrence, unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence must be excluded, if it will render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to 
the administration of justice.29 Deterrence is not dependent on the certainty of exclusion.  
2.1.3 Real evidence and the deterrence rationale 
The South African courts in certain circumstances, when determining the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence, premise the application of the exclusionary 
remedy on the deterrence rationale. Pillay30  states a case in point. In the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the appellant disputed the admissibility of real evidence (money) discovered by the 
police in her home. The appellant alleged that the police had gained knowledge of the 
location of the money by means of having illegally monitored her telephone conversations. 
The prosecution conceded that the order to monitor the appellant’s phone was obtained on 
false information contained in the supporting affidavit. The Court ruled that the monitoring 
order was illegally sought and obtained. The subsequent monitoring by the police was 
therefore illegal.31 The Court concluded that the real evidence was discovered as a result of 
a violation of the following constitutional rights. First, her right to privacy32  was violated in 
that her private communications were illegally monitored following the unlawful tapping of 
her telephone line. Secondly, her right to remain silent and her right against self-
incrimination33 were breached in that she was induced to make the statement that led to 
the finding of the money in the ceiling of her house.34 The Court reasoned that inclusion of 
the evidence might create an incentive for law enforcement agents to disregard accused 
persons’ constitutional rights.35 Creating such an incentive, particularly where a judicial 
                                                          
28 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 182. 
29 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 182. 
30 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA).  
31 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para77. 
32 Section 14. 
33 Section 35(3)(h) and (j). 
34 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 85. 
35 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 98. 
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officer has been misled, was highly undesirable and admission would have harmed the 
administration of justice.36 
2.1.4 Weaknesses of the deterrent principle 
The appropriateness of the deterrence rationale to the exclusionary rule has been 
interrogated by various legal commentators who identified specific inherent anomalies and 
weaknesses. I have only provided an overview of these comments. It should be noted that 
the weight of the different arguments are sometimes influenced by the particular 
procedures followed by the relevant jurisdiction. For example, the admissibility of evidence 
in the United States of America is determined during pre-trial motions, and the fact finders 
(the jury) are then never exposed to inadmissible evidence.37  
(a) Risk of Detection, Conviction and Punishment  
The idea behind using the exclusionary rule as a deterrent is that law enforcement officers 
are penalised by excluding otherwise reliable evidence.38 Legal commentators argue that 
the exclusionary rule appears to be subject to serious limitations in its direct deterrent 
effect upon improper police behaviour,39 meaning that in practice this objective is not 
achieved. The arguments are the following.  
Firstly, judgments of suppression of evidence invariably have no direct impact on police 
behaviour, as it normally does not directly sanction the policeman’s illegal or 
unconstitutional conduct.40 Similarly, the exclusionary rule does not hold any indirect 
sanction for the police officer, as the constitutional violation would in all likelihood have 
                                                          
36 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 94. 
37 See Chapter 5 at para 2.1. 
38 People v Defore 242 NY 13, 21, 150 NE 585 (1926); US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) at 942; Herring v US 555 US  
    135 (2009); Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 720.  
39 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 183; Dripps 2010 Fordham Urban LJ 743 at 747-748: “If police seize evidence in  
    violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence may be suppressed, but the police are not automatically  
    fined or jailed.”; see also Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 720; Mellifont The derivative imperative at 45; 
    Kamisar 2003 Harvard JL and Public Policy 119 at 129-130. 
   40 Dripps 2010 Fordham Urban LJ 743; Heffernan and Lovely 1991 University of Michigan JL Reform 311 at 325;             
Cann and Egbert 1980 Howard LJ 299 at 309: “Obviously, where the object of the police activity is not a trial 
and conviction there is no motivation to fear the consequences of the exclusionary rule.” Oaks 1970 
University of Chicago LR 665 at 726: “So far as police command control is concerned, it is a notorious fact 
that police are rarely, if ever, disciplined by their superiors merely because they have been guilty of illegal 
behaviour that caused evidence to be suppressed.”  
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been forgotten by the time he learns of the judgment.41 The criticism that exclusion has no 
direct impact on police behaviour had been challenged by Kamisar. He argues that logic and 
intuition suggests that the exclusion of evidence and the concomitant loss of convictions 
must have some impact on the behaviour of police.42 One can reasonably assume that 
deterrence in the context of the exclusionary rule should have the same impact on police 
misconduct, as the rules of criminal law have on the conduct of the general public.43 
However, the exclusionary rule does not directly inflict punishment on the police. It cannot 
be expected that the exclusionary rule should deter the police the way criminal law is 
supposed to work.44 The exclusionary rule influences the police -being members of a police 
department- by systemic deterrence through its institutional compliance with constitutional 
standards.45 In certain situations the exclusion of evidence serves as a basis for performance 
evaluations which in turn cause police to increase skills levels which will ensure compliance 
with and respect for the law.46 The argument that exclusion does not hold any indirect 
sanction does not have the same weight in South Africa. In Mthembu47 the court found that 
the police treated the law with contempt and should be held accountable. The Court 
referred the judgment to the policemen’s supervisors and prosecuting authorities for 
possible disciplinary, administrative or criminal action.48  
Secondly, the exclusionary rule as deterrent is limited to official actions which involve the 
procurement of evidence during investigations which result in a prosecution.49 Evidence 
illegally and unconstitutionally obtained and not presented as evidence during a criminal 
trial, will therefore not be detected and penalised through the exclusionary rule. This means 
that the exclusionary rule will not operate in the critical pre-trial area of law enforcement.50 
                                                          
41 Kaplan 1974 Stanford LR 1027 at 1032-1033; Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 725. 
42 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 183; Kamisar 1987 Michigan LR 1. 
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 Kamisar 1987 Michigan LR 1 at 34 fn 147; see also Dripps 2010 Fordham Urban LJ 743; Heffernan and Lovely 
1991 University of Michigan JL Reform 311 at 360; Stewart 1983 Columbia LR 1365 at 1389; Oaks 1970  
University of Chicago LR 665 at 720. 
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2008 SACJ 168 at 183; S v Soci 1998 (2) SACR 275 E. 
46 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 183. 
47 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA). 
48 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 39. 
49 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) at 953; Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968) at 9-10; Stewart 1983 Columbia LR 1365  at 
1395; Shanks 1983 Tulane LR 648 at 654; Dripps 2010 Fordham Urban LJ 743; Kamisar 2003 Harvard JL and  
Public Policy 119 at 126.  
50 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 46; Eleuteri v Richman 26 NJ 506 141 A 2d 46; Elkins v US 364 US 206  
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In these circumstances the court is precluded from detecting and pronouncing on the 
unlawful conduct of law enforcement agents. This is unlikely to happen in South Africa. The 
courts are more likely to detect and pronounce on this issue of exclusion, because the 
question of admissibility is dealt with during a trial-within-a-trial. In Mthembu51the court 
excluded evidence obtained during investigation from an accomplice who was not 
prosecuted. In casu the prosecution failed to lead evidence regarding the circumstances 
under which the identification parade was held. Notwithstanding, the Court detected 
several irregularities regarding the identification parade, such as that the appellant was 
denied the presence of a legal representative; the persons in the parade did not have similar 
or related physical characteristics; they were not similarly dressed; they were not told that 
the suspect might not be present; and there was no evidence that the witness made a prior 
identification which bore any resemblance to the appellant.   
Thirdly, an investigating officer would not be deterred if his misconduct would not lead to 
the gathering and subsequent inclusion of incriminating evidence against an accused.52 The 
exclusionary rule will therefore not be able to deter illegal conduct such as physical abuses 
of persons in custody, unnecessary destruction of property, illegal detentions (unless 
leading to the acquisition of evidence), taking or soliciting bribes and extorting money on 
threats of arrest or other sanctions.53 This weakness is not applicable in South Africa. In 
Mthembu54 the police assaulted the accomplice. As a result of the torture the accomplice 
pointed out the location of incriminating evidence. The accomplice was not prosecuted but 
his testimony and the evidence pointed out was used against the accused. The Court 
through exclusion deterred the physical abuses by the police even when the evidence 
obtained was not included in the trial of the accomplice.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    (1960) 218; Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 720-721: “On the subject of conduct likely to result  
    in prosecution, Chief Justice Warren made the point succinctly in Terry v Ohio: ‘Regardless of  
    how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police,’ it is  
    powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest 
    in prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.”;  
    Kaplan 1974 Stanford LR 1027 at 1031. 
51 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA). 
52 Stewart 1983 Columbia LR 1365 at 1389. 
53 Stewart 1983 Columbia LR 1365 at 1389; Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 720; see also in general  
    Dripps 2010 Fordham Urban LJ 743; Heffernan and Lovely 1991 University of Michigan JL Reform 311 at 360. 
54 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA). 
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The different procedures applicable in South Africa, gainsays much of the criticism originally 
formulated in the United States of America. Based on Mthembu the criticisms do not carry 
much weight and our courts are more likely to detect and pronounce on the issue than in 
the United States of America.   
(b) Minimal correctional effect against the errant policeman 
The impact of the exclusionary rule is misplaced being the second argument against 
deterrence as rationale and impacts negatively on the prosecutor who is attempting to 
obtain a conviction by seeking illegally obtained evidence to be admitted into evidence.55 
The implication is that the police transgress but the prosecutor is the one who suffers.  
The question asked is to what extent this criticism also applies in South Africa. Here in South 
Africa the independence of the South African Police Services is guaranteed and entrenched 
in section 205 of the Constitution. The police have been established by national legislation 
which also provides for its powers and functions.56 The legislative mandates of the police 
are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and 
secure the inhabitants of the Republic as well as their property, furthermore to uphold and 
enforce the law.57 Section 179 of the Constitution also provides for a single, independent 
National Prosecuting Authority. The National Prosecuting Authority has also been 
established in terms of the national legislation.58 The powers of the prosecuting authority 
are to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state and perform functions incidental 
thereto.59 In short, these departments are independent and have different functions 
because of their legislative mandates. 
Because exclusion of evidence occurs during the criminal trial it appears to be most effective 
in deterring prosecutors from acting illegally. In Coetzee60 the court opined that there are 
inherent dangers to the prosecution if they act contrary to undertakings not to prosecute, in 
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    Oaks 1970 University of Chicago LR 665 at 727; Cann and Egbert 1980 Howard LJ 299 at 310: “[T]he rule  
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56 South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995.  
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return for the testimony of a suspect. The prosecutor should avoid any prejudice to the 
accused who previously agreed to be a witness. The implication is that the accused becomes 
a witness against himself.  Any statements obtained from such a witness on the undertaking 
not to prosecute with a subsequent breach of the undertaking will result in the exclusion of 
the statement.61  
It is arguable that the exclusionary rule has minimal correctional effect against the errant 
policeman.62 Legal commentators however discourage this narrow traditional view of 
deterrence and rather prefer to highlight its educative63 and preventative effect instead of 
immediate deterrence.64   
(c) Competing norms of behaviour 
The third argument against deterrence as rationale is that the impact of the exclusionary 
rule on police misconduct during the procurement of evidence is neutralised by the 
prevailing competing formal norms of police behaviour.65 Even where the prosecution was 
unsuccessful due to the illegal action of the police the implicated police officer is assured of 
the support of his colleagues so long as he acted in conformity with administrative norms of 
the police organisation.66 The exclusionary rule, although focused on the misbehaviour of 
the policeman, is oblivious to the fact that the policeman approaches his job with 
departmental expectations and with the fear of departmental discipline for improper 
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conduct.67 These rewards and sanctions are more important to the officer than the threat of 
exclusion of illegally or unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The court’s judicial review 
through the exclusionary rule thus does not seem to have the reforming effect over 
competing norms of police behaviour. In Leon68 the court noted that the operation of the 
rule is not suited to achieve this reforming effect because the judicial review focuses on the 
individual police actions and not the department’s policy.69 Put differently, the 
department’s policy does not form part of the merits of the review and consequently cannot 
be claimed to have been reviewed.70 The weight of this criticism might depend on the 
jurisdiction involved. In South Africa, because the question of admissibility is dealt with 
during a trial-within-a-trial, chances are that our courts would detect and pronounce on a 
state department’s policy or systemic abuse.71     
2.2      Remedial imperative 
2.2.1 Objectives of remedial imperative  
The “remedial imperative” seeks to vindicate constitutional rights.72 Adherents of this 
rationale claim that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is not only to deter unconstitutional 
conduct by law enforcement, but to serve as an effective internal tool for maintaining and 
protecting the value system as a whole.73  The rationale is based on the idea that courts 
should uphold the rights of accused persons during criminal trials.74 The primary goal of the 
criminal justice system is not only to secure a conviction but to secure a conviction in terms 
of procedures which duly and properly acknowledge the rights of an accused during pre-
trial, trial and post-trial proceedings.75 The principle demands that state institutions respect 
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the accused’s rights and consequently should not be allowed to benefit from the use of 
evidence which was obtained illegally.76   
As a result the remedial imperative or protective principle requires that evidence be 
excluded where an accused has not been treated in accordance with particular minimal 
standards.77 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe state further that it is a fallacy to regard a 
criminal justice system as a due process system, if the remedies to rights violations are 
limited to civil litigation and to institute criminal charges.78 Unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence should therefore be excluded as its admission might compromise more important 
constitutional values.79 There are exceptions where the limitations clause (section 36) may 
be applicable. The exclusionary remedy in this way ensures legality in the criminal process.80  
2.2.2 Due process principle 
The exclusionary rule is founded in the concept of due process, which rejects the idea that 
there must be ascertainment of truth at any cost.81 An effective due process system must 
have the inherent ability to correct abuses within the system.82 
In South Africa the weight of the argument that the exclusionary rule is founded in the 
concept of due process is weakened because of the relationship between liberty deprivation 
and criminal procedure rights. The due process jurisprudence originated in the United States 
of America and was subsequently applied in Canada. In both jurisdictions the due process 
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provision has residual operation in the sphere of criminal justice rights (fair trial rights).83 
The fair trial rights are considered to be merely illustrative of the generic due process rights. 
The due process rights would operate independently and would inform the ambit of all the 
criminal justice rights including fair trial rights.84 This approach is not followed in South 
Africa. The South African courts emphasised the difference between criminal procedure 
rights (section 35) and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty (section 12).85 The 
due process right is separated from the right to a fair trial on the grounds that they apply to 
different stages of the criminal process. The right to a fair trial is broader than the list of 
specific fair trial rights listed in section 35(3).86 The courts have in effect rejected recourse to 
other general rights, including due process rights, once a matter has been understood to 
raise fair trial questions.87  
2.2.3 The principle of self-correction 
Advocates of this principle argue that the efficiency of a due process system is dependent 
on the ability to correct abuses, when established, within the system.88 A legal system 
without the ability to correct its own abuses cannot claim to require due process, as it 
would then tolerate a violation of exactly those rights which it claims to guarantee.89 
2.2.4 Real evidence and the remedial imperative 
The remedial imperative was applied in Tandwa90 when the Supreme Court of Appeal 
excluded unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. The court a quo admitted real evidence 
(money and an AK47 rifle) even though the statements accompanying the pointing out were 
inadmissible. On appeal the accused argued that the real evidence should have been 
excluded because it was unconstitutionally obtained and that admitting it rendered his trial 
unfair or otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice. In casu the police’s conduct 
violated a number of the accused’s constitutional rights, including the right to freedom and 
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security of the person, the right to be free from all forms of violence, the right not to be 
treated or punished in a cruel inhuman or degrading way and as a detained person, the right 
not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence 
against the accused.91 The Court found that the rights violations were severe since they 
stemmed from the deliberate and flagrant conduct of the police.92 There was a high degree 
of prejudice because of the close causal connection between the violation and the 
subsequent discovery of the real evidence. The Court held that section 35(5) is designed to 
protect individuals from police conduct in breach of fundamental rights.93 Inclusion of the 
real evidence in the circumstances of this case would render the provision nugatory. The 
evidence was accordingly excluded. 
2.3     Judicial integrity 
Proponents of this rationale reject the notion that deterrence is the sole objective in 
excluding illegally obtained evidence.94 The key feature of the rationale is the desire to 
protect the integrity of the justice system. The court’s power to give effect to the rationale 
lies in the implied powers of the court to protect the integrity of its processes.95 
2.3.1 Origin of judicial integrity rationale 
In the 1928 judgment of Olmstead,96 the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
and applied the judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule. The Court reasoned that 
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if evidence was unconstitutionally obtained by the prosecution the court should not allow 
such iniquities to succeed.97 Brandeis J, although dissenting, commented that in a 
government of laws the existence of government will be compromised if it fails to observe 
the law itself.98  
The imperative of judicial integrity has in subsequent judgments been identified as an 
important rationale of the exclusionary rule.99 In McNabb100 the court held that a conviction 
resting on evidence secured through flagrant disregard of the accused’s rights cannot be 
allowed to stand without making the courts accomplices in wilful disregard of the law.  
In Mapp101 the focus of the court was on judicial integrity. The Court reasoned that the 
admission of illegally obtained evidence adversely affected the integrity of the criminal 
justice system. Accordingly the Court rejected the notion that the exclusionary rule was 
optional in state criminal trials. Evidence obtained in breach of fundamental rights was now 
also constitutionally inadmissible in state courts.102 Shanks argue that the judgment appears 
to have been a reaction to the perceived inability of other methods to effectively deter 
official constitutional violations.103 
2.3.2 Objectives of judicial integrity rationale 
The objective of the judicial integrity rationale is to protect the court’s integrity. Two 
concerns are tightly interwoven in this rationale. The first concern is that the courts 
maintain “clean hands” by not accepting evidence obtained by “dirty ones”.104 The second 
concern is that exclusion of such evidence will garner public praise as an effort by the courts 
to guarantee constitutional rights.105 The rationale requires the public interests of convicting 
the guilty and maintaining the court processes to be weighed against each other.106  
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In Hena107 the court considered both these concerns. The Court observed that judges on 
taking office take an oath of office in which they swear or affirm to uphold and protect the 
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it and to administer justice to all persons 
alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the law, including the 
Constitution. Judges should guard against condoning the abuse and or violation of 
constitutional abuses at the risk of eroding fundamental rights through lack of vigilance or 
for the sake of expediency.108 In casu the Court recognised that the central role of the 
judiciary is the protection of the integrity of the criminal justice system and the promotion 
of acceptable investigation techniques.109 The evidence in Hena revealed that the police 
abdicated their obligations by allowing street committees to perform their duties. It was 
unacceptable and patently unlawful as there was no political or administrative oversight and 
consequently the court was not surprised that the street committee resorted to taking the 
law into its own hands. To ignore this systemic abuse, the Court stated, both undermine the 
Constitution and the integrity of the criminal justice system and consequently justified the 
exclusion of the tainted evidence.110 
The educative functions of court judgments feature prominently when they exclude 
evidence that would taint the integrity of the criminal justice system. Chaskalson P, 
emphasised, in Makwanyane,111 the educative function of the courts when he stated that 
the act of exclusion serves the purpose of fashioning public opinion, rather than expressing 
it. The courts should not merely have regard to public opinion, but should mould people’s 
thinking to accept constitutional norms. The duty of the courts involves educating the public 
that the Constitution is not a set of high-minded values designed to protect criminals, but is 
in fact a shield which protects all citizens from official abuse. This the court should achieve 
by communicating in plain language understandable to the common man. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    the Constitution; (b) courts will act contrary to their oath to uphold the Constitution; (c) courts will indirectly  
    encourage violations of the Constitution; and (d) courts will somehow create the impression that they  
    sanction or condone unconstitutional conduct by government officials.”; Shanks 1983 Tulane LR 648 at 654; 
    Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 24; see also Ally Constitutional exclusion at 44. 
106 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 40.  
107 S v Hena 2006 (2) SACR 33 (SE). 
108 S v Hena 2006 (2) SACR 33 (SE) at 41-42. 
109 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 36. 
110 S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE); see also the discussion in Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of  
     evidence at 192; Shanks 1983 Tulane LR 648 at 653.    
111 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 CC at 431. 
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Tandwa112 is an example of a judgment where the court endeavoured to shape public 
opinion. The Supreme Court of Appeal noted the struggle in our society to maintain law and 
order against the scourge of violent crime and corruption. The difference between the law 
breakers and those committed to the administration of justice is the commitment of the 
latter to moral ends and moral means. The Court was emphatic that the attainment of a just 
order can only be achieved through means that have moral authority.113 This authority will 
be forfeited if the courts condone coercion and violence and other corrupt means in 
sustaining order. The Court ruled that the exclusionary rule is designed to protect 
individuals from police methods which violate fundamental rights. The evidence was 
excluded, as inclusion would have made the exclusionary rule nugatory. 
 2.3.3 Real evidence and the judicial integrity rationale 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu114 applied the judicial integrity rationale to justify 
exclusion of real evidence unconstitutionally obtained. In casu the discovery of the real 
evidence (a Hilux motor vehicle and a metal box) followed the torturing of the witness. The 
issue in the case was whether this real evidence must be excluded because of the torture. 
The Court observed that the absolute prohibition on the use of torture in both our law and 
in international law demands that any evidence which is obtained as a result of torture must 
be excluded in any proceedings. The Court reasoned that if it were to admit the evidence 
the court would have to ignore the manner (torture) in which the police obtained this 
evidence. This amounts to involving the judicial process in moral defilement which would 
compromise the integrity of the judicial process and dishonour the administration of justice. 
The real evidence was for these reasons considered to be inadmissible.  
Similarly in Tandwa115 the Supreme Court of Appeal excluded real evidence (bucket and 
money). The Court found that the real evidence was tainted with the blemish of the police 
brutality. The Court ruled that the trial was rendered unfair because the evidence was 
obtained by means which violated basic civilised injunctions against assault and compulsion. 
Inclusion of the evidence would mean that the court was associating itself with barbarous 
                                                          
112 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA). 
113 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) at para 121. 
114 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA). 
115 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA). 
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and unacceptable conduct. The evidence was accordingly considered not fit for reception.116 
Likewise in Pillay117 the Supreme Court of Appeal excluded the derivative (real) evidence on 
the ground that inclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.118 The 
appellant was given an undertaking that she would not be charged if she were to provide 
incriminating information against the accused. Notwithstanding, the appellant was later 
criminally prosecuted. The Court reasoned that the conduct by the prosecution adversely 
affected the administration of justice.   
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 The South African courts have applied the exclusionary rule in diverse circumstances when 
considering the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. In the judgments 
cited the courts did not favour one single rationale. The courts have not been as bold as the 
judiciary in the United States of America who has exclusively elected the deterrence 
principle to justify the imposition of the exclusionary rule. Legal commentators such as 
Davies support the approach of not selecting one rationale in preference to the other 
two.119 Instead one should examine the common theme that runs through each of the three 
rationales: that of taking rights seriously.  When done, the evidence obtained in violation of 
a right ought generally to be excluded. By excluding the evidence the integrity of the justice 
system remains protected. The alternative is that rights are not taken seriously and in this 
situation none of the above principles can justify the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution.120  
In the following chapter I consider the application of section 35(5) in South Africa. 
                                                          
116 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) at para 89 and 120. 
117 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA). 
118 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 96. 
119 Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21.  
120 Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 32. 
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  CHAPTER 3 
THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED REAL EVIDENCE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA  
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The common law approach, prior to the enactment of section 35(5) of the Constitution, to 
the issue of illegally obtained evidence, was that  relevant evidence was admissible in both  
criminal and civil cases and that the court should not concern itself with how it was 
obtained.1 This approach in criminal proceedings was however substantially changed with 
the introduction of section 35(5).2 Section 35(5) envisages the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional manner.3  
The Constitutional Court have to date not had the opportunity to interpret section 35(5). On 
the other hand legal scholars, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the high courts have made 
meaningful contributions towards its interpretation.4 Common principles emerged that 
guide the courts in determining which factors may play a role in determining whether 
evidence should be received or excluded.  
Section 35(5) reads as follows:  
“Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise 
be detrimental to the administration of justice.” 
                                                          
1 Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 308. 
2 Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 308.   
3 S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N) at 489 and 499-502; De Vos 2011 TSAR 268 at 270: “It follows that  
   evidence that has been obtained improperly or illegally - but not in violation of a constitutional right - must  
   still be determined in accordance with the common law discretion.”; De Vos 2009 SACJ 433; Zeffertt and  
   Paizes Law of evidence at 505; Ally 2011 Stell LR 376-395; Naudé 2008 SAPL 166-183; Ally 2010 SALJ 694 at  
   712; Du Toit et al  Criminal procedure at 95-98O; Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 308; Terblanche et al  
   Evidence at 192. 
4 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 181-259; Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 24-98H  
  to 24-9N-12; Steytler Constitutional criminal procedure at 33-40; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 625- 
  641; Ally 2010 CILSA 239; Naudé 2009 SAPL 506; S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA); S v Tandwa 2008 (1)  
  SACR 613 (SCA); S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA); S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA); Director of Public  
  Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljoen 2005 (1) SACR 505 (SCA).   
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An analysis of the wording contains a constitutional directive to exclude unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence only where admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair, or 
would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. Clearly, therefore, section 
35(5) provides for two exclusionary legs, which are couched in broad language and requires 
a value judgment to be made.5 The two-stage admissibility analysis consists of, what Ally has 
described as, a substantive phase (whether the disputed evidence should either be received 
or excluded) and a threshold phase (jurisdictional facts).6 
In this chapter, I first, consider the procedural aspects associated with an application under 
section 35(5). In this regard procedural matters such as the location of the threshold burden 
and the appropriateness of the trial-within-a-trial procedure for purposes of an admissibility 
assessment are considered.  
Second, I explore the threshold requirements under section 35(5). They are the following: 
(a) The beneficiaries of the exclusionary remedy; (b) the meaning of the phrase “obtained in 
a manner,” or the so-called causal connection requirement; (c) whether “standing” is a 
threshold requirement under section 35(5); and (d) the violation of a constitutional right.  A 
court must be satisfied that all threshold requirements have been satisfied before it 
proceeds to consider the substantive phase of section 35(5).   
Third, I explore the substantive phase of the exclusionary rule. The substantive phase 
introduces a so-called two-legged test:7 firstly, a determination of whether the admission 
would render the trial unfair or, secondly, whether it would otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice. I follow an approach which keeps the two legs of the test separate. 
It is trite law that in determining whether admission would have one of the two identified 
consequences, a court is required to make a value judgment by considering all the 
circumstances.8 For now, though, I consider some of the more important factors in so far as 
they apply to the more specific question of admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real 
evidence.  
                                                          
5 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 92; see also Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 806. 
6 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376; see also Ally Constitutional exclusion at 210-211.    
7 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 505; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 225; S v  
  Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA); S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N).  
8 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 92; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 215. 
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Finally, I examine how the courts apply the principles, identified in both the procedural and 
substantive phase, to real evidence and in the process consider the procedures set out in 
the provisions of section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.  
 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
2.1 Threshold burden 
The Constitution does not expressly mention where the onus is located in section 35(5) 
challenges. The Constitutional Court has yet to decide on the incidence and nature of the 
onus, if any, in section 35(5) applications. The views expressed in case law and the opinions 
of legal scholars cannot be reconciled. Two dominant views exist. The one view advocates 
that the accused should bear the burden of showing that the impugned evidence had been 
obtained through a violation of rights and the other view suggests that the prosecution 
should bear the burden of proving that the disputed evidence has been obtained in a 
constitutional manner, once the accused alleges that it has been unconstitutionally 
obtained.  
In Viljoen9 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that an accused bears the burden of showing 
that the police violated his constitutional rights in the process of procuring the evidence.10 
In casu the accused was charged with the murder of his wife. The accused challenged the 
admissibility of the evidence on the basis that the police failed to inform him of his right to 
remain silent when taking his confession.  This breach, the accused argued, constituted a 
violation of his rights which rendered the information disclosed during these proceedings 
inadmissible.  The Supreme Court of Appeal held that an accused should be informed of the 
right to remain silent because failure to inform an uninformed accused might result in an 
unfair trial. Unfairness, the Court reasoned, in the trial process will only result where the 
accused proved that he did not have knowledge of the right to remain silent and therefore 
had to be informed thereof. In casu the accused failed to place any such evidence before 
                                                          
9  Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljoen 2005 (1) SACR 505 (SCA). 
10 See also Ally 2010 SACJ 22 at 29; S v Zwayi 1997 (2) SACR 772 (CKH); Quozeleni v Minister of Law and Order  
   1994 (3) SA 625 (EC). 
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the court and the Court accordingly ruled that the court a quo erred in holding that the right 
to remain silent had been violated.  
Mgcina11 is an example of the view that the prosecution bears the burden, which arises only 
when the accused first raises the issue of admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. In casu the accused lodged an appeal against his conviction on two charges of 
murder and five counts of attempted murder. The convictions were secured by the 
prosecution by tendering a confession obtained from the accused while participating in a 
pointing out. The accused on appeal challenged the admissibility of the confession on two 
grounds. Relevant to this discussion is the argument that the confession should be excluded 
because the evidence had been obtained in breach of his right to legal representation. The 
accused argued that the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt 
that the appellant was properly informed of the right to legal representation.12 The Court 
noted the conflicting approaches in previous judgments delivered on this point, but 
favoured the approach in Brown.13  The Court reasoned that for the same reasons that the 
onus at common law rested on the state to prove that a confession was freely and 
voluntarily made, so was it on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
constitutional rights of the accused were not infringed during the evidence gathering 
phase.14 The Court concluded that the prosecution bears the burden of proof that the 
evidence had been obtained in a constitutional manner.15 In other words, once the accused 
asserts that the evidence had been unconstitutionally obtained and challenged the 
admissibility thereof, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the evidence had 
been obtained in a constitutional manner.16 The Court added that the prosecution need not 
disprove the violation of each and every conceivable fundamental right. It is only in cases 
when the accused alleges that the evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed one or 
more of those rights, that the prosecution must prove the converse beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This decision appears to have substantial support amongst legal commentators.17  
                                                          
11 S v Mgcina 2007 (1) SACR 82 (T). 
12 S v Mgcina 2007 (1) SACR 82 (T) at 93-94. 
13 S v Brown 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC). 
14 S v Mgcina 2007 (1) SACR 82 (T) at 95; see also Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 757-760. 
15 S v Mgcina 2007 (1) SACR 82 (T) at 95. 
16 S v Mgcina 2007 (1) SACR 82 (T) at 95-96; see also Woolman and Bishop Constitutional law at 52-66. 
17 Woolman and Bishop Constitutional law  at 52-66; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at  
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I prefer the approach of Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, which to a limited extent 
accommodates the Mgcina ruling. The authors propose the following approach: First the 
accused should allege but need not prove that his constitutional rights have been infringed 
and that it should be excluded. Secondly, the court should, during the trial-within-a-trial, 
bear in mind the distinction between facts pertaining to admissibility as opposed to matters 
of judgment and value (weight of evidence). Failure by the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt any factual matter will result in the accused receiving the benefit of the 
doubt. Thirdly, when the factual findings have been made and the court is satisfied that the 
evidence has been obtained in violation of the accused constitutional rights, it is required to 
exercise its discretion and make a value judgment on whether admission would result in one 
of the consequences identified in section 35(5).18 Based on this approach there can be no 
question of an onus in respect of this decision. Viljoen should be rejected because (a) the 
language of section 35(5) does not saddle an accused with the onus and, (b) the accused’s 
right to remain silent, the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of 
innocence could be violated if the accused should bear the onus to prove that his rights 
have been violated.19 
A review of the case law reveals that the nature of the evidence, more importantly whether 
it is real evidence or not, does not affect the issue of onus.20 
2.2 Trial-within-a-trial 
It is trite law that aspects of admissibility and criminal liability are separated by our courts. A 
trial-within-a-trial should be held when considering section 35(5) applications.21 The trial-
within-a-trial procedure ensures that: (a) an accused can testify freely about admissibility 
and not expose himself to cross-examination concerning his guilt and (b) the accused is 
entitled to a decision whether evidence is included before testifying in the main trial.22 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    260; Ally 2010 SACJ 22 at 31- 37. 
18 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 260-261. 
19 Ally 2010 SACJ 22 at 35. 
20 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA); S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA); S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 
(SCA); see in general S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N); S v Gumede 1998 (5) BCLR 530 (D); S v Soci 1998 (2) 
SACR 275 (E).  
21 Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 811; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 259;  
     Ally 2012 PELJ 476 at 480; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 761; S v Lachman 2010 (2) SACR 52 (SCA); S 
    v Dos Santos 2010 (2) SACR 382 (SCA). 
22 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 259. 
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certain cases the failure to hold the trial-within-a-trial to determine admissibility of evidence 
can amount to a failure of justice, which renders the trial unfair.23 However there are 
situations where the admissibility of evidence can be determined without holding a trial-
within-a-trial. For example, in Hena24 the parties agreed that the issue will be dealt with in 
argument because the facts upon which the issue was to be decided were common cause.25 
A ruling on admissibility in a trial-within-a-trial is interlocutory and could be reviewed at the 
end of the trial in light of all the evidence.26      
Our courts have on several occasions been requested to determine questions of 
admissibility by means of pre-trial motion on the grounds that a warrant authorising the 
search and seizure of evidence be declared invalid27 or that legislation authorising a search 
be declared unconstitutional.28  The Constitutional Court has however discouraged the use 
of the pre-trial remedy if it circumvents the application of section 35(5) or if it delays 
finalisation of criminal proceedings.29 
 
3. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS 
The jurisdictional facts (threshold requirements) in section 35(5) must be satisfied before 
the exclusionary remedy becomes operative.30 In addition the threshold requirements serve 
the purpose of separating irrelevant claims from those that have merit. Failure to establish 
the threshold requirements will result in the court refusing to consider the actual test for 
the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, which is to consider whether 
admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.31 In other words a court must be satisfied that all threshold 
                                                          
23 S v Nzweli 2001 (2) SACR 361 (C). 
24 S v Hena 2006 (2) SACR 33 (SE). 
25 See in general Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 259; Zeffertt and Paizes Law of  
    evidence at 760-761; Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 811. 
26 S v Tsotestsi (3) 2003 (2) SACR 648 at 654. 
27 Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SACR 468 (D); Bennett v Minister of Safety and  
   Security 2006 (1) SACR 523 (T). 
28 Magajane v Chairperson, North-West Gambling Board 2006 (2) SACR 447 (CC).  
29 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions  
    2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 13; see also Ally 2012 PELJ 476 at 482. 
30 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 376. 
31 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 216; Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 376. 
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requirements have been satisfied before it proceeds to consider the substantive phase of 
section 35(5).   
The threshold requirements explored below are:  
(a) The beneficiaries of the exclusionary remedy, more specifically the rights of a 
suspect who is neither arrested nor detained;  
(b) The meaning of the phrase “obtained in a manner,” also referred to as the 
“causal connection requirement.” In this regard the nature of the link between the 
impugned evidence and the initial constitutional infringement is discussed;  
(c) The so-called standing aspect. Under the concept standing I examine the 
important question whether an accused should demonstrate that his rights have 
been infringed before he may challenge the admissibility of the impugned evidence. 
Moreover, I consider the issue whether an accused can rely on the exclusionary 
remedy in the event that the rights of an innocent third party and not the rights of 
the accused, during the evidence gathering process, have been infringed.  
(d) The violation of a constitutional right. Police conduct authorised by statute or 
common law can limit an accused fundamental rights. In this regard section 36(1) of 
the Constitution can assist in determining the constitutional validity of the impugned 
statute or common law.32       
3.1 Beneficiary of exclusionary remedy 
Section 35 mentions only the accused, detained or arrested persons.33 Therefore, in terms 
of a literal interpretation, these are the only persons protected by its provisions.34 The 
position of a person suspected of having committed a crime, but who is neither arrested nor 
detained, has been a source of conflicting judgments.   
  
                                                          
32 S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N) at 500; see also in general Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of 
evidence at 223-224.  
33 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 240; Naudé 2009 SAPL at 506. 
34 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 240. 
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3.1.1 The “suspect” and section 35 rights 
Our case law and legal authorities is conflicted on whether the rights in section 35 should be 
interpreted to also include protection for a suspect,35 or whether suspects are sufficiently 
protected by other legal principles36 or whether a “detained suspect” is entitled to be 
informed about certain rights.37  
Sebejan38 is an example of a case where the court stated that section 35 should be 
interpreted to also include protection for a suspect. In casu the accused challenged the 
admissibility of a statement made when she was a suspect. The question the Court had to 
determine was whether constitutional rights operated to the benefit of the accused at the 
time she made the statement to the police and whether such rights were breached.39 The 
Court found that the police considered the accused to be a suspect, but failed to inform her 
of her rights when interacting with her. The Court stated that the conduct to deceive a 
suspect into believing that she is a witness when in actual fact evidence is being sought to 
strengthen the State’s case is “inimical to a fair pre-trial procedure.” In these circumstances 
the Court found that suspects are entitled to fair pre-trial procedures (fair trial rights).40 The 
fair pre-trial procedures must be similar to the rights which would accrue to an accused 
when arrested,41 including the rights to remain silent and to be informed of the right to 
remain silent; the right to be informed of the consequences of making any statement; the 
right to choose and to consult with a legal practitioner and to be informed of this right 
promptly.42 The judgment is authority that a suspect should be afforded general trial 
rights.43 The police should inform a suspect of his constitutional rights, if there was a clear 
indication of criminal involvement, at a stage before the police first interacted with a 
suspect.44 The rights information (manner in which the protective cautions are extended to 
                                                          
35 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W). 
36 S v Mthethwa 2004 (1) SACR 449 (E); S v Van der Merwe 1998 1 SACR 194 (O); S v Ndlovu 1997 (12) BCLR  
    1785 (N); Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 507.  
37 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 507. 
38 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W); see also S v Orrie 2005 (1) SACR 63 (C). 
39 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W) at 628. 
40 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W) at 636. 
41 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W) at 635; Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 256. 
42 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W) at 636. 
43 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 509.   
44 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 510. 
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a suspect, as well as the nature and extent of the protective cautions) should be similar to 
the position of an accused when detained or arrested.45 
Khan46 is an example of a case where the court found that section 35 is not applicable to 
suspects.47 In essence the Court argued that suspects are sufficiently protected by other 
legal principles. The Court declined to follow Sebejan after it embarked on an extensive 
review of authority on the question of whether a person was entitled to be informed of his 
or her rights prior to the point of arrest.48 The Court concluded that the rights of “suspects” 
are adequately catered for by the application of the well-established provisions of the 
Judges' Rules.49 The Court agreed with the opinion in Van der Merwe50 that when a person is 
warned in terms of the Judges’ Rules, expression is given to the provisions of the 
Constitution.51 The Court reasoned that forcing the police to warn the accused both in terms 
of the Judge’s Rules and his constitutional rights would result in an imbalance between the 
need to protect the rights of the person and the importance of not impeding the police in 
evidence gathering.52 On the facts of the case the Court held that the police possessed a 
reasonable apprehension that the appellant was a suspect and were accordingly obliged to 
caution the appellant in terms of the Judges' Rules, before the appellant proceeded to 
produce the drugs in question. Evidence obtained without informing the accused of his 
rights in terms of the Judges’ Rules could be excluded on the grounds of fairness and public 
policy. The court may also exclude, in terms of its common law discretion, improperly and 
illegally obtained evidence.53 
In certain situations an indication of criminal involvement only arises after the police have 
started to interact with someone who felt obliged to respond to questioning. In these 
instances, it has been argued, a suspect, like in the case of a detainee, is entitled to be 
                                                          
45 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 510. 
46 S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP).  
47 See also S v Ngwenya 1998 (2) SACR 503 (W); S v Mathebula 1997 (1) SACR 10 (W); S v Ndlovu 1997 (12)  
    BCLR 1785 (N); S v Mthethwa 2004 (1) SACR 449 (E) at 453; S v Van der Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (O). 
48 S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP). 
49 See in general the following sources about Judges’ Rules: Du Toit et al Criminal procedure Appendix A; S v  
   Mthethwa 2004 (1) SACR 449 (E); S v Van der Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (O); S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 
   (KZP).  
50 S v Van der Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (O). 
51 S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP) at 484. 
52 S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP) at 481–484; see also S v Ndlovu 1997 (12) BCLR 1785 (N) at 1792. 
53 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 510. 
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warned of his rights, even though he was strictly speaking not detained at the time of 
questioning.54  In other words, the argument goes, a suspect that can be seen as a detained 
person, will be entitled to the relevant rights.55  Detention is then determinative of the 
moment when a person should be warned. This approach requires a broad interpretation of 
“detention.” The central question is how one determines whether a suspect has been 
detained or not. Generally detention refers to physical constraint but it can be argued that a 
person is in lawful custody if there has been a deprivation of freedom.56 The Supreme Court 
in Canada held that the concept detained includes “psychological detention” of a person 
which consists of three elements: first, police must have directed a demand to a person; 
then, there should be compliance with the demand which results to a deprivation of liberty 
and finally, the person must believe that he has no other choice but to comply.57 Ally agrees 
that “informational duties” arise from the moment the police embark on an adversarial 
relationship with suspects.58 In South Africa an adversarial relationship will not necessarily 
emerge when an individual becomes a suspect but arises when an individual is required to 
establish or disprove the existence of evidence linking them to the crime.59 The test is 
objective. A relevant factor would be the subjective belief of the person suspected of 
wrongdoing at the time of his interaction with the police.60  
3.1.2 Definition of the word “suspect”  
Most of the authorities support the notion that although section 35 does not refer to 
suspects, some suspects should also have the section 35-rights.61 The question arises who is 
a suspect and who is not.   
A number of definitions have been formulated to describe what a suspect is or could be.62 
Generally a person is a suspect if investigators, in the absence of certain proof, believe that 
                                                          
54 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 -507. 
55 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506.    
56 Steytler Constitutional criminal procedure at 151-152; Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 507. 
57 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 152. 
58 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 259. 
59 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 150; Naudé 2009 SAPL 506. 
60 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506.  
61 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W); S v Orrie 2005 (1) SACR 63 (C); Naudé 2009 SAPL 506; Steytler  
   Constitutional criminal procedure at 151-152; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 152. 
62 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W); S v Khan 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP). 
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he is guilty of a crime or a person suspected of a crime or offence.63 The High Court in 
Sebejan stated that the belief can be “some apprehension” that a person might have 
committed an offence, and that person’s version of events is mistrusted.64 On the other 
hand the courts in Khan65 and Ndlovu66 held that the phrase “some apprehension” sets the 
standard too low and suggested the adoption of an objective element such as a “reasonable 
apprehension.”67 In other words a mere suspicion does not mean that the police have 
enough suspicion.68 It is submitted that the phrase “reasonable apprehension” introduces 
an element of objectivity to the enquiry as to whether the person is in fact a suspect at the 
relevant time.69 A subjective and objective analysis should be employed to ascertain 
whether the person is a suspect.70 The subjective belief of the police should be taken into 
account when determining whether the accused is a suspect.71  
3.1.3 Conclusion  
Common to all the approaches referred to above is that “suspects” are entitled to “certain 
protective cautions” in certain circumstances.72 The distinction between the approaches in 
Sebejan and Khan is the manner in which the protective cautions are extended to a suspect, 
as well as the nature and extent of the protective cautions.73 I prefer the approach followed 
in Sebejan. Ally submits that this view is closely aligned to an “emerging consensus of 
opinion” developing in national and international jurisprudence.74 The approach is also 
significantly aligned to a contextual and purposive interpretation of the provisions of section 
35.75 Based on this, the suspect must be informed of his fair trial rights and must be 
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permitted to rely on the due process rights, in the Bill of Rights.76 Comparative law supports 
the view that a “detained suspect” should accordingly be informed of his fair trial rights.77  
Naudé, even before the judgment in Khan was delivered, argued that the definition of the 
concept suspect in Sebejan is broad and leaves a number of unanswered questions.78 He 
reasoned that the police may become suspicious of a person only after interacting with him. 
Because the interaction between the police and the individual can take place under a variety 
of circumstances, it becomes necessary to further refine the meaning of a “suspect.” The 
definition of the concept suspect in Khan and Ndlovu is therefore preferred. A person is a 
suspect if, in the absence of certain proof, investigators have a reasonable apprehension 
that he is guilty of a crime or a person suspected of a crime or offence.  
3.2 Connection requirement  
The phrase “obtained in a manner” in section 35(5) is also known as the connection 
requirement.79 The wording implies that an adequate link should be established between 
the constitutional breach and the manner of discovery of the evidence.80  In the absence of 
such a link the accused would not be entitled to the exclusionary remedy.81 The issue is in 
essence a factual question. The courts have not been consistent in their approach when 
interpreting this phrase. The diverse interpretational approaches resulted in uncertainty 
about the nature of the link that is required in section 35(5).    
In Orrie82 the High Court adopted a literal approach and held that a strict or direct causal 
link is required. A causal connection requirement entails that an accused must demonstrate 
that the impugned evidence would not have been discovered “but for” the violation. In casu 
the defence challenged the admissibility of a statement, initially on the grounds that the 
accused had not been made aware that he was a suspect and had not been warned of his 
rights to silence and legal representation. The defence later argued that the accused’s 
                                                          
76 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 151. 
77 With respect to Canadian law, see R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; R v 
Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 4. 
78 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506 at 512. 
79 S v Zuko [2009] 4 All SA 89 (E) at para 18; Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 377. 
80 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 34; S v Mark 2001(1) SACR 572 (C); Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 
621; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 163; Currie and De Waal The bill of rights at 806. 
81 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 163. 
82 S v Orrie 2005 (1) SACR 63 (C). 
47 
 
attitude was that if he had known that he was a suspect and had rights, he would have 
remained silent and waited for his lawyer. In determining whether evidence has been 
“obtained in a manner” the Court considered determinative the fact that applicant did not 
establish that he would have relied on the assistance of state provided counsel. The Court 
noted the Canadian authority83 and stated that no causal link was required between the 
rights violation and the evidence sought to be excluded. The Canadian Supreme Court 
stated that the nexus requirement under section 24(2) was satisfied for purposes of the 
exclusionary remedy as long as the rights violation occurred in the course of obtaining the 
evidence. The Court instead elected not to follow the Canadian authority.84 The Court 
preferred a more practical approach to the exclusionary rule, one in which the keystone is 
the right to a fair trial. The Court found that failure to warn the accused of his rights did not 
lead to him suffering any prejudice. The accused therefore did not perform the 
incriminatory acts “but for” a preceding constitutional violation. The evidence was ruled 
admissible. The conclusion of the Court in effect rejected a liberal approach to the 
interpretation of the phrase.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay85 and the High Court decisions of Soci86 and Ntlantsi87  
are examples of cases that rejected a causal connection requirement as determinative and 
confirmed that the “connection” requirement may be satisfied by a temporal connection 
between the violation and the discovery of the evidence. A temporal sequence implies that 
the unconstitutionally obtained evidence was obtained after the rights violation. In other 
words the violation and the procurement of the evidence are to be part of the same 
transaction.88  
In Pillay the court applied a temporal sequence analysis when determining the nature of the 
link. The Court held that the accused’s right to remain silent and her right against self-
incrimination were infringed, in that she was unfairly induced to make the statement that 
led to the finding of the money in the ceiling of her house.89  The rights violations and the 
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discovery of the evidence was therefore part of the same chain of events (transaction). The 
temporal sequence analysis was approved and applied when the Court held that the 
incriminating statement resulted in the discovery of the money.90 The Court confirmed that 
a temporal sequence requirement was sufficient for the purposes of this threshold 
requirement. 
If the violation is part of a chain of events that results in discovery of evidence the important 
question is whether there is a sufficient connection between violation and discovery, which 
is a factual issue. In these situations either the temporal or causal connection must be 
strong; meaning the connection between the violations and the discovery of the evidence 
should not be too remote.91 Mthembu92 provides an example. The state witness in this case 
was arrested and subsequently tortured by the police when in custody. As a result of the 
torture the witness made a statement which implicated the appellant in the theft of the 
motor vehicle and robbery. The torture also resulted in the discovery of the metal box 
linking the accused to the robbery.93 The witness four years later testified in the case against 
the accused. Before he testified the court warned the witness in terms of section 204 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The section 204 warning is given to a witness by the 
court when he will be required by the prosecution to answer questions which may 
incriminate him. The witness thereafter voluntarily testified.94 The issue the Court had to 
determine was whether the evidence obtained during the section 204 procedure had been 
“obtained” within the meaning of section 35(5). The Court found that there was a strong 
causal connection between discovery of the real evidence and the infringement. In this 
regard the Court accepted that the discoveries were made as a result of the police torture.95 
In respect of the statement the Court found that there was a temporal connection because 
the witness made the statement immediately after the discovery of the real evidence at his 
home following the torture. It is arguable that at this stage of the court’s analysis it is clear 
that a strong causal, as well as temporal connection existed.96 The subsequent voluntary 
testimony of the witness the Court found did not detract from the fact that information 
                                                          
90 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 85. 
91 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 354. 
92 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA). 
93 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA) at para 10. 
94 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA) at para 22. 
95 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA) at para 33. 
96 Ally 2011 2 Stell LR 376 at 385.  
49 
 
contained in the statement, the vehicle and metal box, was obtained through torture.97 This 
reasoning confirms that despite the lapse of time between the making of the statement and 
the testimony in court, the causal link between the torture and the testimony was not 
interrupted. The witness must have been aware, having been warned in terms of section 
204 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that any deviation would have serious consequences for 
him. The Court also observed from the witness’ testimony that even after the lapse of four 
years the fearsome and traumatic effects of the torture were still with him. The Court 
accepted that there was an inextricable link between the torture and the nature of the 
evidence tendered in court and that the torture has stained the evidence irredeemably.98 
The Court found that the temporal connection was weak, because of the lapse of time 
between the making of the statement and the testimony in court. A strong causal 
connection existed between the breach violation and the testimony of the witness. 
Although the witness testified voluntarily it could not separate the contents of his testimony 
from the torture.99  
The approach in Pillay and Mthembu is to be preferred. Evidence obtained after a right 
infringement will be viewed as being obtained as a result of the infringement - unless the 
accused had an opportunity to reassert his rights and break the chain of events.100 The 
temporal sequence or causal connection test, whichever is the stronger, should be applied 
to satisfy the threshold requirement. This approach is aligned to a purposive and generous 
approach when interpreting the phrase “obtained in a manner.”  
3.3 So-called standing requirement 
In the United States of America101 and Canada102 an accused must have “standing” before he 
can rely on the exclusionary rule.103 Standing requires that the rights of the accused himself 
have to be infringed, with the result that infringement of a third person’s rights will not give 
the accused standing to object to the admissibility of evidence. Put differently, an accused is 
disqualified to challenge the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at his trial 
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only when the rights of a third person had been infringed. The question arises whether 
there is such a restriction as far as section 35(5) is concerned.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu104 for the first time since the advent of the 
Constitution dealt with the issue of standing.105 In the present case the Court embraced a 
liberal (broad) approach to the question of standing. In casu the police assaulted an 
accomplice and as a result obtained incriminating evidence against the accused. The 
accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence of the accomplice. The Court held that 
a plain reading of section 35(5) requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence from any person, not only from an accused.106 The Court reasoned that there was 
no principle or policy not to interpret the provision in this way.   Against this background the 
Court held that the evidence of a third party may accordingly be excluded in applications 
under section 35(5), where the circumstances of the case warrant it.107 The Court concluded 
that the effect that admission of the disputed evidence would have on the integrity of the 
criminal justice system ultimately informs the standing requirement.108   
Legal commentators seem opposed to read in a standing requirement to the provisions of 
section 35(5) and also favour a broad threshold requirement.109 A broad approach suggests 
that an accused should have standing, if he can show that the violation of a third party’s 
rights has an impact on his own fundamental rights.110 This approach is in line with a 
generous and purposive interpretation of the provisions of section 35(5). A restrictive 
interpretation should not be followed for the following reasons: the exclusionary remedy is 
not necessarily a personal remedy,111 the narrow interpretation of the threshold 
requirement has the potential to frustrate the efficiency of the exclusionary remedy 
provided by section 35(5),112 the words of the provision do not support such a restrictive 
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interpretation,113 the liberal interpretation of standing is closely aligned to the primary 
rationales of the section 35(5)114 and the exclusionary remedy’s goal of protecting the 
fundamental rights of the accused cannot be achieved if section 35(5) is activated in respect 
of evidence obtained only in breach of the constitutional right of an accused. 115     
3.4 Violation of the Right 
The police are empowered and authorised in terms of certain statutes and common law 
rules to obtain evidence from the accused.116 Police conduct in terms of these statutes 
might violate one or more of the accused fundamental rights. These fundamental rights 
include the rights to privacy, dignity, not to be tortured and conceivably even the right to 
property.117 In certain situations an accused may allege that the evidence was 
unconstitutionally obtained, even if in terms of such a statute, in that the statute amounts 
to a constitutionally impermissible limitation. The so-called limitation clause analysis is 
applicable when the constitutional validity of the authoritive rule of law is challenged. As far 
as the “limitation clause analysis” affects the current research, the legal principles are the 
same, regardless of the right involved. Therefore, I only discuss the right to privacy in some 
detail in this thesis, because much of the comparative work had been informed by issues of 
privacy, specifically in the context of search and seizure.  
Evidence obtained when the law was considered valid would not necessarily be excluded if 
the court declares that law unconstitutional.118 A court must, under section 35(5), in the 
exercise of its discretion, consider the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. It 
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follows that a finding of invalidity of a law under section 36(1) must be taken into account 
by the court when it later exercises its discretion under section 35(5).119 
A two-stage analysis is employed to determine whether a right to privacy has been infringed 
upon. The first stage involves interpreting the right, which involves a determination of the 
scope of the right and whether the law or conduct breached the right. The second stage is 
triggered only if there is an infringement. A court must then consider whether the law or 
conduct is justifiable under the limitation clause.120 
3.4.1 Legitimate expectation of privacy 
The first stage involves understanding the values underpinning the right and the 
fundamental interest it protects.121 The constitutional right to privacy is confined to aspects 
of a person’s life or to conduct in regard to which a legitimate expectation of privacy is 
held.122 Both individuals and juristic persons are entitled to the right to privacy.123 A 
legitimate expectation means that one must have a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognise as objectively reasonable.124 Based on this police conduct 
would be unlawful if it is contrary to an accused’s subjective expectation to privacy and is 
objectively unreasonable.125 The subjective component recognises that the right to privacy 
cannot be claimed if the party consented to having his privacy invaded.  
To assess the objective aspect of privacy has proven to be problematic. The Constitutional 
Court gave some guidance in this regard when it held that the scope of the right to privacy 
has to be demarcated with reference to the rights of others and the interest of the 
community.126 As a result of the application of this guideline our courts have identified three 
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areas where an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy would usually be regarded by 
society as objectively reasonable. The three areas of privacy are: those relating to the body 
of the person;127 those relating to a territorial or spatial aspect;128 and those occurring in the 
context of communication or information transfer.129  
3.4.2  Limitation 
During the second stage a court must consider whether the violation of the right is 
justifiable in terms of the limitation clause of the Constitution.130 The justification analysis is 
undertaken on the basis of the criteria in section 36 which provides: 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including;– 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
The limitation must meet two requirements to satisfy section 36. First, it must constitute a law of 
general application and, secondly, it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.131  
(a)  Law of general application    
The “law of general application” requirement arises from an important principle of the rule 
of law, namely that rules should be stated in a clear and accessible manner.132 The limitation 
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must be authorised by a law that must be of general application. The Constitutional Court 
has not given a complete interpretation of the phrase “law of general application” but has 
explicitly set out what would qualify as a law of general application.  For example original 
and delegated legislation, the common law and exercises of executive rule-making all 
constitute a law of general application provided that they are accessible and precise.133 
Unauthorised administrative action134 and employment practices by companies135 do not 
satisfy this requirement, and therefore does not qualify as a law of general application.  
If an applicant establishes that the rule limiting the right is a law of general application,  a 
court must under section 36 determine whether the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including those listed in section 36(1). 
This has become known as the proportionality test. 
(b) Proportionality test 
The proportionality enquiry is a factual one.136 As noted above, section 36(1) sets out factors 
relevant to the limitations enquiry: (1) the nature of the right; (2) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (3) the nature and extent of the limitation; (4) there must be 
proportionality between the limitation and its purpose; and (5) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose.137   
The factors listed in section 36 are not exhaustive but are key considerations, to be used in 
conjunction with any other relevant factors, in the overall determination whether or not the 
limitation of a right is justifiable.138 The factors are simply indications in the overall 
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assessment whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.139 Once the assessment is done for 
all these factors involved, then only  must they be weighed up, but ultimately the section 36 
analysis is one of proportionality, which involves an assessment of competing values on a 
case-by-case basis.140 The factors are now discussed in what follows.  
The nature of the right 
The assessment of this factor considers the importance of the values that the right advances 
in the context in which it is sought to be applied.141 The important question asked in this 
enquiry is how important it is to protect this right from infringement given its nature. The 
Constitutional Court included the importance of the right as a factor to be considered 
alongside the nature of the right notwithstanding the fact that neither section 36(1) nor 
section 33 in the interim constitution contain the phrase “the nature and importance of the 
right.”142 Legal scholars argue that this implies that there is a hierarchy of rights in the 
Constitution meaning that the importance of the right will determine the stringency of the 
limitation test. This means that if right A is more important than right B it will always be 
given precedence over right B. Accordingly certain rights will be hard to justify infringing 
than others.143 Despite the use of the clause the courts have consistently rejected the 
notion of any such hierarchy of rights in the Constitution.144 The question which right should 
dominate over another is a fact-specific enquiry and the outcome will vary from case to 
case.145  
The importance of the purpose of limitation 
In Magajane146 the Court interpreted this factor to mean that a court must carefully review 
the public interest served by the statutory provision and determine the weight that this 
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purpose should carry in the proportionality review. If the state interest is not important the 
limitation will be unconstitutional regardless of the remainder of the enquiry.147 Protecting 
our society against the use of drugs through legislation has, in this instance, been held to be 
an important state interest.148  
Nature and extent of the limitation 
This factor involves an assessment of the effect of the limitation on the right itself. It 
assesses how the conduct or law limits the right and the extent to which the limitation 
curtails the enjoyment of the right.149 This inquiry invariably invites a cost-benefit 
analysis.150 In Mdyide151 the court held that the potential harm to the viability of the 
functioning of the Road Accident Fund should the “knowledge requirement” for 
condonation be introduced outweighs the possible negative impact of the provision in its 
present form.152 The Court found that the person’s right to access to the court had been 
limited; however it found that the limitation was justifiable.153  
The relationship between a limitation and the purpose of the limitation 
This factor is also referred to as the rational connection test.154 During the assessment of 
this factor the court considers whether the purpose of the limitation, regardless of 
importance, is reasonably related to the means used to achieve the purpose.155 The 
Constitutional Court has held that the use of a reverse onus provision that made the 
possession of drugs prima facie proof of trafficking was not rationally related to the stated 
objective, namely curbing the trafficking in narcotics.156 The Constitutional Court also held 
that prescription regulation in the Road Accident fund legislation was rationally connected 
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to a legitimate purpose of high public importance, namely the continued existence and 
maximum efficiency of a fund, for the compensation of people injured in road accidents.157 
Is the limitation chosen the least restrictive means, to achieve the purpose? 
This factor requires the court to determine whether some or other formulation would 
achieve the same purpose but infringe the right less.158 In other words the less restrictive 
means requirement necessitates considering other means that could be available.159  
In practice this enquiry to determine the least restrictive means has in South Africa caused 
an outcry from members of the legislature and the executives. This is what the courts have 
referred to as the fundamental problem of judicial review.160 The dilemma is whether it is 
proper for the courts to substitute their judgments as to what is reasonable and justifiable 
and necessary for that of an elected legislature.  
The courts should not only approve the least restrictive means. If so, the courts would limit 
the legislature’s choices, to those means which are the least restrictive of all possible 
means.161 This the Constitutional Court discouraged by holding that the least restrictive 
means test should not be used to limit the range of legislative choice in a specific area.162  
 
 4. SUBSTANTIVE PHASE  
The relationship between the two aspects of section 35(5), trial fairness and detriment to 
the administration of justice, have been considered by the courts and various legal scholars. 
It is generally accepted that the purpose of section 35(5) is principally one test, namely 
whether the admission of evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice.163 
The test relating to trial fairness is a specific manifestation of this broader test. The 
admission of evidence that would result in an unfair trial will also be detrimental to the 
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administration of justice.164 It is foreseen that the admission of evidence that would not 
render the trial unfair may be excluded because its inclusion could be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.165 However, section 35(5) involves two inquiries which should be 
kept separate, because rules applicable to the one are not necessarily applicable to the 
other.166  
As stated, a number of South African scholars have considered the interpretation and 
application of section 35(5). I refer to these authorities and sources and address the 
developments including considering comparative law sources which have not to date been 
explored. The various issues considered are dealt with by only referring to the most 
influential cases on the aspect, and not all of them.  
4.1 The first leg of the test in section 35(5): trial fairness 
Section 35(5) provides that a court must exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence if 
admission would render the trial unfair. As real evidence can also be obtained 
unconstitutionally, this provision applies equally to real evidence. 
Courts have a discretion when determining “trial fairness.” The discretion must be exercised 
after considering all the facts of the case, more specifically along fair trial principles.167 The 
court must take into account competing societal interests.168 Prominent though in the 
assessment is the public interest in protecting the fundamental rights of the accused.169  
In determining whether the admission of evidence will render a trial unfair the court will 
take into account the “nature of the evidence,” “nature of the right” and the “discoverability 
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analysis”. For now, though, I will consider only the “nature of the evidence” and 
“discoverability analysis” factors. 
4.1.1 The nature of the evidence 
(a) Real evidence and trial fairness 
When it comes to analysing the admission of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence the 
South African courts have adopted the Collins170 fair trial framework in order to determine 
whether admission of real evidence would render the trial unfair.171 In Collins the court held 
that unconstitutionally obtained real evidence “will rarely operate unfairly for that reason 
alone.”172 The ratio is that real evidence not only pre-existed the Charter breach but also 
exists irrespective thereof.  
 (b) Real evidence emanating from the accused and trial fairness      
Our courts have since the adoption of the Constitution employed the Collins fair trial test, 
which is closely aligned to the approach in Matemba.173 In instances where courts have to 
determine the admissibility of testimonial evidence, they excluded the evidence because it 
accepted that there is a need to protect the accused from improper self-incrimination.174 
Evidence of this nature was excluded as it tended to render the trial unfair: the evidence did 
not pre-exist the constitutional violation and it affected the right against self-incrimination 
as one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial.175  
Our courts have consistently since Matemba held that the privilege against self-
incrimination is confined to testimonial evidence and does not extend to real evidence 
emanating from an accused.176 As a result the courts found that the involuntary taking of 
DNA from the accused,177 a voice sample178 and fingerprints179 did not violate the right to 
self-incrimination and therefore would not have rendered the trial unfair.180     
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It seems as if the common law rule that no person may be compelled to supply evidence 
that incriminates him either before or during the trial survived the transition from pre to 
post constitution. However, in the dissenting judgment in Pillay the minority observed that 
the courts in Canada extended the trial fairness test.181 In Stillman182 the court reasoned 
that the compelled production of bodily parts is as great an invasion of the essence of the 
person as are compelled statements. Autoptic evidence obtained without consent or in the 
absence of statutory authorisation would therefore generally tend to affect the fairness of 
the trial. In order to reach this conclusion, the majority in Stillman extended the common-
law privilege against self-incrimination to include evidence of bodily substances from an 
accused. This Schwikkard and Van der Merwe refers to as the “Stillman modification”.183  
South African courts have been keen to follow section 24(2) judgments and the question is 
whether our courts should adopt the “Stillman modification” for purposes of section 35(5) 
when confronted with the admissibility of evidence of unconstitutionally obtained autoptic 
evidence. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe observe that the reliance on the “Stillman 
modification,” if confronted with the admissibility of evidence of unconstitutionally 
obtained bodily samples, for the purposes of section 35(5) “would be totally unnecessary 
and somewhat artificial.”184  The authors argue that the incorporation of the “Stillman 
modification” into our law would serve no purpose except to disturb the well-settled 
distinction between the self-incriminating testimonial evidence and real evidence obtained 
from the body of the accused. The authors argue that the drafters of section 35(5) had in 
mind that there would be unconstitutionally obtained evidence which if admitted would not 
render the trial unfair but which should be excluded as its inclusion would be detrimental to 
the administration of justice.185 Unconstitutionally obtained autoptic (bodily) evidence falls 
within the latter category. The fact that the impugned evidence is excluded because its 
admission would be detrimental to the administration of justice does not make the 
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protection of the accused’s body less worthy of protection.186 The minority opinion, in Pillay, 
on the point also expressed its reservations in our courts adopting the Stillman approach. 
The majority, as well as the minority found it difficult to see how real evidence, having an 
independent existence, can ever be said to render the trial unfair. The fact that our courts 
have not adopted the Stillman fair trial analysis is to be welcomed.187  
4.1.2 Discoverability analysis 
What has been discussed so far can be influenced by the following situation: if the discovery 
of the evidence is linked to the unconstitutional participation of the accused, the question 
of admissibility might be influenced by the fact that the evidence could have been 
discovered by lawful means.188 This is where the so-called “discoverability analysis” comes 
in. The focus of the discoverability analysis is to assess whether the prosecution had any 
means to procure the disputed evidence other than those used to obtain it.189    
4.2 Second leg of test in section 35(5): detriment to the administration of justice  
If the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would not render the trial unfair, 
such evidence must be excluded if inclusion would be detrimental to the administration of 
justice. It is through the public interest standard, that a court can ascertain whether the 
admission of the disputed evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice.190 
The public interest is determined by weighing and balancing the objectives of respect for 
the Bill of Rights (particularly by law enforcement) and respect for the judicial process 
(particularly by the man in the street).191 It is the only manner in which one can ascertain if 
the admission or exclusion of the disputed evidence would be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.192  
To achieve this balance of interests a court must consider “all the circumstances” when 
determining whether the admission of evidence would bring the administration of justice 
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into disrepute.193 Under the second leg of the admissibility analysis, the court should 
consider the seriousness of the constitutional infringement194 and the effect that exclusion 
may have on the integrity of the administration of justice.195  
4.2.1 Seriousness of the constitutional infringement  
A relevant consideration under this factor is the good faith conduct of the police. 
(a) Good faith conduct 
The good faith of police, as an exception to the exclusionary rule, have been considered and 
applied in foreign jurisdictions like Canada and the United States.196 Clear principles 
emanated from these jurisdictions concerning the extent and the role “good faith” can or 
should play in the exclusion of evidence, more specifically in the assessment of the 
seriousness of the constitutional violation.197 It is clear that the “good faith” exception 
relates to the manner in which the police officers obtain evidence during the evidence 
gathering phase. Central to this aspect are the questions whether: (a) section 35(5) allows a 
good faith exception; and (b) whether a subjective or an objective test should be applied to 
assess whether police acted in good faith. A central issue is whether South African courts 
should condone negligent or inadvertent infringements of the law by police as good faith 
violations. 
(i) Good faith exception and section 35(5) 
In Motloutsi,198 a case decided under the interim Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
pointed out that an exclusionary rule that allows for a good faith exception creates a risk of 
encouraging police officers to remain ignorant of the rights of suspects, accused and 
arrested persons.199 The Court articulated its reasoning as follows: 
“To hold otherwise would be to hold what to many people would be an absurd 
position, namely that the less a police officer knew about the Constitution and 
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indeed, of the law itself, the more likely he would be to have the evidence which 
he obtained in breach of the law (and/ or the Constitution) admitted in Court.”200  
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed in Motloutsi, the presence or absence of good 
faith on the part of police arose directly and indirectly in several cases decided under 
section 35(5). Guidance has been provided by the courts in determining whether police 
conduct should be classified as a bona fide violation. The courts classified violations as 
“good faith” when it was motivated by the need to promote public safety and urgency201 
and when the impropriety was neither flagrant nor deliberate.202 The distinction always only 
becomes meaningful within the grey area between clearly inadmissible and clearly 
admissible. It appears that constitutional violations termed “good faith” would weigh 
heavily in favour of the reception of evidence obtained as a result thereof.203 It follows that 
a finding of “good faith” may in certain cases deny the accused access to an exclusionary 
remedy.  
(ii) Good faith test  
Good faith must be reasonable and an objective test must be applied.204 Our courts have in 
judgments considered both objective and subjective factors to determine if police conduct 
could be termed as good faith. It appears that unconstitutional conduct of the police is 
mitigated if reasonable and justifiable,205 bona fide206 and subjectively honest conduct.207 
Conduct would also be termed good faith in situations when the police officers relied on an 
Act of Parliament that has not been declared unconstitutional, or a reported case of the 
highest court which has not been over-ruled,208 or the consent of the legal representatives 
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of the accused was obtained and that at the time no standard practice existed regarding the 
obtainment of consent in respect of the securing of the evidence.209 
4.2.2 The integrity of the administration of justice 
Relevant considerations under this factor are: the seriousness of the charges faced by the 
accused, importance of the evidence to secure a conviction and whether public opinion 
should be a weighty factor when this group is considered. 
(a) Seriousness of the charges 
Relevant under this factor, is the seriousness of the offence charged and not the seriousness 
of the crime committed.210 The seriousness of the charge can be determined by considering 
facts that are not in dispute in the main trial,211 facts in the trial-within-a-trial,212 and the 
allegations in the charge sheet.213 Due regard should be had, when considering this factor, 
to the presumption of innocence and the values sought to be protected by the fundamental 
rights.214 Our courts have delivered different outcomes in judgments because of the weight 
attributed to this factor.215 In Shongwe216 the court emphasised the seriousness of the 
charges factor and admitted the evidence.217 In Melani218 the court considered the 
seriousness of the charge factor but it was not determinative to its decision.219  Recently the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the more serious an offence, the greater likelihood that 
the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by its exclusion.220 The Court 
however qualified this observation by stating that this factor has the potential to “cut both 
ways” and will not always weigh in favour of admission.221 This means, depending on the 
circumstances that evidence which links an accused to serious charges may be excluded.222 
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It is submitted that an inflexible line of reasoning should not be determinative of the 
admissibility assessment.223 
(b) Importance of the evidence to secure conviction 
In Pillay the majority held that the “importance of the evidence to secure a conviction” 
should be considered under this factor in order to determine what effect the admission of 
the disputed evidence would have on the integrity of the criminal justice system.224 As a 
result the court excluded the evidence.  
The importance of the evidence to secure conviction is a factor that courts should consider 
in conjunction with the constitutional rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.225 In short, the 
“importance of the evidence” factor should not be determinative of the outcome of the 
admissibility assessment.   
(c) Public opinion  
The third group of factors are concerned with the public interest in crime control. South 
Africa suffers from a high crime rate which in turn makes it difficult for courts to maintain 
the balance set out in Mphala.226 The question is whether public opinion should play a role 
in the admissibility assessment and if so what weight should be attached to it.227   
The Constitutional Court stated that public opinion does play a role in exercising the 
discretion established by the Constitution, but courts should not be slaves to the “current 
mood” of society.228 Although public opinion is a factor to be considered the court should be 
mindful of the fact that it is entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights.229  
In practice the weight that should be attached to this factor has proven difficult to pin 
down. The majority in Pillay articulated the parameters within which a court should assess 
the community views or public opinion: Courts should take into account the views of the 
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reasonable person, who is usually the average person in the community whose current 
mood is reasonable.230 In contrast, the minority in Pillay, because of the high crime rate and 
the level of public confidence in the criminal justice system, was reluctant to stay within 
parameters set out in the majority judgment of Pillay. Public opinion was accorded far 
greater weight in determining whether admission of evidence would otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice.231   
The minority view in Pillay has been criticised. Although detriment to the administration of 
justice involves the exercise of a value judgement while considering the public views the 
assessment should not be equated with a consideration of public opinion.232 In Williams233 
Langa, Deputy President of the Constitutional Court, emphasised the importance of this 
distinction when he held that South African courts should interpret the Constitution in 
accordance with the "values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality,” instead of "contemporary standards of decency."234  In the 
light hereof, it is noteworthy that Langa DP intended to impress on South African courts that 
the prevailing public mood should occupy a subsidiary role in relation to the long-term 
values sought to be achieved by the Constitution.235 
 
5. PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF REAL EVIDENCE 
 In this part of the thesis I examine how the South African courts applied the principles 
identified when they interpreted the substantive and procedural phases of section 35(5), 
when determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. In the 
process I also consider the procedures provided by the provisions of section 37 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.   
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5.1 Conscription analysis 
The Supreme Court of Appeal delivered conflicting judgments when it applied the Collins 
trial framework to determine the admissibility of real evidence. S v M236 is an example of a 
case where the court determined the trial fairness requirement based on the real evidence 
divide. In casu the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine whether the inclusion of real 
evidence (a letter) in the trial of the accused complied with the notions of basic fairness as 
required in section 35 of the Constitution. The Court classified the letter as real evidence of 
a documentary nature because it did not conscript (incriminate) the accused against 
himself.237 The Court referred to the Canadian decision of Jacoy238 and held that, despite the 
letter being improperly obtained, its admission does not adversely affect the fairness of the 
trial of the appellant. In other words real evidence should be treated differently when 
compared to testimonial evidence.  Unconstitutionally obtained real evidence, it was 
asserted, would more readily be admitted than testimonial evidence.239 The reasoning was 
that real evidence does not conscript the accused against him in the manner of testimonial 
evidence. The Court assessed trial fairness without considering the manner in which 
evidence had been obtained.  
On the other hand in Pillay240 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the admission of real 
evidence could compromise trial fairness, if the accused had been compelled to participate 
in its creation or location and the evidence could not have been discovered by lawful 
means.241 The Court held that the issue of the impact of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence on trial fairness depended not on the nature of the evidence, whether real or 
testimonial, but rather on whether or not it would only have been found with the compelled 
assistance of the accused.242 The admission of conscriptive evidence would render the trial 
unfair.243 The concept conscription conveys the meaning of unconstitutional conduct by 
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police that unlawfully infringes the constitutional procedural rights of the accused, which 
causes him to participate in the production of the impugned evidence.244   
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Tandwa245 and Mthembu246 qualified the impact of Pillay. 
Section 35(5) envisages cases where evidence should be excluded for broad public policy 
reasons beyond fairness to the individual accused.247 The Supreme Court of Appeal in both 
decisions held that the admissibility of derivative real evidence will attract fair trial 
considerations on account of the manner in which it was obtained, specifically in the case of 
torture. The trial is rendered unfair because it introduces into the process of proof against 
the accused evidence obtained by means that violated basic civilised injunctions against 
assault and compulsion.248 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe suggest that Tandwa is not 
support that all derivative evidence must at all times attract fair trial considerations.249 The 
authors conclude that the Supreme Court of Appeal aligned itself with the Canadian 
approach (admissibility of derivative evidence) only insofar as the matter involved violence 
and not a mere technical violation of a guaranteed right.250   
As an intermediate conclusion it can be argued that our courts should follow Pillay as 
qualified by the reasoning in Tandwa. The Courts opted for a purposive interpretation of the 
right to a fair trial by seeking the goals this right seeks to achieve. 251 The judgments confirm 
that the primary purpose of trial fairness in section 35(5) is to ensure the prevention of 
conscription.252 It follows that trial fairness should not be determined on whether or not the 
evidence is real or testimonial but rather whether an accused had been compelled to 
incriminate himself. Central to the determination is the manner in which the evidence had 
been obtained. Our courts clearly distinguish between testimonial and real evidence in the 
context of the privilege against self-incrimination, but the same cannot be said about the 
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     and replaced it with ‘conscription’.” 
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enquiry into the fairness of the trial in terms of section 35(5) of the Constitution.253 The 
courts generally do not, under section 35(5) determinations, distinguish real evidence from 
other evidence such as testimonial evidence, nor have they considered why it might or 
should be different.   
5.2 Discoverability analysis 
The courts have applied both the discovery doctrine and the independent source doctrine 
when considering whether real evidence would- but for the unconstitutional conduct- have 
been discovered by lawful means. The exclusion of such evidence would generally be 
detrimental to the administration of justice.254 
5.2.1 Discoverability doctrine 
The inevitable discovery doctrine has its origin in the United States of America.255 The 
doctrine of inevitable discoverability provides that unconstitutionally obtained real evidence 
which would inevitably have been discovered by alternative means should not be excluded 
on the grounds of unfairness regardless of the information arising from the unconstitutional 
conduct.256 The court must consider whether the prosecution had any other means to 
procure the disputed evidence than those used to secure it.257 The rationale underlying this 
doctrine is that the state gains an unfair advantage it would not have had if this were not for 
the unconstitutional infringement. Excluding evidence after the employment of the 
discoverability analysis may result in the parties being restored to the position they were in 
immediately prior to the infringement (status quo ante).  
The Supreme Court of Appeal adopted the doctrine of inevitable discovery in the case of 
Pillay by relying on Canadian jurisprudence in this regard.258 Like the Canadian authorities 
the Court enquired if the evidence would have been discovered “but for” the violation.259 
                                                          
253 De Vos 2011 TSAR 268 at 276. 
254 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 258. 
255 Nix v Willaims 467 US 431 (1984). 
256 Ally 2005 SACJ 66 at 69; Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984) at 444; Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 169. 
257 Ally 2005 SACJ 66 at 69.    
258 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 169; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 330; R v Burlingham (1995) 28 CRR 2d 244 
(SCC); S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 89; S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA). 
259 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 89; R v Burlingham (1995) 28 CRR 2d 244 (SCC); R v Stillman  
     (1997) 42 CRR (2d) 180 (SCC).  
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The Court found that the illegal monitoring did not constitute conscriptive evidence and the 
money would have been found even in the absence of a violation of the constitutional rights 
of the accused.260 In the circumstances the Court held that admission of evidence would not 
render the trial unfair because the real evidence would inevitably have been discovered.261  
The doctrine has been criticised and problems in its application have been identified. The 
minority opinion in Pillay agreed with the majority but took the matter further. The minority 
warned that a rigid application of the discoverability doctrine might lead to astonishing 
consequences. The minority argued that most fair-minded people, especially in South Africa 
with its high crime rate, would baulk at the idea of a murderer being acquitted because 
evidence of the discovery of the victim’s concealed body would render the trial unfair.262 As 
a result the court stated that an inflexible approach should be discarded. Because of the 
inherent speculative nature of the doctrine, courts should demand a higher standard of 
proof especially because a constitutional breach has been perpetrated.263 As a result some 
legal commentators propose that the doctrine of inevitability to be substituted with the so-
called independent source doctrine.264  
5.2.2 Independent source doctrine 
The independent source doctrine entails that unconstitutionally discovered real evidence 
would be admissible, if subsequent to such discovery, the real evidence is seized through 
sources independent from the initial unconstitutional discovery.265  
Du Toit et al266 submitted that the independent source doctrine was applied in Lachman.267  
In this case the accused was convicted of corruption. The charge arose from his attempt to 
solicit a bribe from the state witness in return for sorting out his tax problems. On appeal 
the accused challenged the admissibility of evidence on two grounds. He argued that the 
cell phone was unlawfully seized and also that he was denied access to legal representation. 
                                                          
260 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 89-90. 
261 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) at para 90. 
262 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) minority judgment at para 8. 
263 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 180; see also Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 200. 
264 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 185; Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 98N- 5. 
265 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 196 and the sources referred to there; Murray v US 
487 US 533 (1988); Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 98N-5. 
266 Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 98N-5. 
267 S v Lachman 2010 (2) SACR 52 (SCA) at para 36; see also Du Toit et al Criminal procedure at 98N-5. 
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The Court firstly, accepted that even if the accused refused consent for the desk to be 
searched, the ultimate result, the retrieval of the cell phone, would still have followed.268 
Secondly, even if the accused retained an attorney one of two courses could have been 
adopted. One, he could have consented to the search, alternatively he may have insisted on 
the police obtaining a search warrant. Confronted with the latter option the police could 
either have conducted a search and seizure on the basis that they had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a search warrant would be issued should they apply therefore and that the 
delay in obtaining the warrant would defeat the object of the search. Alternatively, the 
police would have secured the accused’s desk and returned with a search warrant. The 
retrieval of the incriminating evidence (a cell phone) would therefore have been 
inevitable.269  
5.2.3 Conclusion 
I agree with the approach advocated by Du Toit et al. The authors prefer an approach that 
avoids dogmatic rules and which takes into account all the circumstances in addressing the 
two questions raised in section 35(5).270 They accept that evidence that satisfies the 
independent source doctrine would be less likely to render the trial unfair or be detrimental 
to the interest of justice, if received, than evidence that satisfies the less strict test favoured 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay. 
5.3 Real evidence obtained through compulsion 
The Supreme Court of Appeal have consistently held that compelling an accused to submit 
to the ascertainment of bodily features (real evidence) infringed neither the right to remain 
silent nor the right not to give self-incriminating evidence.271 It is generally accepted that the 
compulsory ascertainment of bodily features authorised by legislation such as chapter 3 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, can infringe on the accused fundamental rights: for 
example the accused has the right to his dignity, the right to freedom and security for the 
                                                          
268 S v Lachman 2010 (2) SACR 52 (SCA) at para 36. 
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person and to be free from all forms of violence, as well as the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity.272   
5.3.1 Objective reasonableness of a right 
The following discussion provides an example of how the courts determine objective 
reasonableness (legitimate expectation of a fundamental right) when faced with an 
application to obtain real evidence through compelled surgery under section 37 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. In Gaqa273 the court allowed a police official to use the necessary 
violence to search the accused including any necessary surgical procedure to be performed 
by a duly qualified medical doctor and paramedic to remove a bullet for the purpose of 
ballistic tests. The Court considered the bullet to be real evidence as opposed to the 
furnishing of oral or testimonial evidence by the accused. The surgical intervention to 
remove the bullet would therefore not violate the right to self-incrimination but would be a 
serious breach of the respondent’s human dignity and an act of State-sanctioned violence 
against his body. The Court stated that the order sought involves the limitation of rights and 
accepted that fundamental rights may be limited in terms of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution, if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society. The Court referred to Dotcom Trading274 and concluded that reasonableness of such 
surgical procedures depended on a case by case approach in which the individual’s interests 
in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interest in conducting the procedure.275 
The Court assessed the individual’s interest by considering the following factors: the bullet 
was lodged in the respondent’s leg (thigh) and the evidence of an orthopaedic surgeon who 
stated that the bullet could be removed through a simple procedure, whereby the 
respondent would have a general anesthetic. The police alleged that in the absence of the 
bullet there would be no other evidence against the respondent.276 These factors were 
weighed against the following public interests: The Court observed that a refusal of an order 
would result in a serious crime remaining unsolved, law enforcement would be stymied and 
justice diminished in the eyes of the public who have a direct and substantial interest in the 
                                                          
272 See respectively sections 10, 12(1)(c ) and 12(2). 
273 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C).  
274 Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty)Ltd t/a Live Africa Network News v The Honourable Mr Justice King NO 2000 (4) 
     ALL SA 128 (C ). 
275 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C); Winston v Lee 470 US 753 (1985). 
276 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 659. 
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resolution of such crime. Although the intrusion was substantial, the Court concluded that 
the community interest must prevail in this case. Because the Court found that the interest 
of society overshadowed the interest of the accused the Court ordered the removal of the 
bullet.277 On the other hand the court in Xaba278  refused to give a similar order. Although 
the facts in Xaba were similar to Gaqa the court did not consider itself bound by Gaqa. The 
Court did not comment on the Gaqa’s analysis of reaching a balance between the interests 
of the individual and the interests of the community. However, the Court emphasised that 
the answer to this complex problem of reaching a balance between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of the community in having crimes solved by using surgical 
intervention posed by similar cases like this should be dealt with by the legislature.279 
 5.3.2 Law of general application 
Under section 36(1) a law of general application can validly limit a right in the Bill of Rights.  Sections 36B 
and C, and 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, are examples of a law of general 
application which authorises the police to obtain (through compulsion, if necessary) a 
person’s fingerprints,280 a blood sample,281 a voice sample;282 or to take part in an 
identification parade.283 The question arises whether the procedures in section 37 sanctions 
the violence necessary to ascertain bodily evidence. 
 The discussion of the cases Gaqa and Xaba above also casts light on the current issue. In 
Gaqa284 the applicant sought an order to have a bullet surgically removed for the purpose of 
ballistic tests. The respondent contended that there was no statutory or common-law 
authorisation for the relief sought. The Court opined that both sections 27 and section 
37(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, permit the violence necessary to remove the 
bullet.285  Section 27 provides that a police official who may lawfully search any person may 
use such force as may be reasonable and necessary to overcome any resistance against such 
                                                          
277 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 659. 
278 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
279 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D) at 714-715. 
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force. The Court found that section 27 permitted police to use any reasonable force to 
conduct a search. The facts of the case will of course determine the force required for the 
search.286 The Court further stated that section 37(1)(c) authorise a police official to take 
such steps as he may deem necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any person 
has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or appearance. 
The Court accepted that a bullet was clearly not a mark, characteristic or distinguishing 
feature of the body but a policeman may take the necessary steps to determine whether 
the body shows the bullet – a “condition or appearance” – which may be linked to the 
murder weapon.287 The Court further held that the police have a constitutional duty in 
terms of section 205(3) of the Constitution to investigate crimes. The police would be 
hamstrung in fulfilling this constitutional duty without the bullet. In short, the Court held 
that sections 27 and 37 were laws of general application as required by the limitation 
clause.  
The court in Xaba,288 in similar circumstances to those in Gaqa, opined that the conclusions 
reached there are clearly wrong and declined to follow them. The Court, in Xaba, concluded 
that section 27 and 37(1)(c) did not permit a police official to use the necessary violence to 
obtain the surgical removal of a bullet. The Court held that a search of a person in section 27 
was not meant to include a surgical operation under general anaesthetic to remove an 
object from the body of a person. The Court reasoned that: (a) the usual meaning of search 
of a person did not include performing surgeries, (b) the police official to whom powers 
were given in the various circumstances got them regardless of whether or not he was 
qualified to do what was contemplated and the legislature would not have vested in a 
layman the power to perform surgery, and (c) because section 37 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act prohibited a police official from taking a blood sample and the legislature would hardly 
have forbidden this if it intended to allow him to remove a bullet in the way contemplated 
in this case.289 The Court concluded that since the police may not search a person by 
operating on his body the police cannot use the reasonable force authorised by section 27. 
Since the police may not delegate the power to search, the police may not ask a doctor to 
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do this in his stead. As a result the  search warrant that authorises the police officer to 
search, in doing so does not authorise such surgical intervention, nor could it.  
The Court considered the provisions of section 37(1)(c) by stating that its construction must 
be read in the context of section 37(2)(a). Section 37(1)(c) was not meant to empower a 
police official to himself engage in surgery neither to take a blood sample.290 Section 37(1) 
(c) was also not intended to give the police the power to delegate to a medical practitioner 
to perform an operation on the accused as it is section 37(2)(a) which deals with police 
empowerment of a medically qualified person and not section 37(1)(c). Section 37(2)(a) 
empowers any registered medical practitioner to do things if requested thereto by any 
police official. If so requested the medical practitioner may take such steps including the 
taking of a blood sample, as may be deemed necessary in order to ascertain whether the 
body of any person referred to has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or 
shows any condition or appearance. The range of steps which may be deemed necessary 
does not include the surgical removal of a bullet under general anaesthetic. The Court 
reasoned that the legislature did not intend this because of its repeated use of the 
expression “including the taking of a blood sample” in section 37. The Court concluded that 
the legislature indicated that only the limited surgery involved in a taking blood sample was 
to be included and not the steps which could be deemed to include the more far reaching 
surgery contemplated in this case.291   
 
6.  SUMMARY  
The following principles discussed in this chapter are clear and need no further attention: 
that a trial-within-a-trial should be held when considering section 35(5) applications, 
whether standing is a requirement under section 35(5) and the good faith conduct of the 
police as a factor to determine the seriousness of the constitutional violation.  
The following principles are still subject to differences of opinion, or where value could be 
added with the comparative perspective that is to follow, whether as far as the principles 
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themselves are concerned, or merely in their practical application: incidence and nature of 
the onus, section 35 should be interpreted to also include protection for a suspect who is 
neither arrested nor detained, meaning of concept suspect, the nature of the link required 
by the words “obtained in a manner”, the factors a court must consider in the substantive 
phase of section 35(5): the “nature of the evidence;” “discoverability analysis,” “nature of 
the right,” the seriousness of the charges, importance of the evidence to secure conviction 
and current mood of society and lastly, the constitutionality of section 37 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.    
 In chapter 4, I consider the exclusionary rule jurisprudence in Canada. The interpretation 
and application of section 24(2) of the Charter is explored and specifically the approach 
adopted by the courts in determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real 
evidence.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE UNDER 
SECTION 24(2) OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 35(5) of the South African Constitution and section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter 
are couched in strikingly similar terms.1 It is therefore not strange that South African courts 
consider Canadian section 24(2) jurisprudence when making determinations under section 
35(5).2 In this chapter a comparative analysis is undertaken to, determine which principles 
Canadian courts employ under the exclusionary remedy and to identify the pitfalls South 
African courts should avoid under section 35(5) applications.            
Prior to the adoption of the Charter there was no rule of law or judicial discretion to exclude 
evidence because of the improper or illegal method by which it was obtained.3 The general 
rule of admissibility was that all relevant, probative and reliable evidence would be 
admitted in court.4 The rationale was that the purpose of a criminal trial was not to assess 
whether the police officers acted legally but rather whether the accused acted illegally. It 
was accordingly considered appropriate that the illegality of an officer’s conduct is to be 
addressed in other legal proceedings.  The common law inclusionary rule effectively 
prevented the courts from dissociating themselves from the police illegal conduct in 
criminal trials.5   
                                                          
1 Ally 2010 SACJ 22 at 23; S v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N).   
2 Naudé 2008 SACJ 168 at 170; see also Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljoen [2005] 2 All SA 355 
(SCA): The court followed the Collins approach that an accused bears the burden of showing on a balance of 
probabilities that the police violated his or her Charter rights; S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA): The 
Supreme Court of Appeal adopted the doctrine of inevitable discovery by referring to Canadian case law; S v 
Soci 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E): The court adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of section 35(5); S 
v Naidoo 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N): The court remarked that a few cases have been decided in respect of 
section 35(5) and therefore it is useful to consider Canadian decisions  because it is closely modeled on 
section 24(2) of the Charter. 
3 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 201. 
4 Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 541; Hogg Constitutional law at 41-2. 
5 Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 587. 
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The Law Reform Commission of Canada in 1975 recommended an amendment to the 
Canadian Evidence Act to include a judicial discretion excluding illegally obtained evidence.6 
The recommendation was ignored and never implemented. The most stinging criticism 
against the common law inclusionary rule came from the 1981 Macdonald Commission.7  
The Macdonald Commission concluded that it is the attitude of the senior officers in the 
police to regard the absence of critical comment by the judiciary as tacit approval of forms 
of conduct that might be unlawful. The conclusion by the Macdonald Commission 
influenced the outcome of parliamentary hearings in 1982 which culminated in the 
proclamation of the Charter and the adoption, in section 24(2), of an exclusionary remedy 
for unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  
Section 24(2)8 is the product of a compromise between the perpetuation of the common 
law position (the common law generally refused to reject evidence because of how it was 
obtained)9 and the American rule that excluded crucial evidence even as a result of minor 
violations.10 Section 24(2), referred to as the exclusionary remedy, directs that all evidence, 
regardless of its probative value, whether real or in the form of out of court statements, 
obtained in violation of rights, must be excluded if it would tend to bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.11 The exclusionary remedy is the primary basis for excluding 
evidence under the Charter.12 The provision introduced a change in philosophy in Canada 
with respect to the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained by state agents.13 Reliability 
                                                          
6 Report on law of Evidence at 22. 
7 MacDonald Commission Report. 
8 Constitution Act, 1982. 
9 See in general Chapter 1; see also Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 201. 
10 R v Buhay [2003] 1 SCR 631; R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607; R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206 at para 84; R v  
   Strachan [1988] 2 SCR 980 at para 52; R v Grant [1993] 3 SCR 223; R v Simmons [1988] 2 SCR 495; R v Begin  
   [1955] SCR 593; R v Wray [1970] 4 CCC 1; R v Jacoy [1988] 2 SCR 548; Mitchell  1987-1988 Criminal LQ 165;  
   Paciocco and Stuesser The law of evidence at 3; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 4; Skinnider “Improperly or  
   illegally obtained evidence” at  7; Bozzo The exclusion of evidence at  5; Stuart 2010 Southwestern Journal of 
   International Law 313 at 315;  Davison 1993 Criminal LQ 493; Hession 1998 Criminal LQ 93 at 119; Eberdt  
   2011 Appeal 65-85 at para 8; Hogg  Constitutional Law at 41-2; Davies  2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 22; Bryant,  
    Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 551.      
11 R v Côté [2011] 3 SCR 215; R v Greffe [1990] 1 SCR 755; R v Genest [1989] 1 SCR 59; R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR  
    265; R v Simmons [1988] 2 SCR 495 at para 60; R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at para 11 and 70-76; R v  
    Strachan [1988] 2 SCR 980 at para 36; Stewart 2009  CR 97 at 101; Morisette 1984 McGill LJ 522 at 525;  
    Shugar Judicial discretion at 47; Bozzo The exclusion of evidence at 1-43; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 1;  
    Paciocco and Stuesser The law of evidence at 3; Jull 1987-1988 Criminal LQ 178 at 182. 
12 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613; R v Nolet [2010] 1 SCR 851 at para 16-17; R v Dawson [1987] 2 SCR 461;  
    Vancouver (City) v Ward [2010] SCR 28 at para 1; Paciocco and Stuesser The law of evidence at 7; Santoro  
     2007 Alberta LR at 1.    
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and relevance as determinative factors have been discarded and pertinent to the 
exclusionary remedy would be for courts to consider the manner of the obtainment of 
evidence.14 The Charter made the rights of the individual and the fairness and integrity of 
the judicial system paramount.15  
Section 24(2)  of the Charter reads as follows: 
“Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence    
was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by the Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” 
The test set out in section 24(2)-what would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute having regard to all the circumstances- is broad and imprecise.16 In 1987 the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Collins17 shed important light on the factors relevant to 
determining admissibility of Charter violation evidence under section 24(2). The Court 
identified three groups of factors relevant to a section 24(2) inquiry: (1) whether the 
evidence will undermine the fairness of the trial by effectively conscripting the accused 
against himself, (2) the seriousness of the Charter violation, and (3) the effect of excluding 
the evidence on the long-term repute of the administration of justice.18  
In Collins the court held that admission of real evidence obtained in a manner that violates 
the Charter will rarely operate unfairly for that reason alone.19 The Court distinguished real 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151; see also Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145; Mitchell “Excluding evidence”   
    at 3; Paciocco and Stuesser The law of evidence at 3; Bozzo The exclusion of evidence at 5; Bryant, Lederman 
and Fuerst The law of evidence at 541; Madden 2011 Canadian Criminal LR 229; Eberdt 2011 Appeal 65-85 at 
para 1; Stuart 2010 Southwestern Journal of International Law 313 at 315-316;.     
14 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 80-84; R v Wray [1971] SCR 272; R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R v  
    Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206; R v Rothman [1981] 1 SCR 640; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 1; Paciocco  
    and Stuesser The law of evidence at 1-2; Watt’s Manual of evidence at 41.01; Stuart 2010 Southwestern  
    Journal of International Law 313 at 319. 
15 R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206.  
16 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 60. 
17 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265. 
18 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 284; see also Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 609; Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The  
    law of evidence at 566. 
19 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 284. 
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evidence from other evidence because real evidence existed irrespective of the violation 
and its use does not render the trial unfair.20  The Court emphasised that the situation is 
very different with respect to cases where, after a violation of the Charter, the accused is 
conscripted against himself through a confession or other evidence emanating from him.  
The use of evidence of this nature would render the trial unfair, for it did not exist prior to 
the violation and it strikes at one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the right against 
self-incrimination.21 In short, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between real evidence 
and self-incriminating evidence obtained as a result of a Charter violation.22 The admission 
of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence would not affect trial fairness because it existed 
irrespective of the Charter breach.23  
The Supreme Court of Canada in Stillman24 replaced the distinction between real evidence 
and testimonial evidence and held that the relevant distinction is between conscriptive  and 
non-conscriptive  evidence.25 Evidence is conscriptive when an accused is compelled by the 
state through unconstitutional conduct to incriminate himself by means of a statement, by 
the use of the body or the production of bodily samples.26 The crucial element which 
distinguishes non- conscriptive evidence from conscriptive evidence is not whether the 
evidence may be characterised as “real” or not.  Rather, it is whether the accused was 
compelled to make a statement or provide a bodily substance in violation of the Charter.27   
Subsequent to the ruling in Stillman the courts formulated separate tests for the exclusion 
of conscriptive evidence and non-conscriptive real evidence. Conscriptive evidence was 
generally inadmissible- because of its presumed impact on trial fairness- unless if it would 
have been independently discovered.28 Once it was found that the evidence in question was 
                                                          
20R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 284; Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 611: “Such evidence therefore has an 
    independent existence and usually possesses an ‘objective reliability’.” 
21 See in general Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 611. 
22
 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265; R v Jacoy [1988] 2 SCR 548 at para 17-20; see also Ally 2005 SACJ 66 at 68;  
    Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 609. 
23
 R v Jacoy [1988] 2 SCR 548 at para 17-20; see, in general Ally 2005 SACJ 66 at 68; Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at   
    609. 
24 R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607. 
25 Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 571. 
26 R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 74-80. 
27 R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 77. 
28 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 64. 
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conscriptive the courts did not consider the other factors of Collins.29 This resulted in the 
courts applying an “all-but-automatic exclusionary rule” for non-discoverable conscriptive  
evidence, despite reminders that “all the circumstances” must always be considered under 
section 24(2).30 On the other hand the courts applied a more flexible balancing test in the 
case of non-conscriptive real evidence, by employing the other two groups of factors, being 
the seriousness of the Charter violation and the effects to the repute of the administration 
of justice in admitting the evidence.31  The courts blindly developed presumptions: Evidence 
that was conscriptive and otherwise non-discoverable was excluded whereas non-
conscriptive real evidence would be admitted.32 
In July 2009, in Grant,33 the Supreme Court of Canada made the Collins/ Stillman framework 
obsolete by rejecting the fair trial theory upon which it was based. A new flexible three step 
analysis, which applies to all kinds of evidence, was adopted which met the requirement 
that the court must consider “all the circumstances” when determining admissibility.34  
The following principles governing exclusion are explored and discussed in what follows: 
procedural matters, threshold requirements and the issue whether admission of the 
evidence in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
2.1 Pre-trial motion 
The Charter does not provide procedural directions for section 24(2) applications.35 The 
question of admissibility is often dealt with during a voir dire at the start of the trial or once 
an indictment has been served. Similar to the procedure in South Africa the admissibility 
issue is separated from the assessment of the criminal liability to ensure that the rights to 
be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify during the trial proceedings are 
                                                          
29 R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151; see also R v Mellenthin [1992] 3 SCR 615. 
30 R v Orbanski [2005] 2 SCR 3 per LeBel J; R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206 per Sopinka J; see in general R v 
    Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at 391. 
31 See, in general, R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 63-66. 
32 See, in general, R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 63-66. 
33 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
34 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at 67-72; see also Naudé 2009 Obiter 607 at 612. 
35 R v Mills [1986] 1 SCR 863; see also Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 5. 
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protected. The proceeding ensures that the accused cannot during the main trial be cross-
examined about the contents of his testimony led during the admissibility enquiry.36 
A ruling made in respect of the admissibility of evidence is final.37 As a result it rarely 
happens that a court may be called upon during the trial to reconsider the admissibility 
issue based on new facts that arose during the trial.38 This is not a problem in South Africa 
because the admissibility question is dealt with during a trial-within-a-trial as part of the 
trial process.39 An accused may, based on new evidence, invite the court to reconsider the 
admissibility assessment at any stage of the trial proceedings.40    
 A review of the Supreme Court cases in Canada reveals that most applications for exclusion 
are made during the trial.41 This is so because the admissibility of evidence is not usually 
challenged until it is actually tendered.42 
2.2 Threshold burden 
The applicant bears the onus of establishing the existence of the prerequisites under section 
24(2).43 Firstly, he bears the onus of persuading the court on a balance of probabilities that 
his rights have been infringed.44 The applicant must assert with reasonable particularity the 
grounds upon which the application for exclusion is made.45 The applicant need not prove 
all facts on which his claim is based. For example it would be unnecessary to prove 
undisputed facts or facts of which a court should take judicial notice.46 Secondly, the 
applicant has to prove that an adequate connection exists between the Charter breach and 
the impugned evidence.47 Thirdly, the phrase “if it is established” places the onus on the 
                                                          
36 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 175-176. 
37 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 407. 
38 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 407. 
39 S v Tsotestsi (3) 2003 (2) SACR 648 at 654; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 535. 
40 S v Tsotestsi (3) 2003 (2) SACR 648 at 654; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 535. 
41 Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 6. 
42 Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 6; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 468. 
43 R v Mayo [2012] NPSC 53 at para 21; R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265; R v Campbell [2011] 2 SCR 549; R v Harper 
   [1994] 3 SCR 343; R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310; R v Willier [2010] 2 SCR 429; R v Nolet [2010] 1 SCR 851 at  
   para 27; R v Horan (2008) ONCA 589 237 CCC (3d) 514; R v Loewen [2011] 2 SCR 167; Naudé 2009 Obiter 607; 
R v McCrimmon [2010] 2 SCR 402; R v Patrick [2009] 1 SCR 579 ; R v Cornell [2010] 2 SCR 142;  
   Jull  1987-1988 Criminal LQ 178.      
44 R v Harper [1994] 3 SCR 343; R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 277; Jull 1987-1988 Criminal LQ 179. 
45 R v Hamill (1988) 41 CCC (3d) 1 (Ont CA). 
46 R v Cobham [1994] 3 SCR 360. 
47 R v Strachan [1988] 2 SCR 980; R v Goldhart [1996] 2 SCR 463.  
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applicant to ultimately persuade the court that admission of the evidence could bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.48 The courts interpreted the word “would” to mean 
“could,” which presents a less onerous burden on the applicant. Proof of something that 
could occur is a subset of proof that it would occur, meaning that the onus imposed by 
section 24(2) has been reduced from an onus to establish an almost certain effect to a 
burden to establish a potential effect.  
Although the burden is on the applicant to persuade the court it does not mean that he at 
all times during the inquiry bears the onus.49 It is a general rule that the burden of 
persuasion is bound to drift to the state since many factors in question are within the 
knowledge of the Crown.50 For example, under the discoverability principle the prosecutor 
bears the onus to establish that evidence could have been obtained independently from the 
Charter breach and not for the accused to prove that the police could have obtained the 
evidence “but for” their unconstitutional conduct.51 The ratio is that the prosecutor is 
considered a public officer engaged in the administration of justice. The prosecutor as 
representative of the Crown has the responsibility of establishing and maintaining the good 
representation of the system of justice.52 
The standard of persuasion is the civil standard of a balance of probability.53 An accused 
seeking exclusion must establish that it is more probable than not that the admission of the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.54 
  
3. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS 
The threshold requirements, which must be satisfied under section 24(2) includes: the 
applicant’s rights or freedoms must have been violated and the applicant must establish 
that the impugned evidence have been “obtained in a manner.” 
                                                          
48 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at para 30; Hogg Constitutional law at 41-8; Bozzo The exclusion of evidence at 6. 
49 R v Bartle [1994] 3 SCR 173. 
50 R v Bartle [1994] 3 SCR 173; R v Harper [1994] 3 SCR 343; R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at para 22; Watt’s 
Manual of evidence at 41.01-9; Jull 1987-1988 Criminal LQ 178.  
51 Hogg Constitutional law 41-9.  
52 Jull 1987-1988 Criminal LQ 178 at 187. 
53 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at para 30; Hogg Constitutional law at 41-8. 
54 R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at para 30; Hogg Constitutional law at 41-8. 
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3.1 Beneficiary of the exclusionary remedy 
The Charter provides a number of rights that arise on arrest or detention.55 For example in 
section 9 an individual is entitled to the right not to be arbitrarily detained and more 
specifically in section 10(b) the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right. The wording of these fundamental rights, similar to section 35 of the 
South African Constitution, suggests that the Charter protections are limited to only 
arrested and detained individuals and does not extend to a suspect who is neither arrested 
nor detained. It appears that the fact of detention identifies the point at which rights 
connected to detention are triggered.56 In the circumstances it is important to determine 
the meaning of the concept detention in the context of the Charter.  
 3.1.1 The meaning of detention  
Detention can have different meanings. In a narrow sense detention refers only to situations 
where the police take explicit control over the person and command obedience.57  The 
concept detention can also have an expansive meaning suggesting that a detention may 
even be established upon a fleeting interference or delay by the police. Practically a person 
stopped by the police would be regarded as being detained in a sense of being delayed or 
kept waiting.      
Neither of these extreme positions offered an acceptable meaning to the concept detention 
as used in the Charter.58 Applying a generous, purposive and contextual approach the court 
in Therens59 settled on a definition between the two rejected extreme positions.60 The Court 
reasoned that the purpose of the right against arbitrary detention is to protect individual 
liberty from unjustified interference.61 The principle of the right to choose underlies the 
                                                          
55 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 249. 
56 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 12 and 22. 
57 R  v Chromiak [1980] 1 SCR 471 at  478-479; see also R v Currie (1983) 4 CCC (3d) 217 (NSSCAD): The court  
   decided that the meaning given to the word “detained” in Chromiak should be applied to the word detention  
    in section 10 of the Charter. 
58 See in general R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59 at para 19; R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644.  
59 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613. 
60 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; see also R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 15; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 
    460; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) [2003] 3 SCR 3; R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265; R v  
    Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295.   
61 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; see also R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 20; Blencoe v British  
   Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307. 
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concept of liberty and when an accused is detained the choice to do otherwise is removed. 
Liberty for Charter purposes is therefore not restricted to mere freedom from physical 
restraint but incorporates the broader entitlement to make decisions of fundamental 
importance free from state interference. The meaning of detention is therefore informed by 
the need to safeguard this choice without impairing effective law enforcement.62 The 
guiding principle formulated by the courts, asserts that a person is detained if he submits or 
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the choice to do 
otherwise does not exist.63 Based on this the Canadian cases distinguishes between physical 
and psychological detention.64 
3.1.2 Physical and psychological detention   
Detention under the Charter refers to a suspension of an individual’s liberty interest by a 
significant physical and psychological restraint.65 To determine the presence of 
psychological detention poses some challenges. Psychological restraint that amounts to 
detention has been recognised in two situations. It is manifested if the subject is legally 
obliged to comply with a restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would 
conclude by reason of the state conduct, that he has no choice but to comply.66 This means 
an element of psychological compulsion is sufficient to make the restraint of liberty 
involuntary. The rationale is that a detention may be affected without the application or 
threat of application of physical restraint if the person concerned submits or acquiesces in 
the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not 
exist.67 The question is whether the conduct in the circumstances supports a reasonable 
conclusion that the accused had no choice but to comply.  
The Supreme Court found that the following relevant circumstances may guide the courts in 
determining if a reasonable person in the subject’s position would have concluded that his 
right to choose how to interact with the police had been removed: 
                                                          
62 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 28.  
63 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 28; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460. 
64 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 249. 
65 R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310 at para 39; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 44; ; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460  
   at para 7; R v Ladouceur [1990] 1 SCR 1257;  R v Thomsen [1988] 1 SCR 640; R v Hufsky [1988] 1 SCR 621; R v 
   Therens  [1985] 1 SCR 613. 
66 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
67 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 644; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460.  
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1. The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would reasonably be perceived by 
the accused. For example whether the police were providing general assistance; 
maintaining general order; making general enquiries regarding a particular 
occurrence; singling out the individual in a focussed investigation; or whether the 
policeman was orientating himself to the situation rather than intending to deprive 
the appellant of his liberty.68  
2. The nature of the police conduct including the language used, for example whether 
the police was respectful in the questioning,69 the use of physical contact; the place 
where the interaction occurred and preliminary questioning to find out whether to 
proceed.70  
3. The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual as they bear on the 
dynamics of the encounter, for example the minority status of the individual and 
level of experience, personal circumstances and feelings or knowledge.71  
This approach has been criticised for being too “claimant centred,” meaning the existence 
or non-existence of a Charter detention solely depends on the perceptions of the 
reasonable person in the individual’s shoes.72 A subjective perspective may result in many 
police-citizen encounters being seen as involving a detention. The net would be too broad 
as most of those who are detained do not believe that they require the services of a 
counsel. A claimant centred approach does not take adequately into account what the 
police knows insofar as the information is conveyed to the person stopped, but what the 
police may not consider to be in their interest to convey.73  In the absence of explicit criteria 
courts would also tend to read into the “reasonable person” their own perceptions of the 
moment at which the person in their view should be warned of his right to counsel.74  The 
test would as a result be uncertain in its application since much depends on the particular 
qualities attributed to the hypothetical reasonable person in the shoes of the individual 
                                                          
68 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460 at para 32. 
69 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 50. 
70 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460.  
71 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
72 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460 at para 48; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; Quigley 2009 CR 88 at 89. 
73 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 178. 
74 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 174. 
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stopped.75 A further criticism against the reasonable person test is the problem to define 
what information this fictional person possesses.76  
The test should be objective and the focus must be on the police conduct in the context of 
the surrounding legal and factual situation and how that conduct would be perceived by a 
reasonable person in the situation it develops.77 Although the test is objective, subjective 
factors may be relevant to answer the question whether there is a detention.78 The question 
is whether the police conduct taken as a whole supports a reasonable conclusion that the 
individual had no choice but to comply.  The presence of detention should be determined by 
taking into account (1) the objective facts of such encounters, whether or not evident to the 
person stopped, (2) the perception of the police in initiating the encounter, whether evident 
to the person stopped and (3) whatever information the police possessed at the time, which 
may not be known to the person stopped, as well as whatever change in the police 
perception occurred as the encounter developed.79  
3.1.3 Detention for investigative purposes 
Prior to Grant80 and Suberu81 it was not always clear whether a person could rely on Charter 
rights if detained for investigative purposes.82 The court in Mann83 raised the possibility that 
not every Charter detention would trigger Charter protection rights.84 In casu the Court 
accepted that a common law power authorised the police to conduct brief “investigative 
detentions” on a standard of reasonable suspicion.85 In these cases the police are required 
only to advise the person of the reason of the detention.86 The Court declined to mention 
                                                          
75 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 170; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460 at para 58; Dawe and McArthur 
“Charter detention” at 11-12. 
76 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 172. 
77 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at 379; R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613; Dawe and McArthur “Charter detention” at  
   7. 
78 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR353 at para 31; Dawe and McArthur “Charter detention” at 7. 
79 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 180. 
80 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
81 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460. 
82 R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460; Dawe and McArthur “Charter detention” at 12. 
83 R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59. 
84 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460 at para 3; R v Hufsky [1988] 1 SCR 632; R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; Stuart 2010 
Southwestern Journal of International Law 313 at 322. 
85 R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; see also R v Mayo [2012] NPSC 53 para 8. 
86R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; R v Orbanski [2005] 2 SCR 3; Dawe and McArthur “Charter detention” at 1. 
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whether the detainee had to be warned of the right to counsel.87 In Suberu the court 
answered the question left unanswered in Mann in the affirmative. Investigative detentions 
trigger the right to counsel the moment the individual is detained. 88 The Charter protection 
rights are however not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or 
psychological restraint. 
3.2 Standing requirement  
The question who may challenge the admissibility of evidence under section 24(2) is usually 
discussed by the courts with reference to the issue of “standing.” The section 24(1) standing 
requirement is incorporated in section 24(2) by the words, “where, in proceedings under 
subsection 1...” The standing requirement under section 24(2) is therefore limited to the 
express standing requirements of section 24(1).89 The wording of section 24(1) directs that 
the exclusionary remedy applies to applicants whose rights have been denied or infringed. 
Section 24(1) reads: 
“Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been 
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such 
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”90 
Individuals as well as juristic persons, whose rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter 
have been violated, may apply for a remedy under section 24(2).91 An application for the 
exclusionary remedy under section 24(2) must be based on a violation of the applicant’s 
own Charter rights.92 The question arises whether the exclusionary rule finds application if 
an accused applies for the exclusion of evidence obtained through the violation of the 
Charter rights of a third party.  
The Canadian courts generally attach a narrow interpretation to the wording of section 
24(2) holding that the exclusionary remedy applies only to evidence obtained in 
                                                          
87 R v Mann [2004] 3 SCR 59; see also R v Orbanski [2005] 2 SCR 3. 
88 R v Suberu [2009] 2 SCR 460; see also R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; R v Mayo [2012] NPSC 53 at para 14. 
89 Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 554. 
90 Emphasis added. 
91 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Belnavis [1997] 3 SCR 341; R v Chueng (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 507; R v 
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contravention of the applicant’s rights.93 An accused can therefore not claim a constitutional 
remedy pursuant to section 24(2) based on the alleged violation of a Charter right of a third 
party.94 The legal position is illustrated by the facts in Edwards.95 The appellant was arrested 
on charges of possession of drugs which was located in the flat of his girlfriend. The Court 
noted that a claim for relief under section 24(2) can only be made by the person whose 
Charter rights have been infringed.96 The appellant’s right to challenge the legality of a 
search depended upon him, establishing that his personal rights to privacy have been 
violated. No personal right of the appellant was affected by the police conduct at the 
apartment and as a result he could not contest the admissibility of the evidence pursuant to 
section 24(2) of the Charter.97    
It appears that the Supreme Court in Thompson98 suggested that an accused might have 
standing to bring a section 24(2) application to exclude evidence where a third party’s 
Charter rights have been violated. The Court held that the extent of invasion of a third 
party’s rights is constitutionally relevant to the issue of whether there has been an 
unreasonable search and seizure.  
I favour the Thompson approach because courts should have the means to exclude 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to dissociate themselves from the illegal 
conduct of the police.99 As a result exclusion of such evidence will also deter violations of 
fundamental rights in general.100 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Wijesinha [1995] 3 SCR 422; R v Paolitto (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 75 (Ont CA). 
94 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Wijesinha 1995 100 CCC (3d) 410; Borowski v Attorney General of Canada 
    [1989] 1 SCR 342; Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst The law of evidence at 555. 
95 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128. 
96 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128 at para 45. 
97 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128 at para 52. See also R v Arason (1992) 78 CCC (3d) 1; R v Patrick [2009] 1 SCR 
    579; R v Tessling [2004] 3 SCR 432; R v Feeney [1997] 2 SCR 13; R v Grant [1993] 3 SCR 223.      
98 R v Thompson [1990] 2 SCR 1111; R v Montoute (1991) 62 CCC (3d) 481 (Alta CA): The court applied the 
    “Thompson approach.” 
99 Penney 2004 McGill LJ 105.   
100 Penney 2004 McGill LJ 105. 
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3.3 Evidence “obtained in a manner” 
Section 24(2) states that only evidence “obtained in a manner” could be subject to 
exclusion.101 The exclusionary remedy does not apply if evidence is obtained before or in the 
absence of a Charter violation.102 It appears from the words of the provision that there must 
be some connection or relationship between the Charter infringement and the obtaining of 
the impugned evidence.103 Conflicting opinions have emerged regarding the nature of the 
connection required.104 Several judgments suggest that the connection between the breach 
and the evidence must amount to a strict causal relationship. 105 In other cases a broader 
test was adopted which focuses on the entire chain of the events during which the Charter 
violation occurred and the evidence was obtained.106  
The strict causal relationship entails that the connection between the impugned evidence 
and the breach must be one of causation, similar to the “but for” causation requirement of 
tort law.107 A causal relationship is established for example in situations where a statement 
was obtained as a result of the investigator’s reference to the earlier statement made by the 
appellant.108 In this approach causation is determinative in answering the question whether 
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed a Charter right.109  
The strict causal requirement presented several pitfalls.  The inquiry tends to focus narrowly 
on the actions directly responsible for the obtainment of the evidence rather than the entire 
course of events leading to the discovery.110 As a result it promotes a restrictive view of the 
relationship between a Charter violation and the discovery of evidence.111 The causal 
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connection is often unhelpful in determining whether evidence can attract the application 
of section 24(2).112 In the absence of the causal relationship evidence could not have been 
obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and therefore section 24(2) was not 
invoked to exclude the evidence in question.113 A further concern is that the courts should 
avoid being placed in the position of having to speculate whether or not the evidence would 
have been discovered had the Charter violation not occurred.114 The events surrounding the 
obtainment of the evidence are complex and dynamic and it could be an exercise in 
sophistry to isolate the events that caused the evidence to be discovered from those that 
did not.115  Based on this it will never be possible for a court to state with certainty what 
would have taken place had a Charter violation not occurred.116   
In Strachan117 the Supreme Court adopted a purposive and generous approach in 
determining if evidence had been “obtained in a manner.” The Court stated that a temporal 
link between the Charter violation and the impugned evidence is sufficient to engage 
section 24(2).118 A temporal connection is established if both the breach and the discovery 
of the evidence are part of the same chain of events.119 An assessment of a temporal 
connection is not a simple counting of the minutes or hours between the breach and the 
obtainment of the impugned evidence.120 The approach was redefined by the court holding 
that a sufficient relationship exists if the violation occurred in the course of carrying out 
some “integral component in a series of investigative tactics which led to the unearthing of 
the evidence in question.”121 A temporal and tactical linkage would be sufficient to consider 
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the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) despite the fact that the police misconduct 
was not directly involved in the acquisition.122  
The notion that a requirement of strict causation is determinative under section 24(2) was 
accordingly discarded.123 Causation has however not been discarded entirely.124 Several 
courts have since adopted a test that does not require an applicant to show that specific 
evidence was obtained by means of a constitutional violation, but rather that the Charter 
violation and the discovery of the evidence were part of a single chain of events.125 
Therefore the meaning of the phrase “obtained in a manner” could plausibly lie in a 
spectrum running from a relationship of strict causation (obtained as a direct result of a 
Charter violation) to a relationship of mere temporality (obtained in the course of a larger 
transaction in which a Charter violation occurred) or that which is contextual (evidence 
linked through association).126  
The court in Wittwer127 ruled that a contextual connection would satisfy the requirement of 
evidence obtained in a manner that violated a Charter right. In casu the accused was 
interviewed on two occasions by the police. During the first interview the accused confessed 
and made a statement in respect of sexual activities involving minors. The accused was not 
warned of his right to counsel and upon realising the error the police conducted a second 
interview with the accused. During the second interview the accused refused to make a 
statement. It was only when the accused was confronted by the police with the content of 
his first statement that he made another incriminating statement. The statement obtained 
during the second interview, the appellant argued on appeal, became inseparably linked to 
the statement unconstitutionally obtained during the first interview. Considering whether 
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evidence had been obtained in a manner that infringed the appellant’s Charter rights the 
court concluded that the connection was contextual. The link is contextual because any gap 
that might have existed between the two statements was intentionally bridged by the police 
through the association of one with the other in the course of the appellant’s 
interrogation.128   
The courts employ a proximity analysis to determine the strength of the connection when 
the discovery of the evidence is part of the chain of events.129 An examination of the 
strength of the connection obliges the court to consider the “entire chain of events” that led 
to the discovery of the evidence.130 Remoteness should therefore be measured by taking 
into account each link in the chain of the circumstances leading to the discovery of the 
evidence in each particular case.131 The case of Goldhart132 is an example of this approach. 
In casu the court a quo failed to examine the entire relationship which resulted in the 
erroneous characterisation of the strength of the connection. Although ruling that there was 
a strong causal connection the court a quo failed to consider a further factual finding that 
the viva voce evidence by the witness was delivered by choice. The Supreme Court 
concluded that this finding upon a proper evaluation  might well have led the court a quo to 
the conclusion that the causal connection was tenuous and that the temporal link was 
weakened by the intervening events of the accomplice‘s voluntary decision to testify.133 
In the case of derivative evidence the discoverability doctrine134 allows the court to 
determine the strength of the causal connection between the Charter infringing self-
incrimination and the resultant evidence.135 The impact on the accused’s underlying interest 
against self-incrimination would be reduced the more likely the obtainment is without the 
statement.136  
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In situations where the connection is tenuous or too remote the evidence may not have 
been obtained in a manner that infringes or denies Charter rights.137 The strength of the 
connection between the evidence obtained and the Charter breach is a question of fact.138 
The applicability of section 24(2) should be dealt with on a case by case basis and there is no 
hard and fast rule for determining when evidence obtained following Charter breach 
violation becomes too remote.139  
 
4.  THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE BRINGS THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE INTO 
DISREPUTE 
Section 24(2) directs that a court should exclude evidence if its admission would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute having regard to all the circumstances. This test is 
broad and imprecise and provides little guidance to the question as to what considerations 
enter into making the determination.140 Cases decided prior to Collins failed to provide 
technical certainty on its application.141 In Collins the court first organised the factors to be 
considered in determining whether the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.142 The factors were divided into 
three groups based on their effect on the repute of the administration of justice.143 The first 
group of factors considered whether the evidence will undermine the fairness of the trial by 
effectively conscripting the accused against him. The second group pertains to the 
seriousness of the Charter breach and the third group concerns the possibility that the 
administration of justice could be brought into disrepute by excluding evidence even though 
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it was obtained in violation of the Charter.144 The Collins test was later modified in 
Stillman.145 The Court created a virtually automatic exclusion for evidence deemed to be 
conscriptive unless it would have been independently discovered. The Court defined 
conscriptive evidence as follows: 
“Evidence will be conscriptive when an accused, in violation of his Charter rights, is 
compelled to incriminate himself at the behest of the state by means of a statement, 
the use of the body or the production of bodily samples.”146 
The Collins/ Stillman test was criticised for effectively reducing the courts ability to consider 
“all the circumstances” associated with the obtainment of the impugned evidence.147 
Determinative to the inquiry was an analysis of whether or not a Charter breach had 
occurred regardless of the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. In Grant148 
the Supreme Court of Canada significantly changed the analytical framework for exclusion 
and the law governing the exclusion of evidence under the Charter.149 The Court discarded 
the trial fairness branch of the Collins test and “repackaged the remaining Collins factors 
into a new three-prong test.”150 Based on Grant, the court must assess and balance the 
effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confidence in the justice system with regard to 
the three lines of inquiry: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-violation conduct, (2) the 
impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interest of the accused and (3) society’s 
interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.151 Although the lines of inquiry do not 
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track the categories of considerations set out in Collins, it captures the factors relevant to 
the section 24(2) determination as enunciated in Collins and subsequent jurisprudence.152 
Because Grant did not change the relevant factors in the section 24(2) analysis, earlier 
section 24(2) cases remains relevant.153 A court must after an assessment of the Grant  
three lines of inquiry, which encapsulates consideration of all the circumstances, determine 
on balance whether the admission of the evidence obtained unconstitutionally would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.154  
4.1  Seriousness of the breach 
The first line of the Grant test does not differ significantly from the second factor in the 
Collins test. The main concern of this inquiry is to preserve public confidence in the rule of 
law and its processes.155 The more severe or deliberate the state conduct that led to the 
Charter violation, the greater the need for the courts to dissociate themselves, by excluding 
evidence linked to that conduct.156 The focus of the inquiry is an assessment of the 
seriousness of the state conduct that led to the Charter breach.  Charter violations vary in 
seriousness. Inadvertent, minor violations and good faith conduct may minimally undermine 
the public confidence in the rule of law whereas a wilful or reckless disregard of the Charter 
will adversely affect public confidence in the rule of law if the admission of evidence could 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Good faith conduct by a police officer 
reduces the need for the court to dissociate itself from the police conduct.157  
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4.1.1 The presence or absence of good faith     
In the absence of extenuating circumstances the Canadian courts were initially reluctant to 
accept a plea of good faith on the part of the police officers who gathered the evidence in 
inadvertent breach of the Charter.158 It appears that the courts limited good faith as a factor 
under section 24(2) to those situations otherwise categorised as exigent circumstances. This 
is illustrated in Therens.159 A breath sample was taken from the accused, suspected of 
impaired driving, without warning him of his right to counsel. The police argued that their 
failure to afford the accused an opportunity to retain and instruct counsel should be 
condoned because it was based on the judicial precedent in Chromiak.160 In Chromiak the 
court held that there was no right to counsel under similar language of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights. In Therens the court held that the police violated the accused’s Charter right and that 
admission thereof would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The judgment 
suggests that the question whether the police acted in good faith or not is irrelevant when 
determining whether admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The breath sample was accordingly excluded.161  
In Simmons162  the court held that good faith on the part of the police will reduce the need 
for the court to dissociate itself from the police conduct.163 In casu the police searched the 
accused without first having informed her of her right to retain and instruct counsel. Drugs 
were found on her person. The Court held that the search violated the accused’s right to 
counsel. The Court however did not exclude the evidence and pointed out that at the time 
of the search the officers had no way of knowing that they violated a Charter right. It 
reasoned that the breach occurred not long after the Charter came into force. A further 
contributing factor was that the breach occurred several years before Therens in which the 
court formulated the meaning of detention in section 10(b). It further observed that at the 
time of the breach, Chromiak stood for the proposition that investigative detentions of this 
sort were not detentions of the type requiring persons to be advised of their right to 
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counsel.164 The Court explained the different outcome to Therens. It reasoned that the 
accused in Therens was conscripted against himself and that the use of the breath sample 
tended to adversely affect the fairness of the trial process. In Simmons, the court pointed 
out, the evidence obtained through the search was real evidence which existed irrespective 
of the Charter violation. The explanation suggests that it was not the police conduct that 
resulted in the exclusion of evidence in Therens but rather the nature of the evidence. The 
Court’s reasoning paved the way to the development of a good faith doctrine under section 
24(2).165  
The courts have since held that the police act in good faith if they relied on the 
constitutionality of legislation,166 there existed uncertainty whether certain conduct 
constituted a Charter breach,167 conduct was inadvertent or minor;168 or where there was a 
threat of danger or that there is a real risk evidence will be destroyed.169 At the opposite 
end of the spectrum are Charter violations committed in demonstrable bad faith, for 
example wilful, deliberate and flagrant breaches,170 Charter-infringing conduct that is part of 
a pattern of abuse,171  pattern of illegality,172 systemic or institutional failures in Charter 
compliance.173 The courts will not condone ignorance of Charter standards nor will it equate 
negligence or wilful blindness with good faith.174  
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4.1.2 The meaning of good faith 
The bona fides of police officers who commit a Charter violation is a relevant factor in 
determining the seriousness of the breach. The courts use good faith in a broad and a 
narrow sense.175 In a narrow sense the conduct would be classified “good faith” if the police 
relied on an investigative technique which is later declared unconstitutional.176 Good faith in 
a narrow sense is easily objectively determined. The question is whether express authority 
for the investigative technique is either present or absent. A finding of good faith in a 
narrow sense will usually result in the inclusion of the evidence. In other words if the court 
finds good faith, the inquiry as to seriousness of the violation need go no further.177  
In a broad sense good faith simply refers to an absence of malice and an honest belief by 
the police that they act constitutionally. The facts in Grant178 provide an example. The Court 
held that the police conduct should be classified as “good conduct” because the breach was 
not egregious or deliberate. Although the police went too far in detaining the accused and 
directing questions at him, the question when an encounter becomes a detention was not 
settled by the courts. Accordingly the police’s failure to advise the accused of his right to 
counsel based on their mistaken view that they had not detained him was understandable.  
The conduct was not considered to be in bad faith. 
Coughlan argues that the application of this broad formulation has produced inconsistencies 
in which the terms good faith and bad faith have been applied by the courts.179 The dangers 
in using labels such as good faith and bad faith is that police conduct can run the gamut 
from blameless conduct, through negligence, to conduct demonstrating a blatant disregard 
for Charter rights. Coughlan argues that Charter breaches by the police should not be 
regarded as in good faith simply because there was an honest belief in guilt or a lack of 
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malice but should be construed narrowly as, for example, relying on a technique 
subsequently held to be unconstitutional.180 
These two meanings have not been kept separate nor have the courts adopted a definitive 
position on the matter.181 In Kokesch182 the majority, failing to find statutory justification for 
the conduct of the police, noted that the conduct was not mitigated by good faith. The 
Court recognised that good faith will justify admission, but used it in a technical sense when 
it stated that the officer could not be said to have acted in good faith when he ought to have 
known that he did not have the powers he purported to exercise.183 The Court held that in 
the absence of such justification the seriousness of the Charter violation is enhanced, which 
favours exclusion.  
Stuart argues that the courts should abandon the use of the politically and emotionally 
charged labels of good or bad faith which contribute to uncertainty and inconsistency.184  He 
states that the courts are familiar with deciding whether conduct is intentional or negligent. 
An intentional breach would be especially serious and a violation negligently performed 
should be categorised as serious.185 Misconception and ignorance of Charter standards 
would only be mitigating factors where the Crown has shown due diligence by the police to 
comply with Charter standards. Decisions would be more consistent if it was made clear 
that the seriousness of a breach can be justified where the police made a diligent effort to 
comply with the Charter. In other words in the case of negligent investigations the standard 
should be whether the police acted professionally and carefully and not just to avoid gross 
negligence.186 
4.1.3 Test for good faith 
In Buhay187 the Supreme Court stated that good faith must be reasonable.188 At the heart of 
the assessment under this line of the inquiry is the mental state and objective 
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reasonableness of the police conduct in relation to the Charter breach.189 In Booth190 the 
court summed up the test by stating that intention of the police is a factor of the process of 
determining how serious the conduct was but not the answer.191 
The test is objective.192 Ultimately a finding of good faith will turn on the subjective question 
of the honesty of the mistaken belief and on the objective question of the reasonableness of 
that belief.193 Good faith is determined by assessing police conduct in the entire evidence 
gathering process, as well as the mental state of the police.194 In Harrison195 the court stated 
that factors to be considered by the court is not confined to the time of the breach but may 
include the officer’s testimony about Charter compliance.196 The attempt by the officer to 
mislead the court was considered a factor when determining the seriousness factor. It is not 
part of the Charter breach but it is conduct that the court should dissociate itself.197 The 
Court was not prepared to condone the brazen and flagrant Charter breach as it does not 
enhance the long-term repute of the administration of justice.198 
 
5. IMPACT ON THE CHARTER PROTECTED INTEREST OF THE ACCUSED 
The second prong in Grant involves an assessment of the seriousness of the infringement 
from the perspective of the accused.199  This inquiry calls for an evaluation of the extent to 
which the infringement actually undermined the interests protected by the right 
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infringed.200 The more serious the impact is on the protected interest, the greater the risk 
that admission of the evidence will signal to the public, that Charter rights are of little actual 
availability to them thus breeding cynicism and bringing the administration of justice into 
disrepute.201 Considerations relevant to this inquiry are the nature of the evidence, 
discoverability analysis and nature of the right.    
5.1 Nature of the evidence  
In Grant the Supreme Court adopted a flexible approach when it discarded the Stillman self-
incrimination test.  The nature of evidence secured is now a key consideration in assessing 
the degree of intrusion.202 The self-incriminatory character of evidence remains therefore a 
relevant and weighty consideration, but is not a decisive factor anymore.203 Evidence will be 
admissible even if its admission offends the principle against self-incrimination.204 For 
example, a statement might be admissible in circumstances if the suspect was clearly 
informed of his choice to speak to the police, even if the caution about the suspect’s right to 
counsel were technically flawed.205 A serious infringement of the applicable interests 
increases the risk that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute.206   
In Grant the court observed that certain patterns emerged with respect to particular types 
of evidence, which serve as guides to future determinations under section 24(2).207 It 
appeared that the interest engaged by unconstitutionally obtained real evidence affected 
different rights. Usually in the case real evidence a person’s section 8 rights is violated, 
which provides protection against an unreasonable search and seizure.  The Court, on the 
other hand, observed that statements (testimonial evidence) engaged the principle against 
self-incrimination.208  
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5.1.1 Bodily evidence 
It has been claimed that the greatest change brought about by Grant is the approach to 
bodily evidence.209 Bodily evidence includes evidence such as DNA, breath and blood 
samples. The Court held that Collins/Stillman erroneously equated bodily evidence with 
statements. The Court reconfirmed the common law position that bodily samples are not 
communicative and therefore not self-incriminatory in the way statements are.210 Courts 
should apply a flexible test based on all the circumstances.211 The Court observed that the 
judiciary’s negative reaction to unconstitutionally obtained bodily samples is not founded on 
the compelled participation of the accused in the investigation but rather to the violation of 
the privacy and dignity of the individual that obtaining the evidence involves. It concluded 
that the nature and the degree of intrusion are therefore better addressed with reference 
to the interest in privacy, bodily integrity and human dignity.212         
5.1.2 Non-bodily physical evidence 
Examples of non-bodily physical evidence are photographs, sketches, surveys, articles found 
in possession of the accused,213 articles found at the scene of the crime, articles connecting 
the accused with the crime, videotapes, tape recordings,214 and documents. The factors 
which may influence an assessment of the impact of the violation on the Charter interest 
include the manner in which the evidence was obtained and the degree in which the 
manner of discovery undermines the Charter protected privacy interest of the accused.215 
Body cavity searches and strip searches are generally categorised as more serious intrusions 
into privacy rights than other personal searches, such as pat down or frisk searches. On the 
other hand a pat down of one’s person tend to be more serious than property searches, 
while searches of one’s home are more serious than one’s car or office.216  
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In Golden217 the court had to assess the seriousness of the breach on a rights interest, the 
reasonable expectation to protection against unreasonable search and seizure.  In casu the 
police observed the accused dealing and trafficking in drugs. The police on the strength of 
their observation decided to arrest the accused. Upon arrest the police conducted a pat 
down search and discovered no weapons or narcotics. The police decided to make a visual 
inspection of the accused underpants and buttocks. The police removed the clothes with 
force and conducted the search in unsanitary conditions. The police saw a plastic protruding 
from the accused buttocks and proceeded to retrieve it. The packet contained drugs. The 
Court held that the manner in which the search was conducted was regarded unreasonable 
as it infringed on the accused’s rights against the unreasonable search and seizure.218  
5.1.3 Derivative evidence 
Derivative evidence is physical evidence discovered as a result of an unlawfully obtained 
statement.219 In Burlingham220 the accused was subjected to intensive and manipulative 
interrogation by the police in violation of his right to counsel. The accused eventually gave a 
full confession, including a statement that the murder weapon could be found at the 
bottom of a frozen river. The gun the police retrieved from the river was derivative 
evidence. 
In Grant the court concluded that section 24(2) applications involving derivative evidence 
must pursue the usual three lines of inquiry outlined, taking into account the self-
incriminatory origin of the evidence as well as its status as real evidence. In casu the Court 
held that unconstitutionally obtained statements will be subject to a “presumptive general, 
although not automatic” rule of exclusion.221 Because the derivative evidence is obtained 
through unconstitutionally obtained statements the intrusion will be significant unless the 
breach was technical and had no impact on the accused to make an informed choice, or the 
statement would have been made notwithstanding the Charter breach, or the derivative 
evidence would have been discovered even had there been no Charter breach.222 It follows 
                                                          
217 R v Golden [2001] 3 SCR 679. 
218 Section 8; see also R v Golden [2001] 3 SCR 679 at para 117. 
219 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 116; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 31; R v Feeney [1997] 2 SCR 13. 
220 R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206. 
221 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 92-96; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 31. 
222 Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 31.  
105 
 
that non-discoverable derivative evidence will under the Grant test not automatically be 
excluded. The impact of the violation on the Charter’s right interest may be lessened if the 
evidence was independently discoverable. Conversely non-discoverable evidence aggravates 
the impact of the breach on the accused’s interest in being able to make an informed choice 
to talk to the police.223   
5.2 Discoverability analysis 
The discoverability test was applied in cases where real evidence was located as a result of 
an inadmissible statement.224 There are two principal bases upon which it could be 
demonstrated that the evidence would have been discovered. The first is where discovery of 
the evidence was inevitable and second is where an independent source of the evidence 
exists.225 In other words, the Crown must show on a balance of probabilities that the 
discovery of the evidence would have been inevitable 226 or that the police would have 
availed themselves of an alternate legal means to obtain the evidence.227 The rationale 
underpinning this doctrine is that the prosecution gained an unfair advantage it would not 
have had, if the rights of the accused had not been violated.228 The discoverability doctrine 
was applied in Black.229 In the present case the accused was charged with murder but was 
never afforded a reasonable time to appoint and retain counsel. During an interview with 
the police the accused made incriminating statements.230 The police accompanied the 
accused to her house where she produced a knife, the murder weapon.231 The Court ruled 
inadmissible the statement made by the accused because it violated her right against self-
incrimination. The knife was admitted. The Court ruled that admission of the knife would 
not render the trial unfair because it would have been discovered in any event.232    
Discoverability, under the Collins/Stillman trial fairness theory, attenuated the impact of the 
unconstitutional conduct on the accused’s right against self-incrimination and his fair trial 
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rights.233 The discoverability rule was thus clearly linked to the protection of the right 
against self-incrimination and the assessment of trial fairness.234  
In Grant and subsequent decisions the court accepted that the conscriptive -discoverability 
doctrine has been justifiably criticised as overly speculative.235 For example, the doctrine led 
courts and counsel into various complicated and time-consuming attempts to “second 
guess” police and other investigatory agencies; judgments hinge more upon the outcome of 
the intellectual engagement between litigants and the presiding officer than upon the actual 
facts of the circumstances as presented to the court and the potential for speculation is 
limitless.236 Based on this the Court cautioned against speculation. It held that in cases 
where discoverability cannot with any confidence be determined, discoverability will have 
no impact on the section 24(2) inquiry.237 In other words, discoverability should be applied 
only in exceptional circumstances where it can confidently say that the evidence would have 
been obtained notwithstanding the Charter breach.  
The Court ruled that discoverability should no longer be determinative of admissibility.238 
Notwithstanding, discoverability continues to play a useful role in the section 24(2) analysis. 
Discovery continues to be relevant to the first and second prongs of the Grant analysis,239 
namely; the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the impact of the 
breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused. Moreover it retains a role in 
assessing the actual impact of the breach on the protected interest of the accused.240 If the 
Crown would have discovered the evidence without the Charter breach, the intrusion is less 
intrusive and exclusion is less likely to follow.241 For example, discoverability will lessen the 
impact of the illegal search on the accused privacy and dignity interest protected by the 
Charter if the police demonstrate to the court that they had reasonable and probable 
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grounds that a crime had been committed and that the evidence was found at the place of 
the search.242 
5.3 Nature of the right  
State agents in Canada may through compulsion obtain real evidence from an individual. 
The legal authority to search and seize is generally authorised by statute law or common 
law.243 In the process of gathering evidence several of the accused fundamental rights could 
possibly be breached. In this thesis I focus on the right to privacy.244  Section 8 of the Charter 
provides Canadians with a substantive right that protects them against an unreasonable 
search or seizure.245 An accused relying on the protection under section 8 is required to 
demonstrate, first that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy and second, if he has 
such an expectation, that the search by the police was unreasonable.246 In order for a search 
to be reasonable, a search must be authorised by law, the law itself must be reasonable and 
the manner in which the search was carried out must be reasonable.247 
 A search that is unreasonable may be subject to exclusion by virtue of section 24(2) of the 
Charter.248 The question whether to exclude evidence after it has been established that 
section 8 has been violated, should be decided upon, by weighing the societal interest in 
truth-finding and suppression of crime against the particular privacy interest infringed.  
5.3.1 Right of privacy 
(a) Reasonable expectation of privacy  
Prior to the adoption of the Charter the common law protections with regard to 
governmental searches and seizures were based on the right to enjoy property and were 
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linked to the law of trespass.249 The meaning of legal protection of privacy did not extend 
beyond what was generally accepted to be private to individuals, being an individual’s 
home, property and secret and confidential information.250 It was therefore not strange 
when in Entick251 the court refused to authorise a search to discover evidence that might 
link the accused to certain seditious libels. The Court ruled that the plaintiff was protected 
from the intended search by the ordinary law of trespass because of the lack of proper legal 
authority for the search or seizure. 
 After the adoption of the Charter the Supreme Court in Hunter252 stated that the privacy 
protection under section 8 protects people and not places and is therefore not restricted to 
notions of property and trespass.253 The Court firmly rejected a narrow property based 
purpose for the section 8 right and emphatically stated that it has a wider ambit than 
enunciated in Entick. The wording of section 8 does not restrict it to the protection of 
property nor can it be associated with the law of trespass.254 This means that section 8 is 
intended to protect more than simply intrusions against property or property rights. In 
several subsequent decisions the courts affirmed that the right against unreasonable search 
and seizure is predicated on the right to privacy.255 Although the courts advocated a broad 
general right to be secured from unreasonable search and seizure they stressed that it only 
protected a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The limiting term “reasonable” implies that 
an assessment be made on the facts whether the public interest to privacy must give way to 
the governments interest in intruding on the individuals privacy to advance its goals of law 
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enforcement.256 If no reasonable expectation of privacy is established then section 8 need 
not be considered because no search or seizure has occurred.257  
(b) Test for reasonable expectation 
Determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy the courts 
initially approached the question by undertaking a normative analysis that was largely 
disconnected from the actual facts of the case. The facts of Duarte258 are a case in point. In 
this case the accused agreed to purchase drugs from a police informer. The parties 
concluded the transaction in an apartment which had been wired to intercept and record 
their conversation. The police and the informer consented to the interception of the 
communication. The question the Court considered pertinent was not whether the accused 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his communication with the informer and police, 
but rather whether individuals generally in society would expect that their private 
communications with others would not be intercepted by the state without prior judicial 
authorisation.259 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Edwards260 abandoned the normative analysis in favour of 
an approach that examined all the circumstances in deciding whether an individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.261 In casu the Court held that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy would be determined on an assessment of the totality of circumstances which would 
include, circumstances such as the accused’s presence at the time of the search, possession 
or control of the property or place searched, ownership of the property or place, historical 
use of the property or item, ability to regulate access, existence of a subjective expectation 
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of privacy and the objective reasonableness of the expectation.262 The approach provides a 
flexible framework and the outcome of any given factual scenario, which is likely to be more 
closely aligned with our common experience and societal expectation that would lead to 
more predictable outcomes we consider just.263 
An approach that examines all the circumstances is to be preferred. Several problems have 
been identified with the normative analysis.264 The outcome of any reasonable expectation 
enquiry is dependent on how the question is framed rather than the actual facts of the case. 
The general approach of the normative analysis is disconnected from the facts which 
inevitably lead to outcomes that are no longer consonant with our common experience and 
societal expectation. The approach also risks diverting the purpose of the inquiry into the 
reasonable expectation of privacy being, whether the individual’s dignity, integrity and 
autonomy be advanced or diminished by validating privacy claims. Finally the approach fails 
to provide police officers with sufficient guidance during investigations.265 
5.3.2 Limitation of rights 
(a) Authorised by law 
The police may forcibly seize real evidence if authorised by statute law or common law.266 In 
other words agents of state can only enter onto or confiscate someone’s property when the 
law specifically permits it. If not authorised they are constrained by the same rules regarding 
theft and trespass as everyone else.267  A search is unreasonable if not authorised by specific 
statute or common law; if not carried out in accordance with the procedural and substantive 
requirements of the law; or if the scope of the search exceeds the limits for which the law 
granted authority to search.268   
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(i)  Authorised by specific law 
In Stillman the police forcibly obtained bodily samples and teeth impressions from the 
accused whilst in detention. The accused argued at his trial that the evidence obtained 
should be excluded because the search and seizure was unreasonable as it was not 
authorised by statute or the common law.269 The Court agreed that the bodily samples could 
not have been authorised under the existing statutory provisions. The Court observed that 
the investigative warrants under section 487270 of the Criminal Code only provided authority 
to search places. An alternative argument by the Crown that the search and seizure of the 
evidence was authorised by the common law, the Court rejected as well. The Court held 
that the common law search and seizure incident to arrest did not extend to the obtainment 
of bodily samples. Accordingly the Court held that the search and seizure of the accused was 
unreasonable. In the wake of Stillman the legislature noted that parliament has expressly 
limited the scope of the general investigative warrant as it relates to the interference with 
the bodily integrity of any person. Parliament subsequently enacted section 487.0(2) which 
permits a search warrant to issue for the seizure of handprints, fingerprint, foot 
impressions, teeth impression or other print or impression of the body or any part of the 
body.271 
The existence of implied statutory powers has been acknowledged by the courts.272 For 
example, teachers would have implied authority for conducting reasonable searches of 
students based on the statutory obligations of schools and teachers to maintain order and 
discipline.   
(ii) Compliance with procedural and substantive requirements of the law 
Compliance with the law is an essential element of reasonableness.273 For example, in 
Grant274 the police conducted a search under section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act.275 
Section 10 authorises police officers to search without a warrant a place other than a 
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dwelling-house, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that it contains a narcotic in 
respect of which an offence has been committed. In casu the Court held that a search 
undertaken in a dwelling without the necessary prior authorisation is rendered 
unreasonable and in violation of section 8 of the Charter. This approach was followed in 
Feeney276 as well. In casu the Court decided that section 8 requires a warrant for entry into a 
dwelling house in order to make an arrest. The Criminal Code did not make provision for this 
requirement; however the Court held that it should be read in. Subsequent to Feeney 
parliament amended the Criminal Code.277 The amendment makes provision for a warrant 
to enter a dwelling to make an arrest and for entry without warrant by reason of exigent 
circumstances278 if it would be impractical to obtain a warrant. 
(iii) Scope of the search exceeds the limits for which the law granted authority  
The court in Mann279 found that the police detained a suspect for investigation purposes 
and subsequently proceeded to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. The police felt a 
soft object in the pocket of the suspect, reached in and discovered drugs. The Court held 
that the search and seizure of the drugs by searching the suspect’s pocket went beyond the 
search for weapons permitted by the common law as likely to occur during a so-called 
investigative detention. The power to search subsequent to the arrest is an exception to the 
ordinary requirements for a reasonable search, in that it requires neither a warrant nor 
independent reasonable and probable grounds. The Court held that the evidence was 
obtained without lawful authority which amounted to a breach of section 8 and accordingly 
excluded the evidence under section 24(2).280  
The Canadian courts do not have the power, unless specifically authorised, to enforce or 
order the accused to subject themselves to a search and seizure not provided for in any 
statutory or common law. The rationale is that it is up to the legislature and not the courts 
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to balance the accused’s Charter rights against society’s interest in effectively monitoring 
their conduct.281  
An illegal search is an element which impacts on the determination of the reasonableness of 
a search under section 8 of the Charter.282  This is significant because the common law rule 
was that illegally obtained evidence was admissible if relevant and could therefore not be 
excluded.283 Illegally obtained evidence is a breach of section 8 (it is unreasonable) and can 
now be excluded under section 24 (2) of the Charter.284 
 (b) Law must be reasonable 
A search is reasonable if the law that authorises it is reasonable as well. Laws that fail to 
meet the minimum constitutional standards in section 8 are in breach thereof. Under 
section 1 of the Charter the courts have the ability to review legislation and determine if the 
legislation is inconsistent with the Charter. Section 1 of the Charter reads: 
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 
Oakes285 is the seminal case in Canada on the interpretation of the meaning of “reasonable” 
and “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The court in Oakes devised a 
set of criteria against which limitations on rights and freedoms must be measured. In other 
words even if legislation violates section 8 it can still be upheld as a reasonable limit under 
section 1. The four Oakes test criteria are; firstly, the law must have a sufficiently important 
objective, secondly, the law must be rationally connected to the objective, thirdly, the law 
must not infringe a right more than is necessary to meet the objective and lastly the law 
must not have a disproportionately severe effect.286  
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(i) Sufficiently important objective 
The first step in the Oakes test is to assess whether the impugned legislation pursue an 
objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right. The objective of 
legislation can be ascertained from the wording of the statute, the intention of parliament 
or the legislative history. The identification of the legislative objective is not always clear 
and has proved difficult to determine.287  
At which level the objective is determined by a discretionary choice of the reviewing 
court.288 Oakes provides guidelines to determine whether the objective achieves the levels 
of sufficient importance, in order to justify overriding a Charter right. The objective must be 
consistent with the values of a free and democratic society; the objective must relate to 
concerns which are pressing rather than merely trivial and the objective must be directed to 
“the realisation of collective goals of fundamental importance.”289 These guidelines were 
applied in Butler.290 The accused sold pornographic material which was seized following the 
execution of a search warrant by the police. The applicant was subsequently charged with 
possession and distribution of obscene materials. He argued that the definition of obscenity 
in the Criminal Code impermissibly violated the right to freedom of expression contained in 
section 2(b) of the Charter. The Court agreed that the Criminal Code violated section 2(b) of 
the Charter, but upheld it as a reasonable limitation under section 1. The Court reasoned 
that prohibition of obscene material captured by the section served a pressing and 
substantial objective aimed at preserving equality and to prevent harm to females.291  
 
 
                                                          
287 Hogg Constitutional law at 38-19 to 38-20. 
288 Hogg Constitutional law at 38-23. 
289 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 69. 
290 R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452. 
291 R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452; see also R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 76: ”The objective of protecting our  
     society from the grave ills associated with drug trafficking, is in my view, one of sufficient importance to  
     warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom in certain cases. Moreover, the degree of 
     seriousness of drug trafficking makes its acknowledgement as a sufficiently important objective for the 
     purposes of s. 1 to a large extent, self-evident. The first criterion of a section 1 enquiry, therefore, has been  
     satisfied by the Crown.”; see also R v Tse [2012] 1 SCR 531: Regarding the first question the court in Tse held 
     that the objective of preventing serious harm to persons or property in exigent circumstances is pressing  
     and substantial.    
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(ii) Rational connection 
The second step in the Oakes test requires the law to be rationally connected to the 
objective of the law. In other words the law must be designed to achieve the objectives in 
question and should not be arbitrary unfair or based on irrational considerations.292 This 
step is undertaken only after finding that the objective of the law is sufficiently important to 
justify in principle the limiting of the Charter right. The rational connection requirement 
implies that there must be a causal relationship between the objective of the law and the 
measures enacted by the law.293 A causal relationship does not have to be established 
through direct evidence only. A causal connection based on reason or logic would suffice.294 
The point is illustrated in Oakes. In casu the Court had to determine the constitutionality of 
section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act.295 The section provided that proof of possession of 
drugs raised a presumption that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking. The 
legislation in effect cast the burden on the accused to prove that he was not in possession 
with the intent to deal in narcotics. The question the Court had to consider was whether the 
reverse onus clause in section 8 was rationally related to the objective of curbing drug 
trafficking. In the absence of a rational connection the reverse onus clause could be the 
cause of unjustified and erroneous convictions of drug trafficking of persons guilty only of 
possession of narcotics.296 The Court observed that it would be irrational to infer that a 
person has intent to traffic on the basis of his or her possession of a small quantity of 
drugs.297 The reverse onus did not satisfy the rationality requirement as it did not refer to 
the quantity of drugs in the possession of the accused.298  
(iii) Least drastic means 
The least drastic measure requirement is the third step in the Oakes test. This step has also 
been described as the minimum impairment test, because it requires that the limit on the 
Charter right be the least drastic means to achieve the objective. Determining whether the 
                                                          
292 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 70. 
293 Hogg Constitutional law at 38-35. 
294 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 156-158. 
295 Narcotic Control Act in Canada, 1970. 
296 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 77. 
297 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 78. 
298 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 78; see also in general R v Tse 2012 SCC 16 at para 97.  
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law limiting the Charter right is the least drastic is not self-evident from the legislation.299 In 
Edwards Books and Art300 the court held that some margin of appreciation had to mitigate 
the least drastic means requirement.301 This means courts should allow the legislature some 
latitude to consider which legal framework limiting a fundamental right is reasonable for the 
legislature to impose.302  
In Ramsden303 the accused advertised upcoming performances of his band by affixing posters 
to hydro poles contrary to a city by-law banning posters on public property.  He was charged 
under the by-law and while not denying the offences, argued that the by-law was 
unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression in s 
section 2(b) of the Charter. The issues before court were whether the by-law limited the 
relevant right and if so, whether such limitations were demonstrably justified under section 1. 
The Court found that by prohibiting posters entirely littering, aesthetic blight and associated 
hazards were avoided. The complete ban on posters however, did not restrict expression as 
little as is reasonably possible. Many alternatives to a complete ban existed. The Court held 
that proportionality between the effects and the objective was not achieved because the 
benefits of the by-law were limited while the abrogation of the freedom was total.304   
(iv) Proportionality 
The proportionality requirement is the last step in the Oakes test for justification. It requires 
proportionality between the effects of the measures responsible for limiting the Charter 
right and the objective which has been identified as of sufficient importance.305 In Alberta306 
the court reasoned that the first three steps of the Oakes test are anchored in an 
assessment of the law’s purpose whereas the fourth step takes full account of the “severity 
of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups.” In Tse307 the Supreme 
Court applied the proportionality test and held that the legislation did not satisfy the 
                                                          
299 R v Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 SCR 713. 
300 R v Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 SCR 713. 
301 R v Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 SCR 713. 
302 R v Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 SCR 713; Hogg Constitutional law at 38-39. 
303 Ramsden v Peterborough (City) [1993] 2 SCR 1084. 
304 Ramsden v Peterborough (City) [1993] 2 SCR 1084 at 1105-1106; see also Dunmore v Ontario [2001] 3 SCR  
     1016; see also cases in which Criminal code provisions failed the least-drastic-means test; R v Logan [1990]  
     2 SCR 731; R v Hess [1990] 2 SCR 906. 
305 Hogg Constitutional law at 38-43. 
306 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR 567. 
307 R v Tse [2012] SCR 531. 
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requirement. The Court concluded that the obligation to give notice to intercepted parties 
would not impact in any way the ability of the police to act in emergencies.308 Notice would 
enhance the ability of targeted individuals to identify and challenge invasions to their 
privacy and seek meaningful remedies. The Court ruled that Parliament’s goal of preventing 
reasonably apprehended serious harm could still be achieved by implementing this 
accountability mechanism. The court in Tse concluded that the provision fails to satisfy the 
second stage of the Oakes test and ruled that the impugned legislation was 
unconstitutional.309  
(c)  Manner of search unreasonable 
An authorised search must be conducted in a reasonable manner. The manner of the search 
is unreasonable in circumstances where the police authority to arrest was exceeded,310 
invasive strip searches,311 the compelled obtainment of bodily samples notwithstanding the 
accused refusing consent and if the police during a search showed considerable disregard 
for the accused’s dignity and physical integrity.312 
The conduct of the search must as a whole be assessed in light of all the circumstances. The 
question is whether the overall search and not whether every detail of the search in 
isolation is appropriate.313  During the review of the decision of the police to act as they did 
the following factors must be considered: Firstly, the decision of the police must be judged 
against what was known or should reasonably have been known to them at the time,314 
secondly, the police must be allowed some discretion in the manner they decide to execute 
the search.315  In Cornell316 the police executed a warrant by entering the house of the 
accused without prior warning and by battering down the door. The accused argued that 
the evidence should be excluded on the ground that the search was executed in an 
unreasonable manner. The Court rejected his argument and included the evidence in the 
trial. The evidence revealed that the police’s conduct was motivated by concerns of safety 
                                                          
308 R v Tse [2012] SCR 531 at para 98 
309 R v Tse [2012] SCR 531 at para 99. 
310 R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 46; R v Mayo [2012] NPSC 53 at para 17. 
311 R v Golden [2001] 3 SCR 679 at para 105. 
312 R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607; R v Golden [2001] 3 SCR 679 at para 116. 
313 R v Cornell [2010] 2 SCR 142 at para 31. 
314 R v Cornell [2010] 2 SCR 142 at para 23. 
315 R v Cornell [2010] 2 SCR 142 at para 24. 
316 R v Cornell [2010] 2 SCR 142. 
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to them, the accused and to avoid the possible destruction of evidence, if the accused had 
the opportunity to do so. The Court accordingly held that the police was justified in their 
conduct and the search was accordingly reasonable in the circumstances.  
 
6.  SOCIETY’S INTEREST IN ADJUDICATION OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS 
Grant discontinues asking the pro-admissibility balancing question of whether exclusion will 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute and replaces it with a consideration of 
impact of exclusion on the public interest in the truth-seeking function of the court.317 This 
line of the inquiry asks the question whether the truth seeking function of the criminal 
process would be better served by the admission or exclusion of the evidence.318 The weight 
afforded society’s interest in adjudication of the case on the merits varies according to the 
reliability of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the case for the prosecution 
and the seriousness of the offence charged.319  
6.1 Reliability 
The courts prior to Grant did not recognise the reliability principle.320 The minority in 
Burlingham321 attempted to develop a guiding reliability principle which was rebuffed by the 
majority.322 In Grant the court ruled that the reliability of evidence is relevant in determining 
the impact exclusion will have on the public interest in truth finding. It however cautioned 
that the reliability factor is not a return to the common law approach as formulated in 
Wray.323 In Wray the court held that reliable evidence is admissible regardless of how it was 
obtained. Grant held that Wray is inconsistent with the wording of section 24(2), which 
mandates that the court considers all the circumstances, not just the reliability of the 
                                                          
317 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 79; R v Askov [1990] 2 SCR 1199 at 1219-1220; Watt’s Manual of  
     evidence at 41.01; Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 23. 
318 R v Côté [2011] 3 SCR 215 at para 47; R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; Mitchell “Excluding evidence” at 42;  
     Paciocco and Stuesser The law of evidence at 35; Stuart 2010 Southwestern Journal of International Law 313  
     at 318; Eberdt 2011 Appeal 65-85 at para 20. 
319 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353; R v Harrison [2009] 2 SCR 494. 
320 R v Côté [2011] 3 SCR 215 at para 113; R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607; Dawe and McArthur “Charter  
     detention” at 25. 
321 R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206. 
322 R v Burlingham [1995] 2 SCR 206 at para 37-39, 85 and 146; see also R v Belvanis [1997] 3 SCR 341; R v 
     White (2007) 47 CR (6
th
) 271 (Ont CA). 
323 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 80. 
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evidence.324 This approach was endorsed in Harrison325 where the court excluded reliable 
evidence after a finding that the Charter breach was serious and the impact significant. A 
breach that undermines the reliability of the evidence is generally excluded because the 
inclusion of unreliable evidence will not serve the accused’s fair trial interest, or the public’s 
desire to uncover the truth.326 Excluding reliable evidence may on the other hand 
undermine the truth-seeking functions of the justice system and render the trial unfair from 
the public’s perspective.327 
6.2 Importance to prosecution 
The exclusion of evidence may adversely affect the repute of the administration of justice if 
it substantially diminishes the strength of the prosecution’s case.328 Although an important 
pro-inclusionary consideration prior to Grant, it was not determinative.329 In Grant the court 
opined that this factor is a corollary to the inquiry into the reliability.330 The admission of 
unreliable evidence is more likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute where 
it forms the entirety of the case against the accused and likewise will the exclusion of 
reliable evidence have an adverse effect on the repute of the administration of justice 
where the remedy weakens the prosecution.331   
6.3 The seriousness of the offence    
The seriousness of the offence was prior to the Grant decision an important pro-
inclusionary consideration in determining the effect exclusion would have on the repute of 
the administration of justice.332 The rationale was that the more serious the offence is, the 
greater the likelihood that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by 
the exclusion of the evidence. Exclusion of evidence did not follow automatically in serious 
                                                          
324 Stuart 2010 Southwestern Journal of International Law 313 at 327. 
325 R v Harrison [2009] 2 SCR 494. 
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     at para 21. 
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cases.333 In Grant the court observed that this factor may be a consideration but neutralised 
its impact by suggesting that it has the potential to cut both ways.334 The Court observed 
that the public has an interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence is 
serious and on the other hand also has an interest in having a justice system that is above 
reproach especially in cases where the penalties can be severe.335 Put differently, Grant has 
rendered the factor largely immaterial to section 24(2) inquiries.336 The Court opined that 
the section 24(2) goals operate independently of the seriousness of the offence charged and 
noted that the section addresses the long term interest of the administration of justice and 
not the immediate impact of how the people view the justice system.337 The shift means 
that the seriousness of the offence will not be the focus to measure the public’s reaction to 
the exclusion of evidence. Applying the principle in context the Court concluded that short 
term clamour for a conviction in a particular case must not deafen the court to the longer 
term repute of the administration of justice.338  
In Harrison339 it appears as if the seriousness of the offence might still be a relevant 
consideration. The Court considered the seriousness of the offence factor but cautioned 
that it should not weigh heavily in the analysis.340 Allowing the seriousness of the offence to 
overwhelm the section 24(2) analysis would deny those charged with serious offences of the 
fundamental rights afforded all Canadians, in effect declaring that in the administration of 
criminal law the ends justify the means.341 Although the Supreme Court cautioned against 
an over reliance, it however failed to clarify what degree of reliance is permissible.342  The 
fact that courts are encouraged to balance the short-term and longer term repute of the 
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justice system is a discretion not to be overly influenced by the seriousness of the 
offence.343 
The minority judgment in Grant, delivered by Judge Binnie, disagreed that the factor is 
neutral in the analysis relating to the maintenance of the repute of the administration of 
justice.344 Judge Binnie disagreed with the majority that this line of the inquiry should strike 
a balance between the public concern for sustaining prosecutions and the principle that all 
stand equal before the law. He restated his opinion in Harrison that the interest of an 
accused person in the exclusion of evidence is irrelevant to the analysis of the branch of the 
public interest in adjudication on the merits.345 He reasoned that the rights of the accused 
have already been considered under the first and second branches of the framework and to 
import this concern into the third branch of the framework would be illogical as it 
concerned society’s interest in the adjudication on the merits.346 He emphasised that society 
will have a greater interest in adjudication on the merits when it involves a serious crime.347 
Assessing the seriousness of the offence is as important as determining whether evidence is 
reliable or essential.348 The judge concluded that the majority approach is inconsistent with 
the purpose of section 24(2) of the Charter which is to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
I am of the view that seriousness of the offense should be considered a factor in this line of 
the inquiry. The degree of reliance must however not be weighty or determinative of the 
outcome of this line of the inquiry. This approach would be in line with the prescribed 
wording in section 24(2) that all circumstances be considered when the court exercises its 
judicial discretion. The approach will be consistent with the flexibility principle that is the 
essence of the Grant section 24(2) analytical framework. 
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7.  SUMMARY 
In Canada the admissibility of evidence is usually challenged by means of a pre-trial motion. 
The wording of section 24(2) clearly suggests that the burden of persuasion is upon the 
applicant seeking exclusion. The standard for establishing disrepute is the civil standard of 
the balance of probabilities.  
A person is entitled to police information duties when he is detained. The Supreme Court 
stated that detention in the context of the Charter refers to the suspension of a person’s 
liberty interest by a significant physical and psychological restraint.349 The test is whether a 
reasonable person would have believed that he had no alternative but to co-operate. 
Neither a causal nor a temporal connection between the Charter violation and the evidence 
is, on its own necessarily sufficient to engage the provisions of section 24(2) if the evidence 
and the breach is too remote.350 The whole of the relationship, on a case-by-case basis, 
must be considered in the context of the factual determination of the connection between 
the evidence obtained and the breach.351 An applicant under section 24(2) must establish 
that one or more of his fundamental rights, and not merely the rights of a third party, have 
been infringed or denied.352  
In Grant and Harrison the Supreme Court of Canada reconsidered the Collins/ Stillman 
analysis for judging disrepute for the purposes of section 24(2) exclusion. The Supreme 
Court discarded the Stillman approach to admissibility, as well the fair trial theory. The 
Court adopted a new three-step test. The admissibility of all types of evidence under section 
24(2) must be determined by considering the three lines of inquiry identified in Grant.  The 
test involves an inquiry into the effect admission may have on the repute of the justice 
system, having regard to the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact of the Charter 
breach on the protected interests of the accused. The three step analysis, treats statements 
and bodily samples differently for the purposes of admission, reduces the importance of 
discoverability, renders the seriousness of the offence almost immaterial under section 
24(2) and discontinuous asking the pro-admissibility question of whether exclusion will bring 
                                                          
349 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 44. 
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the administration of justice into disrepute and replaces it with a consideration of the 
impact of exclusion on the public interest in the truth-seeking function of trial.353 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the exclusionary rule jurisprudence in the United States of America 
and in the process assess how the courts deal with the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained real evidence. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The focus in this Chapter is on the application of the exclusionary rule in the United States of 
America. The reason for including the United States of America in this study is that it has a 
richer body of exclusionary rule jurisprudence than South Africa. As such it is a valuable 
resource to determine the reasoning behind the principles of the exclusionary rule.1 The 
rationale of the exclusionary rule has been dealt with in some detail by South African legal 
commentators.2 I will not repeat these sources, but will take their writings further and 
update their contribution with the latest cases and discussions. In this regard I specifically 
explore the narrow issue of the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court developed a number of exclusionary regimes to each of 
the Fourth,3 Fifth,4 Sixth5 and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution.6 The 
discussion in this Chapter focuses on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. It is a useful 
place to examine the United States law because it is the first exclusionary rule to be 
developed in the USA and its jurisprudence has substantially shaped the development of the 
other exclusionary regimes.7  
                                                          
1 S39(1)(b) Act 108 of 1996, substituted by s 1(1) of the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act No. 5 of 2005: 
”[W]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-may consider foreign law.”; see in general 
Chapter 2: The origin of the exclusionary rule can be traced to early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; 
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 194: The authors argue that the exceptions created 
by the Supreme Court in the USA can assist the South African courts to determine whether admission of the 
evidence would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. 
2 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 193-200; see also Zeffertt and Paizes Law of   
evidence at 711-775; Basdeo Search and seizure; Ally Constitutional exclusion.  
3 Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643, 654-655 (1961). 
4 Bram v US 168 US 532, 548 (1897); Blackburn v Alabama 361 US 199, 205 (1960).  
5 US v Wade 388 US 218, 237-239 (1967); Massiah v US 377 US 201, 206-207 (1964). 
6 Miller v Fenton 474 US 104 (1985); Rochin v California 342 US 165 (1952); see in general Mellifont The  
derivative imperative at 100. 
7 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 100; Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 523; see also  
  Roberson Criminal justice at 119; Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643, 654-655 (1961). 
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The Fourth Amendment to the USA Constitution reads: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures but contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of its directions.8 The courts until the early 20th century affirmed that there was no 
general power in the common law to exclude real (non-confessional) evidence obtained 
illegally or improperly.9 The courts generally authorised the use of real evidence even 
though it was obtained in violation of the search and seizure provisions.10 In 1914 the 
Supreme Court in Weeks11 rejected the common law rule and adopted the exclusionary rule 
which prescribes that evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure would usually 
be excluded.12 The exclusionary remedy, the Court reasoned, was necessary because other 
remedies, civil monetary relief or criminal prosecution of offending officers had not been 
                                                          
8 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 290 (2011); see also Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); Arizona v Evans 514 US 1, 10 
(1995); US v Leon 468 US 897, 906 (1984); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 550. 
9 Mellifont The derivative imperative at 101. 
10 Adams v New York 192 US 585 (1904): The courts will not inquire into the means by which evidence 
otherwise admissible was acquired; Weeks v US 232 US 383, 396 (1914): “[T]he underlying principle of all 
these decisions obviously is, that the court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action, will not take notice 
of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence, 
which are material and properly offered in evidence.”; US v La Jenue Eugenie 26 F Cas 832, 843-844 (CCD 
Mass 1822) quoted in Mellifont The derivative imperative at 101 fn 15; Klotter and Kanovitz Constitutional 
law at 170. 
11 Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914). 
12 Weeks v US 232 US 383, 398 (1914); see also Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961): The court held that the 
exclusionary rule applied to every court and law enforcement officer in the nation; Alderman v US 394 US 
165, 171 (1969): ”[T]he exclusionary rule fashioned  in Weeks and Mapp excludes from the criminal trial any 
evidence seized from the defendant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”; US v Calandra 414 US 
338, 348 (1974): “[T]he majority characterised the rule as a judicially created remedy, when applicable, 
forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.”; Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 290 (2011): “[T]o 
supplement the bare text, this Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the 
prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of Fourth Amendment violation.”; Klotter and 
Kanovitz Constitutional law at 168 and 170: ”[T]his rule is not a provision of the Fourth Amendment itself, 
but is a rule that has been framed by the courts.” 
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effective.13 In Silverthorne Lumber Co.14 the court extended the exclusionary rule to 
derivative evidence.15 
The exclusionary rule serves two dominant functions. In essence the courts created the 
exclusionary rule to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through the exclusionary rule’s 
goals of deterrence and maintaining judicial integrity.16 The exclusionary rule serves to deter 
lawless conduct by law enforcement officers as well as maintain the judicial integrity of the 
justice system by closing the doors of the court to any use of evidence unconstitutionally 
obtained.17 The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right because the 
application of the rule is restricted to those areas where its remedial objective is more 
effective.18 The exclusionary rule applies both to the investigatory and accusatory stages of 
a criminal prosecution.  
In the early years since the adoption of the exclusionary rule a substantial body of case law 
developed which established a broad rule requiring exclusion of all evidence obtained by or 
derived from a breach of the Fourth Amendment.19 The employment of an inflexible 
exclusionary rule became unpopular because of the automatic rule of exclusion irrespective 
                                                          
13 Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961); see also Bloom 1992 American J Crim L 71 at  
79; LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 107. 
14 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v US 251 US 385 (1920).  
15 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v US 251 US 385 (1920); see also Nardone v US 308 US 338 (1939); Wong Sun v US 
371 US 471 (1963): The court extended the exclusionary rule to evidence that was the indirect product or 
”fruit” of unlawful police conduct; Alderman v US 394 US 165, 171 (1969); Bloom 1992 American J Crim L 71 
at 80. 
16 See in general Davis v US 131 S Ct 2419 (2011); US v Calandra 414 US 338, 348 (1974). 
17 Elkins v US 364 US 206 (1960): ”[I]ts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in  
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.” and at 222: “[T]he rule also 
serves another vital function- the imperative of judicial integrity.”; Linkletter v Walker 381 US 618 (1965): The 
rule is characterized as an effective deterrent to illegal police action; Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968): The court 
stressed that the rule’s major thrust is a deterrent one; see also Arizona v Evans 514 US 1, 10 (1995); see also 
Davis v US 131 SCt 2419 (2011); LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 107: ”[T]he purposes of the 
exclusionary rule are of more than academic concern, for the Court’s perception of them will determine the 
scope and ultimately the fate of the exclusionary rule.”; Shively 2008-2009 Vaparaisol Univ LR 407 at 441; 
Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 97: ”[M]odern courts view the Fourth Amendment as 
serving one primary function: limiting the discretion of police and government agents to violate liberty, 
privacy, and possessory rights.” 
18 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 293 (2011): It is not a constitutional right nor is it designed to redress the injury 
   occasioned by an unconstitutional search; see also Moran 2011 Ohio State J Crim L 363 at 369; Cammack 
2010 American J Comp L 631; De Golian 2012 Mercer LR 751 at 752; Gross 2011 Santa Clara LR 545 at 548; 
Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 551.     
19 Bloom 1992 American J Crim L 71 at 79. 
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of how technical, minor or unintended the breach was.20 The courts appreciated the 
potential risk to the administration of justice and adopted the cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the facts of the case. The cost-benefit 
analysis involves weighing of the deterrent benefit of exclusion against the costs in terms of 
lost evidence.21 The exclusionary rule does not apply when its social costs, including the loss 
of probative and reliable evidence, outweigh the deterrent benefits. Based on this the 
Supreme Court in several cases modified the exclusionary rule if its application would serve 
no deterrent function and its unbending application would impede unacceptably the truth-
finding functions of the court.22 
The application of the cost benefit analysis caused the Court to create exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule.23 The peremptory exclusionary rule is currently subject to a number of 
court created exceptions which are relevant when considering the admissibility of illegally 
obtained real evidence. The exceptions to the exclusionary rule are based on the "standing" 
doctrine,24 the "objective justification" doctrine,25 the "attenuated taint" doctrine,26 the 
"inevitable discovery" doctrine,27 the "independent source" doctrine,28  and the "good faith" 
doctrine.29 To determine the admissibility of real evidence obtained through compulsion a 
                                                          
20 Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 551: The indiscriminate application of an inflexible  
    exclusionary rule generated disrespect for the law and administration of justice; US v Payner 447 US 727 
(1980); Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co v US 251 US 385 (1920); 
Nardone v US 308 US 338 (1939); Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631 at 641. 
21 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984); see also De Golian 2012 Mercer LR 751; Gross 2011 Santa Clara LR 545 at 546: 
“[I]n these decisions the court claims that it has always been reluctant to employ the exclusionary rule due to 
the costs it imposes on society, namely the obfuscation of truth, the thwarting of law enforcement objectives 
and the freeing of dangerous criminals.”    
22 Boyd v US 116 US 616 (1886);  Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v US 251 US 385 
(1920); Gouled v US 255 US 298 (1921); Agnello v US 269 US 20 (1925); Olmstead v US 277 US 438 (1928);  
Lustig v US  338 US 74 (1948); Wolf v Colorado 338 US 25 (1949); Elkins v US 364 US 206 (1960);  Mapp v Ohio 
367 US 643 (1961); Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 (1963); Davis v Mississippi 394 US 721 (1969); US v Calandra 
414 US 338 (1974); Stone v Powell 428 US 465 (1976); US v Leon  468 US 897 (1984); Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service v Lopez-Mendoza 468 US 1032 (1984); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal 
procedure at 523. 
23 Illinois v Gates 462 US 213 (1983); US v Leon 468 US 897, 911 (1984): “[I]s a product of considerations 
relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect.”; Shively 2008-
2009 Vaparaisol Univ LR 407 at 410-411; Mellifont The derivative imperative at 138; see also Grey 2008 
University of San Francisco LR 621 at 635. 
24 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978). 
25 Devenpack v Alford 543 US 146 (2004). 
26 Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 (1963). 
27 Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984). 
28 Murray v US 487 US 533 (1988). 
29 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). 
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court must in addition to the exclusionary rule exceptions consider whether the state 
complied with the constitutional standards set out in the Fourth Amendment. In this regard 
I discuss the meaning of the phrase “unreasonable search and seizure.” Important 
procedural matters considered in this chapter are the location and nature of the onus and 
the motion to suppress procedure. In what follows these principles are dealt with by only 
referring to the most influential cases on the relevant aspect and not all of them. 
    
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
2.1 Motion to suppress 
A motion to suppress evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure must be issued and 
filed in advance of trial.30 The application may be in the form of a Notice of Motion and 
supporting affidavit wherein the affiant sets out the evidence (operative facts) forming the 
basis for the relief. The applicant would ask the court to review the method by which the 
evidence was obtained and to determine whether the admission of the evidence is 
constitutional. The prosecution may oppose an application by refuting the allegations on an 
affidavit. In the absence of an affidavit the applicant may elect to testify or call witnesses to 
prove the operative facts. Evidence delivered in support of the motion may not be used 
against the accused at his trial on the question of guilt or innocence.31 If the applicant 
successfully brought the validity of the search and seizure into issue the onus is on the 
prosecution to prove its constitutional validity.32 The evidence will be excluded at a 
defendant’s later trial if the motion to suppress is upheld. Ordinarily the question of 
admissibility is unlikely to be reconsidered at trial.33 The finding to suppress may only be 
reconsidered by the trial court if new or additional evidence were produced on the issue or 
substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced at the pre-trial hearing of 
motion.34 
    
                                                          
30 Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 210; LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 500. 
31 Simmons v US 390 US 377 (1968).  
32 LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 503. 
33 LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 515. 
34 LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 515: ”[I]t would seem that a defendant is entitled to a 
redetermination of his claim at trial only if new evidence comes to light which was unavailable at the time 
of the original hearing on the motion through no fault of the movant.”; see also Brinegar v US 338 US 160, 
162-163 (1949): ”[A]t the trial the court overruled petitioner’s renewal of objection.” 
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2.2 Onus 
The courts generally agree that the burden of proof is on the accused on issues involving 
whether the defendant has standing, whether the government engaged in a search or 
seizure, whether there was government action and whether the evidence sought to be 
suppressed is the fruit of the poisonous tree.35 The burden of proof resorts with the 
prosecution to prove exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The onus will be 
with the prosecution to prove that there was an independent source for evidence or that it 
inevitably would have been discovered even without the illegal search.36 The burden of 
proof is ordinarily satisfied by preponderance of the evidence.37  
 
3. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
3.1 Standing doctrine 
In the USA an accused must have standing before he can object to the admission of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.38 A person must be able to demonstrate that he had a 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the place that was searched or the thing that was 
seized. In this part of the thesis I also explore the question whether a person has standing if 
rights of a third party have been infringed when obtaining evidence.39 A further aspect 
considered is whether a detainee may rely on the guarantees in the Fourth Amendment. In 
other words whether conduct that neither rises to the level of a search and seizure within 
the meaning of the Constitution falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.    
  
                                                          
35 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 183 (1969). 
36 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 183 (1969): ”[T]he United States concedes that when an illegal search has come 
to light, it has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted.”; see also Brown v 
Illinois  422 US 590 (1975); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 211. 
37 Nardone v US 308 US 338 (1939); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 211. 
38 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 738-739; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 
193-200; Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978): One must therefore show that the disputed search and seizure 
has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. 
39 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 172 (1969); Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978); Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 
(1963); Rawlings v Kentucky 448 US 98 (1980); US v Payner 447 US 727 (1980); see also Roberson Criminal 
justice at 53: “[B]ecause the phrase ‘of the people ‘ is immediately qualified by the use of the more 
individualistic language of ‘persons’ twice in the amendment and nowhere else in the Constitution, the 
courts have accepted the phrase to protect the individual private rights of persons and have not considered 
the phrase to refer to the people solely in the collective sense.”  
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3.1.1 Reasonable expectation of privacy 
An application to suppress the evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure may 
only be moved by an individual whose privacy has been invaded.40 
(a)  Scope of the right to privacy 
The privacy concept under the Fourth Amendment was until the latter half of the 20th 
century tied to common-law trespass and property law concepts.41 In the common law 
authority, Carrington,42 the court articulated the significance of property rights in search 
and seizure analysis: 
“Our law hold the property of every man so sacred that no man can set his foot 
upon his neighbours close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though 
he does no damage at all if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must 
justify it by law.”  
In line with the common law position the Supreme Court in Olmstead43 held that wiretaps 
attached to telephone wires on the public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search. The Court reasoned that the absence of a physical trespass or seizure of a physical 
object foreclose a Fourth Amendment inquiry.44 This approach was known as the property 
approach.45 
In Katz46 the court deviated from the Olmstead exclusively property approach.47 In casu the 
state unlawfully attached an electronic device to the outside of a telephone booth to 
                                                          
40  US v Leon 468 US 897, 910 (1984): “[S]tanding to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in which the 
 prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct.”; 
Harris v US 331 US 145 (1947); Davis v US  328 US 582 (1946); see also LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure 
at 460: “[T]he standing rule the court explained on another occasion, is premised on a recognition that the 
need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the 
Government’s unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the 
search.”   
41 LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 124: “[F]or some years the Supreme Court was of the view that for  
there to be a Fourth Amendment search there must have been a physical intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area.” 
42 Entick v Carrington 95 Eng Rep 807 (CP 1765). 
43 Olmstead v US 277 US 438 (1928). 
44 Olmstead v US 277 US 438, 457,464 (1928); see also Goldman v US 316 US 129 (1942): The court held that  
    electronic surveillance accomplished without the physical penetration of petitioners premises by tangible   
object did not violate the Fourth Amendment; Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 102. 
45 Roberson Criminal justice at 66. 
46 Katz v US 389 US 347 351 (1967). 
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monitor the defendant’s conversations. The Court observed that the existing authority to 
determine whether police violated the Fourth Amendment was the so-called trespass 
doctrine. Under this inquiry Fourth Amendment rights apply only if there has been a 
physical intrusion into a house or office. The Court observed that the advent of modern 
technology allowed law enforcement agents to electronically intercept conversations 
without physical intrusion into any house or office. It was clear that the Fourth Amendment 
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.48 
The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places.49 The 
threshold question, the Court reasoned, is whether the means by which the challenged 
evidence was acquired infringed the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.50 
Applying this framework to the facts the court ruled that the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment right was infringed through the attachment of an eavesdropping device to a 
public telephone booth.51 
 (b) The impact of Katz opinion on so-called trespass test  
The courts appear to suggest that Katz abandoned the trespass doctrine and substituted it 
with the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry.52 In other words it is no longer sufficient 
to allege possession or ownership of seized goods to establish the interest.53 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
47 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 353 (1967). 
48 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 353 (1967): ”[B]ut the premise that property interests control the right of the  
   Government to search and seize has been discredited in Warden v Hayden 387 US 294 [1967].”; see also 
Jones v US 362 US 257 (1960): The court rejected the use of property concepts to determine whether the 
movant had the necessary interest or standing to obtain exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence; Taslitz 
and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 100.  
49 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 353 (1967). 
50 Katz v US 389 US 347, 353, 360 (1967): The term reasonable expectation was coined by Justice Harlan in Katz 
v US 389 US 347 351 (1967) in his concurring judgment. The majority used the words “privacy upon which he 
   justifiably relied.” see also Bond v US 529 US 334 (2000); California v Ciraolo 476 US 207 (1986); Smith v   
Maryland 442 US 735 (1979). 
51 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 353 (1967): ”[T]he fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end 
did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”; see also US v 
Jacobsen 466 US 109,121-122 (1984): ”[F]or it is well settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law 
enforcement officials to seize effects that cannot support a justifiable expectation privacy without a warrant, 
based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband.”; LexisNexis Criminal procedure at 3.  
52 Note dissenting opinion by Alito J in US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 919 (2012); see also Rakas v Illinois 439 US 
128, 143 (1978); LexisNexis Criminal procedure at 3. 
53 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978): Passengers in automobile had no privacy interest in interior of the car and 
could not object to illegal search; see also, US v Padilla 508 US 77 (1993); Rawlings v Kentucky 448 US 98 
(1980): Fearing imminent police search, defendant deposited drugs in companion's purse where they were 
discovered in course of illegal search; defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in her purse, so 
that his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, although hers were.  
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Court in Jones54 revisited the approach attributed to Katz.  In casu the Court held that an 
attachment of a Global Positioning-system (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle 
and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets 
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.55 The prosecution argued 
that no search occurred since the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
area of the Jeep accessed by the police agents and in the locations of the Jeep on the public 
roads which were visible to all.56 The Court opined that the accused Fourth Amendment 
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. Courts must assure preservation of that 
degree of privacy against the state that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 
The Court accepted that since its adoption the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon persons, houses papers and 
effects. In support of this the Court observed that the text of the Fourth Amendment 
reflects its close connection to property. If this was not the case it would have referred 
simply to the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures 
making the phrase “in their persons houses papers and effects” superfluous.57 Consistent 
with this understanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass 
at least until the latter half of the 20th century. The Court concluded that Katz did not 
repudiate that understanding. The Court held that the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test has been added to and  did not substitute the common law trespass test and 
therefore, rejected the interpretation that Katz should be the exclusive test.58 The Court 
conceded that the Katz test may be applied in situations where there is no physical trespass 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without physical trespass.59 
(c) Test for reasonable expectation of privacy 
In Katz Judge Harlan in his concurring judgment articulated a two-fold test to determine if 
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy at the searched location.60 Firstly, an 
individual has to exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, secondly, the 
                                                          
54 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 919 (2012). 
55 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 918 (2012). 
56 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 919 (2012). 
57 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 918 (2012). 
58 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911, 920 (2012).  
59 US v Jones 181 LEd 2d 911 (2012). 
60 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 361 (1967). 
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expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable.61 LaFave and 
Israel conclude that the ultimate question under Katz is a value judgment. The courts must 
assess whether the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go 
unregulated by constitutional restraints which involves the guarantee of privacy and 
freedom consistent with the aims of a free and open society.62 
(i) Subjective expectation of privacy 
Under the first leg of the test, the person must demonstrate that he really did expect the 
area or item to be private, not that he might or often expects privacy. In Rakas63 the 
passenger in a car failed to prove that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
area searched, namely in the locked glove compartment and the area under the front 
passenger seat.64 The Court held that he could not successfully claim the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.65 In other decisions the court considered the following factors to 
determine subjective expectation of privacy: the location where the search occurs,66 
whether the individual assumed the risk that certain information will not be kept private,67 
property interests,68 social custom,69 and situations where it is generally accepted that 
individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy.70 
(ii) Society recognise as reasonable 
Secondly, the accused must establish that the expectation to privacy is objectively one that 
society is willing to recognise as reasonable. The question is whether the individual’s privacy 
                                                          
61 Katz v US 389 US 347 351, 361 (1967); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 104. 
62 LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure at 126. 
63 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978). 
64 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128, 148 (1978). 
65 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978). 
66 Hester v US 265 US 57 (1924): The court held that the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment 
to people  in their person’s houses, papers and effects’ are  not extended to open fields. 
67 Hoffa v US 385 US 293 (1966) (admissions made to an informant); California v Greenwood 486 US 35 (1988)  
   (home garbage once put outside the house); USCA Const amend 4 MGLA Const amend Art 14 Com v Cabral 
69 Mass App Ct 68 866 N.E. 2d 429 (2007) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in spittle lifted from a 
sidewalk or DNA evidence derived there from).  
68 Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128, 143 (1978). 
69 Minnesota v Olson 495 US 91 (1990): The court held that Olson had a privacy interest in the premises 
because of his status as an overnight guest. By longstanding social custom, the court said, we seek temporary 
shelter when we are in between jobs or homes or when we house-sit for a friend as well as when we travel 
to a strange city to visit relatives out of town. 
70 New Jersey v TLO 469US 325 (1985): The court held that school students have reduced privacy rights 
   expectations. 
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is objectively reasonable. The accused might claim that he expected something to be private 
but society as a whole would disagree.  
The Supreme Court in Ciraolo71 held that police conduct was a reasonable invasion of the 
accused right to privacy. The police received a tip that marijuana was growing in the 
defendant’s backyard. The police were unable to view the backyard because of two high 
fences, one ten feet high, enclosing the property. The police secured a plane and flew over 
the defendant’s house at an altitude of 1000 feet, within public navigable airspace and were 
able to identify marijuana plants with unassisted vision.72 The police subsequently obtained 
a search warrant and seized the marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 
holding that although the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, that 
expectation was unreasonable since any member of the public flying in that airspace could 
have seen everything that the officers observed.73 The Court reasoned that in this day and 
age where flights in the public airways are regular, it is unreasonable for the respondent to 
expect that the plants were constitutionally protected from being observed.74    
A person is entitled to the Fourth amendment protection of an area he seeks to preserve as 
private even if accessible to the public.75 As a result the courts held that citizens maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the “curtilage" immediately surrounding their home, 
but not in the "open fields" and "wooded areas" extending beyond this area,76 in the 
automobile that he or she is driving, but not in items that are in "plain view" from outside 
                                                          
71 California v Ciraolo 476 US 207 (1986). 
72 California v Ciraolo 476 US 207, 209 (1986). 
73 California v Ciraolo 476 US 207, 213-214 (1986).    
74 California v Ciraolo 476 US 207, 215 (1986); see also Minnesota v Olson 495 US 91, 96 (1990): “[W]e need go 
no further than to conclude, as we do, that Olson’s status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that 
he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable.”; 
Minnesota v Carter 525 US 83 (1998): The evidence revealed that  out of town defendants came to another’s 
apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine, had never been to the apartment before and were 
only in the apartment for approximately 2,5 hours. The court focused on three factors in finding that the 
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment searched: (1) The purely economical 
nature of the transaction engaged in there, (2) the relatively short period of time in the apartment and (3) 
the lack of any previous connections between the two defendants and the occupant of the apartment.”; see 
also California v Greenwood 486 US 35 (1988): The Court reasoned this was no search because the 
defendants had no subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively 
reasonable. 
75 Katz v US 389 US  347 (1967). 
76 Hester v US 265 US 57 (1924). 
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the vehicle.77 On the other hand people do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in 
personal characteristics.78 
3.1.2 Evidence obtained through infringement of third party rights 
An application to suppress the evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure may 
only be moved by an individual whose privacy has been invaded.79 The courts have 
therefore consistently ruled that an applicant cannot rely on the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence illegally obtained through a violation of a third person’s privacy.80 In 
other words the Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be asserted 
vicariously. The facts in Alderman81 are illustrative of the point. In casu the defendant 
moved for the suppression of evidence allegedly unlawfully obtained by the police, through 
electronic surveillance of a co-accused’s place of business. All the accused argued that the 
state conduct breached their Fourth Amendment rights and tainted their convictions.82 The 
accused demanded a re-trial if any of the evidence used to convict them was the product of 
unauthorised surveillance, regardless of whose Fourth Amendment rights the surveillance 
violated.83 The Court noted that the accused appear to assert an independent constitutional 
right of their own, to exclude relevant and probative evidence because it was seized from 
another in violation of the Fourth Amendment.84 This expansive reading of the Fourth 
Amendment and of the exclusionary rule fashioned to enforce it was rejected by the court 
as being inconsistent with prior cases. The Court stated that the established principle is that 
                                                          
77 Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 US 443 (1971). 
78 US v Dionisio 410 US 1, 93 SCt. 764 35 LED 2d 67 (1973). 
79 US v Leon 468 US 897, 910 (1984): ”[S]tanding to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in which the  
    prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct.”; 
Harris v US 331 US 145 (1947); Davis v US  328 US 582 (1946); see also LaFave and Israel Criminal procedure 
at 460: “[T]he standing rule the court explained on another occasion, is premised on a recognition that the 
need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the 
Government’s unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the 
search.” 
80 Weeks v US 232 US 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1964); Goldstein v US 316 US 114 (1942); Alderman 
v US 394 US 165, 171 (1969); Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978); US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984); US v Ceccolini 
435 US 268 (1978); US v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974). 
81 Alderman v US 394 US 165 (1969). 
82 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 168 (1969). 
83 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 171 (1969): “[A]t the very least, it is urged that if evidence is inadmissible against 
one defendant or conspirator, because tainted by electronic surveillance illegal as to him, it is also 
inadmissible against his co-defendant or co-conspirator.”   
84 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 171 (1969): “[I]n Mapp and Weeks the defendant against whom the evidence 
was held to be inadmissible was the victim of the search.” 
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a party seeking suppression of the evidence can only obtain the benefit of the exclusionary 
rule if he was the victim of an unlawful search and seizure as opposed to one who claims 
prejudice only through use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure 
directed at a third party.85 The Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and accords no 
special standing to co-conspirators or co-defendants and therefore may not be vicariously 
asserted.86  
The Court opined that the deterrent benefits stemming from third-party challenges are low 
because the actual victims of misconduct will normally have ample motivation to challenge 
the misconduct.87 
Cammack88 opines that a rule that entitles- only those who have suffered an unlawful search 
or seizure to invoke the exclusionary rule is arguably in tension with the current rationale 
for the rule as designed to deter Fourth Amendment violations. The author further submits 
that the logic of deterrence would seem to dictate that applying the exclusionary rule more 
widely would have the effect of further reducing the frequency of the Fourth Amendment 
violations. The author concludes that in limiting the exclusionary rule to the victims of 
unlawful searches or seizures, opens the possibility that police will conduct searches which 
they know are unlawful, in anticipation that those against whom the unlawfully obtained 
evidence is to be used, will lack standing to seek exclusion.89 
Standing is also a requirement in Canada.90 The situation is different in South Africa where 
the entitlement to the exclusionary remedy does not demand a link between the breach of 
                                                          
85 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 171-172 (1969); see also Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978): A defendant has 
standing to object to the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence only if such seizure violated that 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In other words, a defendant may not assert another person's rights; 
Jones v US 362 US 257, 261 (1960); Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631 at 642.  
86 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 172 (1969); Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978); Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 
(1963); Rawlings v Kentucky 448 US 98 (1980): Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in 
which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police 
misconduct; US v Payner 447 US 727 (1980): ”[B]ecause the improperly seized evidence was offered against a 
bank customer rather than the bank officer whose rights were violated, the Supreme Court held that the 
district court lacked authority to exclude it.” 
87 Alderman v US 394 US 165, 174-175 (1969); Jones v US 362 US 257 (1960): (Defendant had standing because 
he had the permission of the owner to be in the apartment); US v Decoud 456 F 3d 996 (Defendant did not 
have standing because he denied ownership of the property); Milligan 2007 Cardozo LR 2739 at 2782-2783.   
88 Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631. 
89 Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631 at 642.  
90 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 711-775; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 221. 
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an accused fundamental right and the securing of the evidence. 91 There is no such 
restriction under section 35(5).92 The Supreme Court of Appeal explained in Mthembu93 that 
the exclusionary remedy is applicable to unconstitutionally obtained evidence improperly 
obtained from any person, not only from the accused.94 
3.1.3 Seizure under Fourth Amendment 
(a) Detention or arrest 
The seizure of an individual is affected either by the application of physical force,95 however 
slight,96 or where that is absent, submission to an officer's show of authority to restrain the 
subject's liberty.97 The question when and whether a seizure occurs with respect to 
application of physical force has not been as difficult to determine as when and whether a 
show of authority constitutes a seizure. 
A show of authority does not constitute a seizure if the subject does not yield.98 In Hodari99 
the police approached the accused and advised him that he is under arrest. The accused 
escaped before the police could arrest him. The police gave chase and subsequently 
arrested the defendant and recovered the drugs which he abandoned just before the police 
tackled him. The Court held that even if it accepted that the police’s pursuit constituted a 
show of authority enjoining the defendant to submit, because he did not comply with that 
                                                          
91 S v Mthembu 2008 2 SACR 407 (SCA); Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 221. 
92 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 217. 
93 S v Mthembu 2008 2 SACR 407 (SCA). 
94 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 218. 
95 California v Hodari 499 US 621, 624-625 (1991); Terry v Ohio 392 US 1, 19 n 1 (1968); see Whitehead v Keyes, 
85 Mass 495, 501 (1862): "[A]n officer effects an arrest of a person whom he has authority to arrest, by 
laying his hand on him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping and holding 
him." 
96 California v Hodari 499 US 621-622, 626 (1991): An arrest discontinue during the period of fugitivity. 
97 US v Mendenhall 446 US 544 (1980); California v Hodari 499 US 621 (1991): “[T]he word seizure in the Fourth 
Amendment the court declared means a laying on of the hands or application of physical force to restrain 
movement even when it is ultimately unsuccessful and also submission to the assertion of authority as to 
which the subject does not yield.” 
98 California v Hodari 499 US 621, 626 (1991). 
99 California v Hodari 499 US 621 (1991). 
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command, he was not seized until he was tackled.100 The drug abandoned while the accused 
was running was not the fruit of a seizure.101  
In Mendenhall,102 the court formulated an objective test to determine whether a show of 
authority constitutes a seizure. A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment if 
considering all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave.103 In other words the court will look at all the 
circumstances of the encounter from the viewpoint of a hypothetical reasonable man in the 
position of the subject to determine whether the subject was detained or arrested.104 
Factors relevant to a determination of whether an individual has a reasonable belief that he 
is not free to leave includes the degree of police force or authority, the duration of time of 
the contact, the display of a weapon by an officer, the amount of restriction of movement of 
the suspect, seriousness of the suspected crime, danger to police and or citizens 
surrounding the police contact.105    
The situations that accused find themselves in at times have made it difficult for the courts 
to literally apply the so-called free to leave test. The free to leave test is employed to 
determine whether a defendant’s movement had been restricted by the police conduct. The 
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Bostick.106 In casu the police boarded a bus and without 
reasonable suspicion questioned the defendant, requested his consent to search his luggage 
for drugs and advised him of his right to refuse consent. The defendant consented and the 
officers arrested the accused after finding cocaine in his luggage. The defendant applied for 
the suppression of the drugs on the ground that it had been seized in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.107 The sole issue for determination by the Court was whether a police 
encounter on a bus necessarily constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court observed that the courts erred in focusing on the literal 
                                                          
100 California v Hodari 499 US 621, 626, 629 (1991); see also Leen “Educational manual” at 38.  
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meaning of the words free to leave, rather than on the principle that the words were 
intended to capture.108 The Court opined that the free to leave inquiry is not an accurate 
measure of an encounter's coercive effect when a person is seated on a bus about to depart 
or has no desire to leave or would not feel free to leave even if there were no police 
present.109 The Court stated the free to leave analysis is inapplicable and the appropriate 
test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a 
reasonable passenger would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise 
terminate the encounter.110 The rule is applicable to encounters on the street, airport 
lobbies and equally applies to encounters on a bus.111   
 (b) Stop and Frisk (Investigative detention) 
In certain situations the police detain individuals for the sole purpose to investigate. The 
question arises whether an individual in these situations may rely on the guarantees in the 
Fourth Amendment. In other words, whether conduct that neither rises to the level of a 
search and seizure within the meaning of the Constitution falls outside the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment.112     
In Terry113 the court considered whether a stop and frisk (detention for investigative 
purposes and so-called surface searches) by police officers constitute conduct outside of the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment.  In casu a police officer observed the unusual conduct of 
defendant and two other men and concluding that these men contemplated a daylight 
robbery, proceeded to detain and search them. The defendant in a pre-trial motion moved 
for the suppression of the firearms discovered during the search to be introduced at his 
trial. The question the Court had to determine was when and whether the police seized the 
defendant and when and whether the police conducted a search. The Court rejected the 
                                                          
108 Florida v Bostick 501 US 429, 435 (1991). 
109 Florida v Bostick 501 US 429, 435-436 (1991): The present case is analytically indistinguishable from INS v  
     Delgado 466 US 210, 215 (1984). Like the workers in that case, Bostick's freedom of movement was 
restricted by a factor independent of police conduct - i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus. 
110 Florida v Bostick 501 US 429, 436, 439 (1991); see also INS v Delgado 466 US 210, 215 (1984): ”[N]o seizure  
     occurred when INS agents visited factories at random, stationing  some agents at exits while others 
questioned workers, because, even though workers were not free to leave without being questioned, the 
agents' conduct gave them no reason to believe that they would be detained if they answered truthfully or 
refused to answer.”; Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure at 302. 
111 Florida v Bostick 501 US 429, 439-440 (1991). 
112 See in general Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 197. 
113 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1, 19 (1968). 
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argument that stop and frisk conduct is outside of the purview of the Fourth Amendment 
because neither action constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Constitution.114 The Court stated that a distinction between stop and arrest and on the 
other hand frisk and search seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of 
the contact between the policeman and the citizen.115 The Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment governs seizures of individuals which do not eventuate in arrest in traditional 
terminology. 116 The Court held that whenever a police officer by means of physical force or 
show of authority on an individual restrains his freedom to walk away he has seized that 
person.117 The Fourth Amendment, the Court found, is applicable as a limitation upon police 
conduct if the police officer stopped short of something called a “technical arrest” or a “full 
blown search.”118  
 (c)  Interference with possessory interest 
A person has standing in the case of a seizure of a thing, if he demonstrates that he has a 
substantial possessory interest in that property.119 The courts employ the principles of 
property law to determine possessory interest.120 An individual does not have standing to 
suppress evidence in circumstances where he has been a passenger in a vehicle and not the 
owner of the vehicle or the weapons seized;121 drugs in the purse of his girlfriend122  or 
where the accused is charged with the possession of stolen mail.123 
3.2 The Objective Justification Doctrine 
The exclusionary rule will not apply in cases where an officer may have misidentified the 
proper justification for a search or seizure, but his conduct can actually be justified on some 
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objective basis. This is generally referred to as the objective justification doctrine. In 
Devenpeck124 the court considered the question whether an arrest is lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment when the criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is 
not closely related to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of arrest. The 
accused approached a disabled automobile and its passengers by activating his “wig–wag” 
headlights. Noticing the approaching law enforcement officer the accused hurried to his car 
and drove away. The police suspected the accused of impersonating a police officer and 
pursued his vehicle and pulled him over. In the vehicle the police noticed a pair of handcuffs 
and observed that he was listening in on a police frequency on a special radio. The police 
questioned the accused about the headlights and whether he was a police officer. In the 
course of the questioning the police noted that the defendant recorded their conversation. 
The police proceeded to arrest him for unlawfully recording their conversation. In the 
criminal trial the charges were dismissed against the accused. The accused instituted a claim 
for damages for unlawful arrest and imprisonment. Both claims were founded upon the 
allegation that the police arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. The court a quo held that the probable-cause inquiry is confined to 
the known facts bearing upon the offence actually invoked at the time of arrest and that (in 
addition) the offence supported by these known facts must be closely related to the offense 
that the officer invoked. The Court found no basis in precedent or reason for the 
limitation.125 The case law reveals that an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the 
facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.126 The Court concluded 
that the important issue determined is whether the circumstances viewed objectively justify 
the action rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the 
officer.127 In casu the officer's conduct was objectively justifiable. The arrest was lawful and 
therefore there could be no exclusion of evidence. 
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3.3 Attenuated taint doctrine 
The attenuation doctrine recognises an exception to suppression if the connection between 
the constitutional breach and the discovery of the evidence becomes so attenuated (weak) 
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies the social costs.128  The 
notion of the “dissipation of the taint” attempts to mark the point at which the adverse 
effects of the unconstitutional conduct become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.129 The Supreme Court in Hudson130 
identified two forms of attenuation. The first is based on the nature of the causal links 
between the constitutional violation and the discovery of the evidence and the second on 
the relationship between the purposes served by the rule that was violated and the 
exclusion of the evidence.131 
3.3.1 Nature of the causal connection 
(a) The so-called but for requirement 
In Wong Sun132 the court stated that it need not hold that evidence is the fruit of the 
poisonous tree simply because it would not have been obtained but for the illegal actions of 
the police.133 In casu the accused was unlawfully arrested and subsequently released. A few 
days later the accused voluntarily returned and made a confession to the police. The Court 
accepted that the accused would never have confessed but for the prior arrest. 
Notwithstanding, the Court held that the connection between his unlawful arrest and the 
statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. If the illegal action of the 
police has been established, the question is rather whether the evidence has been 
improperly obtained or whether the connection between the constitutional breach and the 
discovery of the evidence is so weak that its admissibility is not purged by the primary 
taint.134  
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The “but for” as determinative factor of the issue has been rejected in several other 
decisions by the Supreme Court.135 In Segura136 the court stated that the  “but for” test is 
not sufficient to resolve the question of admissibility when it is claimed that evidence 
obtained as a result of a previous constitutional breach is “tainted”  or is “fruit” of a prior 
illegality.  Grey agrees that a “but for” test would have very broad and far reaching effects in 
excluding evidence that could have no meaningful relationship to the initial illegality.137  
The court resolved the question of attenuation by considering the totality of the 
circumstances.138 A determination of the question of attenuation may not be premised on 
the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a “but-for-cause” of obtaining evidence.139 
The courts enumerated three factors in determining whether there has been sufficient 
attenuation: the temporal proximity of the illegality and the illegal evidence, the presence of 
intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct and the 
willingness of the witness to testify.140 
(b) Proximity of the illegality and the illegal evidence 
The proximity between the actual illegality and the evidence obtained is a factor to consider 
when determining whether there has been sufficient attenuation. It is not a mathematically 
precise test involving a determination of how much time must pass in order to purge the 
taint.141 Generally a shorter lapse of time between the constitutional violation and the 
acquisition of the impugned evidence will more often result in a court concluding that the 
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evidence is tainted.142 For example, in Wong Sun the court suppressed a statement taken 
from the defendant in his bedroom immediately after his unlawful arrest.143  
 (c ) The presence of intervening circumstances 
A court need not exclude evidence if an intervening event purges the taint of the initial 
illegality.144 Illegally obtained evidence is deemed to have lost its taint if several intervening 
events are established between the constitutional breach and its acquisition. The court in 
Wong Sun refused to exclude a confession obtained from the accused. The Court held that 
the illegally obtained evidence lost its taint of the earlier Fourth Amendment violation 
through the intervening act when the accused voluntarily returned to the police station and 
provided a written statement.145  
(d) The purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct 
The exclusionary rule need not apply if the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct 
was not intended to discover the impugned evidence. In Ceccolini146 the court refused to 
suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was learned as a result of constitutional 
violation. The Court found that the police’s illegality was not designed or intended to 
discover the identity of the witness.147 The essence of the analysis is whether the evidence 
was discovered as a result of the exploitation of the illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.148 
(e) Willingness of the witness to testify 
This factor does not merely require that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard 
of voluntariness but the conduct should be sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 
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primary taint.149 The court in Brown150 considered the meaning of the words free will. The 
issue determined by the court was whether the statements by the accused were to be 
excluded as the fruit of the illegal arrest, or should be included in the trial because the giving 
of the Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated the taint of the arrest. The Court observed 
that it is not merely required that the statement meet the standard of voluntariness but 
that the question whether a confession is the product of a free will must be answered on 
the facts of each case, no single fact is dispositive.151 Factors considered by the court 
included: the Miranda warnings, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, 
the presence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct and the voluntariness of the witness.152 
3.3.2 The relationship between the purposes of the rule that was violated and suppression 
In Hudson153 the court articulated a second form of attenuation based on the relationship 
between the purposes served by the rule that was violated and the exclusion of the 
evidence.154 In casu the court observed that the interests served by the “knock-and-
announce” rule include protection against violence that could occur if the occupant 
mistakenly believed that the officers were intruders, the protection against destruction of 
property caused by the unnecessary forced entry, and the protection of privacy and dignity 
interests that can be compromised by a sudden entrance. Since the exclusion of evidence 
obtained following a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule furthered none of these 
interests the court found the discovery of the evidence to be attenuated.155 
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3.4 The Inevitable Discovery doctrine 
The Supreme Court in Nix156 held that logic, experience and common sense necessitated the 
adoption of the inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule.157 In 
this seminal case the court not only adopted and employed the inevitable discovery 
doctrine but defined the rationale and formulated certain principles underlying it. In casu 
the defendant was arrested for the murder of a 10 year old girl. The police subsequent to 
the arrest gave defence counsel undertakings that the accused would not be questioned 
concerning the facts of the case. Whilst escorting the accused to the place where he was to 
be charged one of the officers began a conversation with him that ultimately resulted in the 
accused making incriminating statements and directing the officers to the child’s body. The 
issue before the court was whether the illegally obtained evidence pertaining to the 
discovery and condition of a murder victim’s body, could properly be admitted on the 
ground that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any 
constitutional or statutory provision had taken place.158 Employing the inevitable discovery 
doctrine the Court held that although the evidence was illegally obtained it should be 
included in the trial.159 The doctrine, the Court intimated, rests on the rationale that 
society’s interest in the purpose of deterrence and the public interest in the inclusion of all 
probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a 
worse position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had 
occurred.160 The inevitable discovery doctrine requires that the prosecution shows by a 
preponderance of evidence that the police would have discovered the evidence by lawful 
                                                          
156 Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984).  
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means. The police successfully demonstrated that they had planned to search the area 
where the body was found the next day. The Court concluded that despite the defendant’s 
statement about the location the police would have found the evidence even without the 
illegal conduct.161 In summary, the inevitable discovery doctrine prescribes that although 
evidence is prematurely found through an unreasonable search or seizure, it need not be 
suppressed if it would have been found lawfully in due course.162 The state must establish 
by a preponderance of evidence that at the time of the misconduct or after the misconduct 
there was an independent line of police investigation underway which developed facts not 
as result of the misconduct and would have led to the discovery of the evidence.  
The inevitable discovery doctrine could apply, if the prosecution establishes that there was a 
standard inventory procedure in effect that would have turned up the same evidence.163 For 
example, the court refused to suppress the discovery of cocaine in a misrouted suitcase 
because the cocaine would have been found by the airline when it searched the suitcase for 
identity of the owner.164 The inevitable discovery doctrine requires more than an argument 
about things that in retrospect the police could have done and therefore would not apply in 
cases where the police have probable cause to search without a warrant but argue that they 
could have acquired a search warrant.165  
Supporters of the doctrine argue that it is logical and will serve well, the goal of the 
exclusionary rule, by denying the state the use of illegally obtained evidence and at the 
same time it minimises the opportunity for the defendant to receive an undeserved and 
socially undesirable benefit.166 The doctrine is, on the other hand, criticised because it is 
based on conjecture and may potentially encourage police to take short cuts whenever 
evidence may be more readily obtained by illegal rather than by legal means.167  
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3.5 The Independent Source Doctrine 
The Supreme Court holdings clearly state that the exclusionary rule has no application 
where the State learned of the evidence from an independent source.168 The rationale of 
the independent source doctrine is premised on the notion that if there is an independent 
source for challenged evidence the police should be placed in no worse a position than if the 
unlawful conduct had not occurred.169 In other words the independent source doctrine 
continues to balance protecting constitutional rights while also avoiding a situation where 
the police are placed in a worse position than before a tainted search.170 The independent 
source doctrine does not require the prosecution to establish the existence of a separate or 
distinct line of inquiry leading to the same evidence.171 
Under the independent source doctrine evidence illegally discovered without a search 
warrant is admissible if the evidence is later found and legally seized based on information 
independent of the illegal search.172 In Segura173 federal agents unlawfully entered the 
accused’s apartment and remained there until a search warrant was obtained. The search 
warrant was untainted because the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not refer 
to the unlawful search but was rather based on the information possessed by the agents 
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before they entered the apartment. The Court held that the evidence obtained through the 
execution of the warrant was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to an 
independent source unconnected to the invalid entry.174 
In Segura the court left unanswered the question of the admissibility of evidence discovered 
before the police obtained the search warrant. In Murray175 the court answered this 
question. In casu informants advised federal agents that the accused were trafficking in 
illegal drugs. The police decided to monitor and conduct surveillance on the accused. Agents 
observed the accused driving vehicles into a warehouse and leaving. The vehicles driven by 
the defendants were stopped and lawfully searched and they were found to contain drugs. 
Based on this information the agents forced their way into the warehouse where they saw a 
number of marijuana bales.176 They left without disturbing the bales and returned with a 
search warrant. In applying for the search warrant the agents relied on the evidence of an 
informant and the results of the vehicle search. The police did not mention their illegal entry 
into the warehouse or the drugs discovered.177 The opinion of the Court was that the taint 
of the illegal search was erased by the subsequent legal warrant search. The warrantless 
entry did not contribute either to the issuance of a warrant or to the discovery of the 
evidence during the lawful search pursuant to the warrant. The Court refused to suppress 
the evidence discovered in the warehouse and stated that the evidence would be admissible 
so long as the fruits of the illegal search were not used to obtain the warrant.178 The 
doctrine applies to evidence obtained for the first time during an independent lawful 
search, as well as to evidence initially discovered during an unlawful search but later 
obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.179  
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3.6 The Good Faith doctrine 
3.6.1 Nature of the Good faith exception 
In the mid 1980s the Supreme Court created the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, implicitly repudiating the notion that the exclusionary rule was a necessary corollary of 
the Fourth Amendment.180 The doctrine permits the inclusion of evidence illegally obtained 
through police conduct that was objectively reasonable and pursued in good faith.181 The 
good faith doctrine was employed to the facts in Leon.182 The police in this case seized drugs 
on reliance of a warrant they believed to be valid but was later determined to be 
unsupported by probable cause. A review of the case law revealed that the Fourth 
Amendment has never been interpreted to proscribe the inclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.183 The Court observed that the 
driving policy behind the creation of the exclusionary rule was to deter law enforcement 
officers from acting unlawfully.184 The evidence revealed that the officer’s conduct was in 
good faith because they believed that they were acting lawfully and therefore excluding the 
evidence would not serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.185 The deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule would further not be served in this case because the 
misconduct was the result of an error by a magistrate and not the police and there was no 
evidence suggesting that the judiciary are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
Amendment.186 The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule’s purposes will only be 
rarely served by applying it in such circumstances.187 
                                                          
180 Massachusetts v Sheppard 468 US 981 (1984); US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). 
181 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984); Massachusetts v Sheppard 468 US 981, 987-988 (1984). 
182 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). 
183 US v Leon 468 US 897, 905 (1984): The court referred to Stone v Powell 428 US 465. 
184 US v Leon 468 US 897, 908 (1984); see US v Calandra 414 US 338, 348 (1974): The court declined to allow 
grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or 
seizure since any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury 
proceedings is uncertain at best; Michigan v Tucker 417 US 433 (1974): "[W]here official action was 
pursued in complete good faith, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." 
185 US v Leon 468 US 897, 926 (1984).  
186 US v Leon 468 US 897, 916 (1984): Also referred to in subsequent cases as the Leon framework; see also  
     Massachusetts v Sheppard 468 US 981, 990-991 (1984): ”[S]uppressing evidence because the judge failed to  
     make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made will not  
     serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” 
187 US v Leon 468 US 897, 926 (1984). 
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Leon is not an authority in that the good faith doctrine applies generally in situations where 
searches are executed in reliance on warrants. The good faith exception recognised by the 
court will not apply in situations if it is unreasonable for the executing officers to presume it 
to be valid. For example: if the judicial officer issues a warrant, was misled by information in 
an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his 
reckless disregard of the truth;188 where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role (in such circumstances no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the 
warrant),189 a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,190 and lastly a warrant that is so facially 
deficient, namely failing to particularise the place to be searched or the things to be 
seized.191  
In Leon the court took a narrow view and limited the good faith exception to those instances 
where the officer conducted a search pursuant to a warrant issued by a detached and 
neutral magistrate.192 The court has since Leon extended the good faith doctrine to a 
number of other contexts. In Krull193 the court considered whether the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule should be recognised when officers acted in objectively reasonable 
reliance upon a statute authorising warrantless administrative searches, but where the 
statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth Amendment.194 The Court held that the 
approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the present case. The suppression of evidence 
obtained by an officer acting in good faith reasonable reliance on a statute, would have as 
little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions, as would the exclusion of evidence when an 
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.195 The Court found that the 
                                                          
188 Franks v Delaware 438 US 154 (1978). 
189 Lo-Ji Sales v New York 442 US 319 (1979): In this case the court held that the judge allowed himself to 
become a member if not the leader of the search party. The court reasoned that evidence obtained when 
the judge has abandoned his or her judicial role is inadmissible because the officer who relies on a warrant 
issued by such a judge is not acting in good faith, and the evidence subsequently obtained is therefore 
inadmissible. 
190 Brown v Illinois 422 US 590, 610-611 (1975). 
191 Massachusetts v Sheppard 468 US 981, 988-991 (1984); Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal procedure 
at 555-556.  
192 Bloom 1992 American J Crim L 71 at 89. 
193 Illinois v Krull 480 US 340, 342 (1987). 
194 Illinois v Krull 480 US 340, 342 (1987). 
195 Illinois v Krull 480 US 340, 349 (1987). 
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police officer’s reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable.196 The Court stated that 
its holding would not have followed if (a) the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility 
to enact constitutional laws or (b) if a reasonably well trained officer should have known 
that the statute was unconstitutional.197  
 In Evans198 the court applied the Leon framework and concluded that it supports a 
categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.199 In 
casu the warrantless search was based on an error made by a court employee, rather than 
by a police officer. The evidence did not reveal that the police officer did not act objectively 
reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record.200 The Court opined that the 
exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors because court clerks 
are not adjuncts to law enforcement teams.201  
Evans left unresolved the issue whether evidence should be suppressed if the police 
committed the error. The authority since Evans stood for the proposition that police act in 
good faith if they rely on information supplied by courts, legislatures and other police 
agencies. The Supreme Court had not approved the admission of evidence seized 
unconstitutionally by police relying on their own mistaken information. The court in 
Herring202 further extended the scope of the exception by holding that police act in good 
faith if they rely on information supplied by a police clerk in a separate county. The Court 
stated that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence found due to negligence 
regarding a government database, as long as the arresting police officer relied on that 
database in good faith and that the negligence was not pervasive.203 The Court denied 
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant on the grounds that 
the police had not exhibited deliberate reckless or grossly negligent conduct or recurring or 
systemic negligence.  
                                                          
196 Illinois v Krull 480 US 340, 356 (1987). 
197 Illinois v Krull 480 US 340, 355 (1987); see also Leen “Educational manual” at 14. 
198 Arizona v Evans 514 US 1 (1995). 
199 Arizona v Evans 514 US 1, 16 (1995). 
200 Arizona v Evans 514 US 1, 16 (1995). 
201 Arizona v Evans 514 US 1, 14 (1995). 
202 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009).  
203 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009): The court held that the police conduct constituted good faith because the 
officer’s error was not deliberate and the officers involved were not culpable; People v Robinson 224 P 3d 
55 (Cal 2010): In People v Robinson the court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence acquired 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a police agency relying on its own mistaken information. 
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In Davis204 the good faith exception was further extended to a warrantless search conducted 
in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. In Davis the accused was a passenger 
in the vehicle stopped by the police and later arrested and charged for illegal possession of a 
firearm. The accused brought a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun tendered by the 
prosecution. The question in Davis was whether the exclusionary remedy is available when 
the police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.205 
The accused argued that the evidence should be suppressed in light of the recent judgment 
in Gant.206 Gant overruled the longstanding principle that a lawful arrest of a recent 
occupant of a vehicle justifies a search even after the arrestee is secured. The court in Gant 
held that once the person is secured, a subsequent vehicle search may only be conducted 
where there is reason to believe the search will reveal evidence of the arrest offence. The 
Court refused to suppress the gun and accepted that under Gant the vehicle search 
subsequent to Davis's arrest would not have been permissible. The Court held that searches 
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject 
to the exclusionary rule because suppression would not serve to deter police misconduct in 
these circumstances and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and public 
safety.207    
3.6.2 Cost-benefit analysis 
The exclusionary rule applies only if the goal of deterrence is furthered. The Court adopted 
the cost-benefit analysis to determine when the goal of deterrence is furthered.208 In the 
cost-benefit analysis the extent to which application of the rule advances the deterrent 
benefits of exclusion is weighed against the social costs of exclusion.209 The benefit of the 
exclusionary rule is the goal of deterrence on the future unlawful conduct of law 
                                                          
204 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011). 
205 Arizona v Gant 556 US 332 (2009). 
206 Arizona v Gant 556 US 332 (2009). 
207 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 296-297, 302 (2011). 
208 Hudson v Michigan 547 US 586, 596 (2006); US v Leon 468 US 897, 909, 921 (1984): Deterrence is a 
necessary condition for exclusion but not sufficient, the analysis must also account for the substantial cost 
generated by the rule; US v Calandra 414 US 338, 348 (1974): Specifically acknowledging use of the cost/ 
benefit analysis to determine whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate; Alderman v US 
394 US 165, 174-175 (1969); Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 633; Bloom 1992 American J 
Crim L 71 at 88.  
209 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 294 (2011); Herring v US 555 US 135, 141 (2009).  
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enforcement officers.210 Grey argues that there are two other important factors to consider 
in the analysis of the deterrent benefit of the rule, namely; whether other forms of 
deterrence exist, such as civil suits or internal police discipline and secondly, whether the 
strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act is addressed.211 The primary costs is 
that the exclusionary rule interferes with the truth seeking functions of a criminal trial by 
barring relevant and trustworthy evidence and setting free the guilty.212 The exclusionary 
rule is employed only if the goals of deterrence outweigh its social costs. If the costs are 
deemed to outweigh the minimal benefits of exclusion even though the police misconduct 
amounts to a constitutional violation, to exclude the evidence from trial would do little or 
nothing to deter officers from engaging in such conduct in the future.213 
In Herring214 a review of the case law revealed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
deter deliberate reckless or grossly negligent conduct or in some circumstances recurring or 
systemic negligence.215 Based on this the Court slightly recalibrated the cost-benefit analysis 
applied in Leon and its progeny by focussing on the flagrancy of the police misconduct. The 
Court held that the exclusionary rule is triggered only when the police conduct is sufficiently 
deliberate and exclusion can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. This, the Court reasoned, is 
consistent with the Leon line of cases wherein the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with 
the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue.216 The majority viewed culpable 
conduct as that which is deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, or in some circumstances 
recurring or systemic negligence (pattern of repeated mistakes on validity of warrants).217 
The court in Davis218 affirmed the necessity for culpable action as a prerequisite for 
deterrence. The Court opined that conduct absent of culpability is not deliberate enough to 
                                                          
210 Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 633-634. 
211 Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 633-634.  
212 Illinois v Gates 462 US 213 (1983). 
213 Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 635. 
214 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009). 
215 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); see also US v Leon 468 US 897, 905 (1984). 
216 Herring v US 555 US 135, 143 (2009); see also Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011). 
217 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 295 (2011); Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009); De Golian 2012 Mercer LR 751 at 
764-765: “[D]avis narrowed the exclusionary rule by strongly affirming that evidence will only be excluded 
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218 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011). 
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yield meaningful deterrence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the officer’s reliance 
on binding precedent did not create sufficient culpability and therefore deterring such 
behaviour would not be conducive to achieve the goal of the exclusionary rule.219 The police 
acted in strict compliance with binding precedent and their behaviour was not wrongful. 
The analysis of deterrence and culpability is not an inquiry into the subjective knowledge of 
the police.220 The officer’s knowledge and experience may be a factor to consider but is not 
determinative.221 A mistaken belief or ignorance of constitutional standards alone does not 
qualify as good faith. The state must establish not only that the officer had a subjective 
good-faith belief that his actions were lawful, but also that it was objectively reasonable for 
the officer to hold that belief. The objective inquiry is confined to the question whether a 
reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the conduct was illegal in light of all 
of the circumstances.222 In Herring the court found that the recordkeeping errors were the 
result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. The Court concluded that the 
conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion and therefore bar 
the jury from considering all the evidence. The Court said: 
“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate 
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not 
rise to that level.”223 
                                                          
219 Davis v US 180 L Ed 2d 285, 304-309 (2011); see also dissenting judgment of Breyer J: The judge suggests 
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It appears that evidence will be included if the constitutional violation by police occurred 
through inadvertent or accidental conduct after making a good faith attempt to obey the 
law.224  
 
4. REAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH COMPULSION 
The admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence should not only be considered 
against the principles underlying the exclusionary rule but it should be assessed against the 
provisions and standards of the Fourth Amendment.225 Under the Fourth Amendment 
search and seizures must be reasonable to be held constitutional. Reasonableness is 
determined on a case-by-case basis because it is dependent on the context within which the 
search takes place.  
4.1 So-called reasonable balancing test 
The obtainment of real evidence, whether by means of a warrant or warrantless, is 
reasonable if the state establishes a superior interest in the search and seizure.  To 
determine whether a state has a superior interest the courts employ the so-called 
reasonable-balancing test.226 The balancing test involves weighing the level of intrusiveness 
of the state conduct against the state interest in the search and seizure. Accordingly, the 
search and seizure is reasonable if the state’s interest outweighs the level of intrusiveness 
into the individual’s privacy interest.227  
In Camara228 the court applied this test to determine whether the state conduct in question 
(warrantless search authorised by legislation) was reasonable. The appellant awaited trial 
on a charge that he violated the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a 
warrantless inspection of his residence. In an application to stop his prosecution he argued 
                                                          
224 Herring v US 555 US 135 (2009): “[W]hen police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of 
isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of 
constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.”; see also Brewer v Williams 430 US 387 
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225 Katz v US 389 US 347 (1967); Roberson Criminal justice at 55. 
226 Camara v Municipal Court 387 US 523, 528 (1967); see also Taslitz and Paris Constitutional criminal  
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227 Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 627; see also Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968).   
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that the ordinance authorising the warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. He alleged 
the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment by authorising municipal officials to enter a 
private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a 
violation of the Housing Code exists therein.229 The Court affirmed that the Fourth 
Amendment standard is reasonableness, meaning the state interest must outweigh the 
intrusion upon personal freedom.230 The Court intimated that the reasonable balancing test 
gives recognition to the competing public and private interest at stake and in so doing fulfils 
the purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable invasions of 
privacy.231 The Court held that the legislation authorising the warrantless search caused 
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment because it 
subjected the accused to the discretion of the law enforcement agents whether to invade 
private property. The state’s interest, the Court opined, can equally be attained through 
warrant procedures. The Court determined that this substantial weakening of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections outweighed the justification for upholding the warrantless 
searches.232 
 
 Similarly the Supreme Court held reasonable the search of scholars for the presence of 
drugs,233 the fruits and instrumentalities of crime;234 as well as searches or seizures which 
involves finger prints,235 blood,236 urine samples,237 fingernail and skin scrapings,238  voices 
and handwriting exemplars.239 The courts require a more substantial justification for 
searches undertaken in situations where society recognises a heightened expectation of 
privacy such as the physical penetration of the body.240 
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4.2 Physical penetration of the body 
A compelled surgical intrusion into the individual’s body for evidence requires an inquiry 
into the facts and circumstances to determine whether the intrusion is justifiable. Thus, the 
reasonableness of a particular practice is determined by balancing the individual’s right to 
protection for personal privacy and bodily dignity against illegal intrusions into the body 
against the prosecution’s interest in gathering evidence necessary to determine the accused 
guilt or innocence.241  
In Schmerber242 the court considered the question whether the means and procedures 
employed during the taking of a blood sample respected the relevant Fourth Amendment 
standards of reasonableness.243 The accused moved for the suppression of evidence 
obtained as a result of blood obtained from his body without his consent. The Court 
intimated that the reasonableness of a surgical intrusion should be determined on a case-
by-case approach. To determine if the procedure meets the reasonableness standard, the 
individual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in 
conducting the procedure. Considering the privacy interest the Court held that the test was 
reasonable in the sense that such tests are common place and involve virtually no risk, 
trauma or pain and that the blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices.244 Weighed against the privacy interest is the 
community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. The evidence 
revealed that a blood test is effective to determine the degree to which an accused is under 
the influence, there had been a clear indication that the extraction would produce evidence 
of crime (defendant was intoxicated while driving), and the blood test was of vital 
importance to prove the crime.245 The Court concluded that the compelled blood test was 
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.246 The Court recognised society’s interest in 
maintaining the individual’s integrity to privacy and therefore cautioned that although the 
Constitution does not forbid minor intrusions by the prosecution into the body of the 
                                                          
241 Gitles  1985 The journal of criminal law and criminology 972.  
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accused under stringently limited conditions in no way permits more substantial intrusions 
or intrusions under other conditions.247  
Schmerber did not articulate the difference between permissible “minor” intrusions and 
impermissible “major” intrusion. Notwithstanding, the Court, in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment held that reasonableness is properly decided on the facts and circumstances of 
each case.248   
The court extended the Schmerber framework to the context of court-ordered surgical 
intrusions.249 In Winston250 the complainant was approached by the accused where after an 
exchange of gun fire ensued resulting in both parties sustaining injuries. The accused was 
later found suffering from a gunshot wound to the chest and taken to hospital. At the 
hospital the complainant identified the accused as the assailant. The prosecution 
subsequently brought an application for an order directing the accused to undergo surgery 
using local anaesthetic to remove the bullet. Based on the expert medical testimony the 
court a quo granted the order.  Prior to the surgery the x-rays revealed that the bullet was 
lodged much deeper than anticipated and that the surgeon subsequently recommended 
general anaesthetic. The Court reasoned that the competing interests that arise in 
extracting blood from a suspect (Schmerber) are similarly raised when a suspect undergoes 
surgery for the removal of bullets. Employing the Schmerber framework the Court stated 
that the individual’s interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity should be weighed 
against the community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt.251 The court’s 
inquiry therefore must focus on the extent of the intrusion on the respondent’s privacy 
interests and on the state’s need for evidence.252 In determining whether medical tests and 
procedures are reasonable the Court considered the extent to which the procedure 
threatens the individual’s safety or health, the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s 
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity and the importance of the 
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evidence to the prosecution’s case.253 Considering the community’s interest in the truth 
finding function of the courts the Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish a 
compelling need to intrude into the accused’s body which in turn limited the need to 
compel the accused to undergo the surgery. In addition the Court found that the state had 
available substantial evidence to prove its case. The Court ruled that to compel surgery 
would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and would violate the 
accused right to be secure in his person.254 The Supreme Court observed that the medical 
procedure is an example of the more substantial intrusion cautioned against in Schmerber.  
Discussions of these judgments gave rise to a number of points of view. For example, Gitles 
argues that Winston offers little practical guidance concerning the relative weights to be 
assigned to each interest. The opinion fails to discuss at what point the prosecution’s 
evidentiary needs will outweigh the suspect’s Fourth Amendment interests and furthermore 
does not address whether the heinousness of the crime committed should be considered in 
the balancing test.255 Taslitz256 opines that the court does not usually balance the privacy 
and public interests on a case-by-case basis. He suggests that the courts engage in balancing 
privacy and public interests with the sole purpose to craft a new rule for future cases to fit 
into a certain category. The effect of such a new rule is that at the hearing of future cases 
the court will first assess whether it falls within the created category and if it does, applies 
the rule to the facts in order to determine whether the police acted reasonably.257 
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5. CONCLUSION 
There are fundamental differences between the exclusionary rule applicable in the USA and 
South Africa. The South African exclusionary rule is discretionary and is contained in the 
Constitution whereas in the USA a strict court-created exclusionary rule is employed. 
Notwithstanding these important distinctions the South African courts can benefit with 
regard to the interpretation of a number of aspects from the USA jurisprudence.  
The admission of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence may be challenged in South 
Africa in a trial-within-a-trial process but in the USA (like in Canada) a motion to suppress 
must be issued and filed prior to the trial. Except for this distinction the processes are 
substantively comparable. Real evidence will be excluded at a defendant’s later trial if the 
motion to suppress is upheld. The onus in both jurisdictions rests on the accused and must 
be satisfied on a preponderance of the evidence.258 The onus resorts with the prosecution, 
for example in proving that there was an independent source for unconstitutionally 
obtained real evidence or that it inevitably would have been discovered even without the 
illegal search.259  
In contrast to the USA and Canada the threshold requirement of standing is not applicable 
to South Africa because of the difference in the rationale of the exclusionary rule and the 
wording of section 35(5). In the USA a person must demonstrate that he had a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" in the place that was searched or the real evidence that was seized. 
An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy if he exhibits an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and secondly, the expectation must be one that society is prepared 
to recognise as reasonable.260 The exclusionary remedy does not apply in circumstances 
where real evidence was illegally obtained through a violation of a third person’s privacy.261 
The admissibility of real evidence may be challenged by a person if obtained by means of 
physical force or show of authority on an individual, which restrains his freedom to walk 
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away or where the search and seizure stopped short of something called a “technical arrest” 
or a “full blown search.”262 A person also has standing in the case of a seizure of real 
evidence if he demonstrates that he has a substantial possessory interest in that 
property.263 
In the USA unconstitutionally obtained real evidence is generally inadmissible, except when 
any of the exceptions created by the courts finds application. The exceptions to the 
exclusionary remedy include the "objective justification" doctrine,264 the "attenuated taint" 
doctrine,265 the "inevitable discovery" doctrine,266 the "independent source" doctrine,267  
and the "good faith" doctrine.268 The exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been adopted 
because suppression of real evidence in certain cases would not serve the twin purposes of 
the exclusionary rule, namely deterrence and judicial integrity. The exceptions created by 
the Supreme Court of the USA can assist South African courts in its interpretation of section 
35(5) more especially as regards the second leg of the test, that is, whether admission of the 
real evidence would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.269 
In addition to the exclusionary exceptions the USA courts must consider whether real 
evidence has been obtained in compliance with the standards of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that evidence should not be obtained through an 
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure is reasonable if the state’s interest 
outweighs the level of intrusiveness into the individual’s privacy interest.270  
The USA Constitution does not contain a specific right to privacy but it is implicitly 
guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment. In cases where real evidence is obtained through 
compulsion both the South African courts and the USA courts stress the importance of the 
right to privacy and associated rights. The courts in the USA apply a so-called reasonable 
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263 Jones v US 362 US 257 (1960): Property interest was held to sufficiently predicate for standing under the 
Fourth Amendment; US v Jacobsen 466 US 109, 113 (1984); Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978): The courts 
have held that an accused does not have standing who does not have property or possessory interest; 
Klotter and Kanovitz Constitutional law at 251. 
264 Devenpack v Alford 543 US 146 (2004). 
265 Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 (1963). 
266 Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984). 
267 Murray v US 487 US 533 (1988). 
268 US v Leon 468 US 897 (1984). 
269 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 194. 
270 Grey 2008 University of San Francisco LR 621 at 627; see also Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968).   
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balancing test to determine the reasonableness of search and seizure of real evidence. Real 
evidence obtained through compulsion in circumstances where the person has a decreased 
expectation of privacy, is usually considered reasonable. In circumstances of heightened 
expectation of privacy the courts require additional justification. For example, the courts in 
the USA employ the Schmerber framework to determine the admissibility of real evidence 
emanating from the body of an accused. The court’s inquiry focuses on the extent of the 
intrusion on the respondent’s privacy interests and on the state’s need for evidence.271 The 
test involves balancing the individual’s interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity 
against the community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt.272 This 
framework cannot assist the South African courts because of the inherent limitation of the 
scope of the right to privacy which produces a narrow meaning of the right to privacy.273      
In Chapter 6, I examine how the courts in Namibia interpret and apply the exclusionary 
remedy to unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 
                                                          
271 Winston v Lee 470 US 753, 763 (1985). 
272 Winston v Lee 470 US 753, 762 (1985). 
273 Basdeo Search and seizure at 56-57.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN NAMIBIA 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the comparative study regarding the interpretation and application of the 
exclusionary rule is extended to the Republic of Namibia. Prior to the independence of the 
Republic of Namibia its judiciary applied the laws of South Africa and as a result became a 
mere extension of the judicial system of South Africa.1 This arrangement substantially 
changed with the introduction of the Namibian Constitution. The Constitution created a 
sovereign nation and an independent judiciary with its apex the Supreme Court.2 The 
Supreme Court is the final appeal tribunal although it sits in certain circumstances as Court 
of first instance.3 The Namibian Constitution did not absolutely sever the proverbial legal 
umbilical cord with South Africa.4 This appears from the Constitution which provides that 
the decisions by the South African courts are binding on the courts of Namibia until 
independence.5 The South African Criminal Procedure Act6 is further applicable in Namibia 
and the countries’ respective constitutions share similarly worded provisions in their 
respective bills of rights, for example the fair trial rights expressed in article 12(1)(a) of the 
Namibian Constitution and section 35(3) of the South African Constitution.7 Article 12(1)(a) 
provides: 
                                                          
1 S v Scholtz 1998 (NR) 207 at 215; see also Amoo Introduction to law at 69.  
2 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 113: “Article 81 
  provides that a decision of the Supreme Court is no longer binding if reversed by its own later decision or if 
  contradicted by an Act of Parliament. This means, so it would appear, that Parliament is not only the directly  
  elected representative of the people of Namibia, but also some sort of High Court of Parliament which in an 
  exceptional case, may contradict the Supreme Court, provided of course that it acts in terms of the letter and  
  spirit of the Namibian Constitution, including all provisions of Chapter 3 relating to fundamental human  
  rights.”; Amoo Introduction to law at 69.  
3 Cilliers and Amoo The role of the court at 15. 
4 Amoo Introduction to law at 70. 
5 Constitution of Namibia Act 1 of 1990, article 66(1); see also Myburgh v Commercial Bank of Namibia 2000  
   NR 255. 
6 Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. 
7 S v Kapika (1) 1997 NR 285 at 288.  
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“In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal   charges 
against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by law: 
provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the press and/or the public from 
all or any part of the trial for reasons of morals, the public order or national 
security, as is necessary in a democratic society.” 
A comparable study of the Namibian jurisprudence is useful particularly as the courts and 
legal commentators would have grappled with legislative and constitutional issues similar to 
those confronting the South African courts.8  
The focus of the study undertaken is to establish how the courts approach the question of 
admissibility regarding unconstitutionally obtained evidence, more particularly real 
evidence emanating from the accused. Principles adopted and employed by the Namibian 
courts when determining admissibility of illegally obtained evidence is identified and 
discussed with the view to determine to what extent the approaches can be implemented in 
the South African context. 
An aggrieved person whose fundamental rights or freedoms under the Constitution has 
been infringed or threatened shall be entitled to approach a court to protect such right or 
freedom.9 A person who relies on the exclusionary remedy must establish particular 
threshold and procedural requirements. In this regard it is important to ascertain how the 
Namibian courts define and interpret the following: the beneficiary of fundamental rights; 
standing requirement, the trial-within-a-trial procedure and whether the accused bears the 
onus of proving that his fundamental rights have been violated.  
In contrast to the South African Constitution, the Namibian Constitution does not have an 
exclusionary provision. Notwithstanding, the Namibian courts apply a discretionary 
exclusionary rule.10 The ratio is that in certain situations fairness might require that 
evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded and in other situations fairness will 
                                                          
8 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 811I-812A. 
9 Constitution of Namibia Act 1 of 1990, article 25(2). 
10 S v Shikunga 1997 NR 156; see also S v Kanduvazo 1998 NR 1; S v De Wee 1999 NR 122 at 127; S v Kapika (1) 
    1997 NR 285. 
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require that evidence, albeit obtained unconstitutionally, be admitted.11 The Supreme Court 
of Namibia formulated an exclusionary test to guide and assist in the exercise of the 
discretion. Evidence improperly and unlawfully obtained may be excluded if the irregularity 
is fundamental and it taints the conviction.12 In the case of unconstitutionally obtained real 
evidence additional factors such as the lawfulness and the constitutionality of the impugned 
law, rule or action are considered. Similar to the preceding Chapters, these principles are 
dealt with by only referring to the most influential cases on the relevant aspect, and not all 
of them. 
 
2. PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
2.1   Trial-within-a-trial procedure 
The admissibility of evidence is usually determined during a so-called trial-within-a-trial 
procedure.13 The question of admissibility is a question of law and therefore separately 
resolved from the question of guilt.14  
In Malumo15 the court considered the admissibility of evidence regarding an admission or 
pointing-out by the accused in a trial-within-a-trial.16 The evidence revealed that the police 
deliberately and consciously violated the accused constitutional rights. The Court based on 
the nature of the constitutional violation and the possibility that admission of the evidence 
might in case, of an eventual conviction taint the verdict, exercised its discretion and 
excluded the evidence.17  
The nature of a trial-within-a-trial procedure has been described as a “watertight 
compartment, with no spill-over into the main trial…”18 and as a “one way glass where one 
                                                          
11 S v Kutamudi 2002 NAHC 8; see also S v Bruwer 1993 NR 219. 
12 S v Kukame 2007 (2) NR 815 at 816 and 838-839; see also Hinz, Amoo and van Wyk The constitution at work    
at 315. 
13 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 204. 
14 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 207. 
15 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198. 
16 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 207-208. 
17 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 216. 
18  S v Sithebe 1992 (1) SACR 347 (A) at 351. 
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is prevented from peering into the trial-within-a-trial from the main trial.”19 The ratio is that 
an accused person must be at liberty to challenge the admissibility of evidence in a trial-
within-a-trial without the fear of inhibiting his election whether or not to testify on the issue 
of his alleged guilt.20 A court must make its ruling on the admissibility or otherwise of 
evidence at the conclusion of the trial-within-a-trial, before the main trial may proceed.21 
In Malumo22 the court stated that a trial-within-a-trial procedure is interlocutory and if new 
evidence appears later in the trial which is relevant to the question of admissibility a court 
may and should reconsider its earlier decision. A court need not wait until the end of the 
trial before considering the admissibility of new facts which appeared during the trial.23 This 
principle was employed in Tjiho.24 The evidence of the investigating officer, in the Court a 
quo was ruled admissible at the end of a trial-within-trial. During the trial and under cross-
examination the police officer testified, confirming the accused’s version that he had 
advised the accused that an oral statement not reduced to writing could not be used as 
evidence against him. The applicant argued that because the decision regarding 
admissibility is interlocutory it is the court’s duty to consider such matter again if other 
relevant evidence comes to light.25 The prosecution argued that the court should not 
consider the admissibility of the evidence at that stage, but only at the end of the case after 
all the evidence has been adduced. After a review of the authority the court concluded that 
there is no authority for the proposition that the court must wait until the end of the case 
before reconsidering the question of admissibility if new facts regarding the statement 
come to light during trial.26 The circumstances of each case will determine the procedure to 
be followed.27 In casu the court opined that the evidence was complete and properly before 
the court and that it was obliged to give its decision on this evidence. The Court reasoned 
that if this is not done the accused might have to subject him to cross-examination on 
evidence that appears to be inadmissible.28 This, the Court concluded, may cause 
                                                          
19 S v Michindu 2000 (2) SACR 313 (W) at 315. 
20 S v Malumo 2010 (1) NR 35 at 39. 
21 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 207.  
22 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 207. 
23 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
24 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242. 
25 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
26 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
27 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
28 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
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incalculable prejudice to the accused because, if the evidence had been excluded at an 
earlier stage, the accused might have made different procedural decisions. The prejudice, 
the Court concluded, cannot be remedied by excluding the evidence at a later stage.29 The 
Court was not satisfied that the confession was freely and voluntarily made and ordered 
that it was inadmissible and would not form part of the record on which the court would 
come to a decision.30 
In Malumo31 the court referred to the South African case Muchindu32 wherein the court 
determined the question whether evidence obtained earlier, during the trial, is relevant in 
the determination of the issues in the trial-within-a-trial.33  The Court opined that any party 
in the criminal trial may during the trial-within-a-trial refer to evidence already led in the 
main trial and that the court may consider such evidence as may be appropriate.34  
2.2 Onus 
It is trite law that the onus resort with a litigant, who must persuade the court on a balance 
of probabilities that he is an aggrieved person and that his fundamental right or freedom 
has been infringed or threatened.35 The Namibian Constitution distinguishes between 
fundamental rights and freedoms.36 The difference between a right and a freedom is that a 
right means that the state must intervene when necessary to protect a person when he 
exercises the right37 whereas a freedom means that the state must not intervene or 
interfere when an individual exercises the freedom.38  
                                                          
29 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 246. 
30 S v Tjiho (1) 1990 NR 242 at 249. 
31 S v Malumo 2010 (1) NR 35. 
32 S v Muchindu 2000 (2) SACR 313 (W). 
33 S v Malumo 2010 (1) NR 35 at 39. 
34 S v Malumo 2010 (1) NR 35 at 40, referring to S v Muchindu 2000 (2) SACR 313 (W) at 317. 
35 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 55; see also S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at  
    665-667; S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23 at 40-41. 
36 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 94: “The South  
    African Constitution, both the interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 contained in  
    the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996, makes no distinction between  
    fundamental rights and freedoms as is the position in Namibia. The general qualification clause in the South  
    African Act applies to both fundamental rights and freedoms.” 
37 For example, art 14(3) of the Constitution provides that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit  
    of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.  
38 For example, art 21(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees that every person has the right to freedom of  
    speech and expression. 
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The location of the initial onus is the same for fundamental rights and freedoms. However, 
whether an applicant must satisfy the court as to the meaning, content and ambit of the 
particular right or freedom, depends on whether a right or freedom has been violated.39 
The Supreme Court in Alexander40 affirmed the decision in Africa Personnel Services41 that 
the person who alleges a breach of his constitutional rights must prove the breach. The 
appellant, in Alexander, challenged the constitutionality of section 21 of the Extradition 
Act.42 The Court observed that section 21 of the Namibian Extradition Act permits a person 
to apply for bail at all stages up until a committal order is made. The applicant pointed out 
that the position in Namibia is not consistent with extradition legislation in other foreign 
jurisdictions where an accused is generally permitted to apply for bail up to the stage when 
he is surrendered to the foreign state. The Court held that the impugned legislation 
effectively denied applicant the right to bail, which constituted an infringement on his right 
to liberty.43  
In the case of the fundamental freedoms, the initial burden is on the person alleging an 
infringement to prove the infringement and as part thereof, satisfies the court with regard 
to the meaning, content and ambit of the fundamental freedom.44 In Kauesa45 the litigant 
failed to discharge the onus because he could not prove that he claimed the right to 
freedom of speech which fell within the definition and boundaries of the said freedom, the 
so-called regulated area. The Court found on the papers that his speech was false, 
defamatory and gravely injurious and in breach of the fundamental rights of others.46  
The location of the onus once a person has proved his fundamental freedom has been 
considered by the High Court and Supreme Court in Kauesa.47 The High Court held that the 
                                                          
39 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 94-95. 
40 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328. 
41 Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia 2009 (2) NR 596 (SC). 
42 The Extradition Act 11 of 1998. 
43 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 365. 
44 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 96: “This initial 
   onus corresponds to the ‘initial onus’ referred to by Chaskalson,P, in the decision of the South African  
   Constitutional Court in S v Mkwanyane and Another.”  
45 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC). 
46 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC); see also S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23 at 41-42 
   and 44. 
47 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC); Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs (SA 5/94) 
    [1995] NASC 3.  
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litigant who contends that the regulation is unconstitutional bears the onus to prove that 
the legislation is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic state and not on the state to 
show that it is justifiable.48 On appeal the Supreme Court49 overruled the High Court 
decision and held that, once the initial burden is discharged, the burden shifts to the party 
contending that the law, regulation or act in question providing for the exception or 
qualification, falls within the reasonable restrictions on the fundamental freedom.50 
The Namibian courts have in several judgments subsequent to Kauesa considered whether 
the ruling is applicable to fundamental rights. In Van den Berg51 the High Court ruled that 
the location of the onus may be different where an accused alleged that a fundamental right  
had been breached. The Court ruled that in the case of fundamental rights the onus should 
be on the complainant to prove the content of the right and to prove its infringement.52 
Before it can be held that an infringement has taken place, it will be necessary to define the 
exact boundaries and content of the alleged fundamental right and the applicant will have 
to prove that the right or freedom claimed to have been infringed, falls squarely within the 
definition and boundaries of the said right.53  
Vries54 revisited the question of onus in respect of fundamental rights. The Court first 
considered the extent to which the ruling of the Supreme Court in Kauesa is binding on the 
High Court. The Court stated that if Kauesa was construed to be applicable also to the onus 
when dealing with fundamental rights the decision is to that extent obiter and not 
applicable.55 The decision was not binding because the Supreme Court did not distinguish 
between the fundamental rights and the freedoms, read with the limitations. The High 
Court ruled that when dealing with an alleged breach of a fundamental right, in contrast to 
the freedoms, the initial onus, as well as the overall onus is on the person who alleges a 
breach.56 The rationale was that the Constitution has no limitation clause in regard to 
                                                          
48 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 55. 
49 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 NASC 3. 
50 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC); see also The Chairperson of the Immigration 
   Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 96.  
51 S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23. 
52 S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23 at 44. 
53 S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23 at 40-41. 
54 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 666. 
55 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 666. 
56 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 667. 
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fundamental rights.57 In casu the accused not only had to satisfy the court on a balance of 
probabilities that the provisions of the Stock Theft Act violated his dignity, he also had to 
prove that cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment should not be imposed on a convicted 
person.58  The High Court judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in The Chairperson 
of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank59 where the court held that, in regard to 
fundamental rights, the burden of proof remains on the applicant throughout. The applicant 
must prove that a fundamental right has been infringed at least in regard to all those 
fundamental rights where no express qualification or exception is provided for in the 
wording of the fundamental rights. The Court obiter opined that where an express 
qualification or exception is provided for as in the articles of the Constitution, the burden of 
proof may shift as in the case of the fundamental freedoms.60  
 
3. STANDING REQUIREMENT 
The Namibian Constitution provides that only an aggrieved person may rely on the 
fundamental rights. Standing is limited to aggrieved litigants to avoid court rolls being 
cluttered with vexatious and frivolous litigation. The question of standing is generally 
inferred from the language of the infringed fundamental right and in cases where it does 
not confer standing on a person, the court will dismiss the action on the ground that it is not 
justiciable.61 A finding of non-justiciability implies that the litigation does not directly relate 
to the litigant or that none of his rights or interests are involved or the judgment would not 
adversely affect his rights, interests or legitimate expectation.62 A court of law would not 
entertain issues which are merely academic or hypothetical and where there was not a real 
or threatened infringement of a person’s rights. 
 
                                                          
57 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 664-665: “For the same reasons the Namibian position must be  
   distinguished from that in South Africa under the interim Constitution dispensation, where fundamental 
   rights and freedoms are lumped together and a limitation clause made applicable to both. See the clear  
   distinction drawn on the basis between the South African and USA position in the decision in S v  
   Makwanyane.” 
58 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 667. 
59 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 95. 
60 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 95. 
61 Hinz, Amoo and van Wyk The constitution at work at 123-124.  
62 Hinz, Amoo and van Wyk The constitution at work at 123-124. 
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3.1 Aggrieved Person 
The Namibian Constitution provides that an aggrieved person may enforce his constitutional 
rights in a competent court if his fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by the 
Constitution has been infringed or threatened.63 This means that a litigant must show that 
he has standing by either alleging that a right of his was infringed or threatened by an 
invalid act.64 In Alexander65 the Supreme Court considered and applied this principle. In casu 
the appellant noted an appeal against the court a quo’s ruling that his challenge to the 
constitutionality of a provision in the Extradition Act was not ripe for hearing and therefore 
premature. The court a quo reached this decision after finding that there was no evidence 
that indicated that a right of the appellant had been threatened or infringed by the 
legislation. The impugned provision provides that once a person is committed and until he is 
removed from Namibia such a person may not be granted bail. The state argued the 
appellant’s entitlement to bail may never arise and therefore a determination of the 
constitutionality of the impugned provision would be merely an academic or hypothetical 
issue, meaning that there was not a real or threatened infringement on the person’s 
fundamental rights.66 On the other hand the appellant argued that the law violated the 
Constitution and was therefore invalid from its inception. Based on this the appellant 
submitted that the issue of constitutionality was ripe for hearing.67 The Court affirmed the 
principle that if an individual challenges the legislation on the basis that it is unconstitutional 
from inception he must still show that he has standing. It was not in dispute that the 
application of the impugned provision may result in the accused having to spend time in 
prison as a result of an invalid provision if the court should eventually make a finding of 
unconstitutionality. The prosecution, realising the danger hereof, submitted that the 
impugned legislation would be ripe for hearing once a magistrate was authorised to conduct 
the extradition enquiry and it was certain that the matter would proceed.68 The Court 
opined that the threat of committal and the subsequent ex lege application of the impugned 
legislation is not dependant on whether proceedings will be protected, nor whether there 
                                                          
63 Article 25(2).  
64 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 330.  
65 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328.  
66 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 348. 
67 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 348. 
68 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 349. 
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would be a committal or not, in deciding whether the question of constitutionality is ripe for 
hearing.69 The evidence revealed that the extradition proceedings had been set in motion by 
the provisional warrant of arrest and there was no indication that the matter would not run 
its course from there.70 The Court was satisfied that the appellant’s constitutional right to 
liberty was threatened and therefore the issue of the constitutionality of the legislation was 
ripe for hearing. The committal of the accused was therefore not necessary for the 
appellant to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned legislation.71  
The Supreme Court in Africa Personnel Services72 considered whether a juristic person could 
be an aggrieved person. In casu the respondents challenged the applicant’s right to seek 
constitutional review on the basis that it lacked standing. The respondent alleged that the 
appellant’s fundamental rights had not been infringed or threatened by the impugned 
legislation and therefore the appellant could not claim to be an aggrieved person. The 
respondent specifically argued that the fundamental freedom on which the appellant relied 
for protection only vests in natural and not juristic persons.73 The Court adopted a liberal 
and purposive approach to interpret the fundamental freedom. In assessing the purpose of 
the freedom the Court referred to its history and background and also to its intended 
objectives. The Court reasoned that freedoms exclusively apply to natural persons are 
qualified by words generally associated with natural persons, for example, “men,” “women” 
and “children.” In the absence of such a qualification the Court concluded that the phrase 
“all persons” must be construed to incorporate juristic persons.74 The Court held that the 
applicant, a juristic person, had standing or was an aggrieved person under article 25(2). 
3.2 Interested Person             
The High Court stated in Daniel75 that an interested person has standing in cases where his 
rights are existing, future or contingent. In casu the applicant sought an order declaring the 
minimum sentences provisions in the Stock Theft Act 12 of 1990 unconstitutional and 
invalid on the basis that the impugned provisions violated his rights to dignity and 
                                                          
69 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 349. 
70 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 350.  
71 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 350. 
72 Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia 2009 (2) NR 596. 
73 Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia 2009 (2) NR 596 at 624. 
74 Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia 2009 (2) NR 596 at 630. 
75 Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330. 
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equality.76Although the applicant was not sentenced, the Court found that if the impugned 
provision were to be unconstitutional some advantage would emerge to the applicant’s 
position with reference to his future or contingent right not to be subject to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment.77 The Court ruled that the applicant is an interested person with 
an existing, future or contingent right to the determination of the constitutionality or not of 
the sentences handed down.78  The Court accordingly rejected the argument that the 
application was purely academic or hypothetical. 
3.3 Suspects 
The Constitution specifically mentions the entitlement of persons arrested and detained to 
the fundamental rights. However, the Constitution does not expressly make provision for 
the right of a suspect to enforce any of the rights in the bill of rights. In Malumo79 the court 
considered the question whether there was any constitutional duty upon a law enforcement 
officer to inform a suspect of the existence of a constitutional right. The Court observed that 
the witness was unsophisticated and therefore would have been ignorant of his 
constitutional rights or the right to have been warned in terms of Judges’ rules. The Court 
adopted the approach formulated in the South African case of Sebejan80 and opined that the 
police was under a duty to warn the accused according to Judge’s rule and had a duty to 
inform him of his constitutional rights.81 The duty to warn the accused was not dependent 
on whether the accused person had at that stage been arrested or whether he was still 
regarded as a suspect.82 A suspect is entitled to the same rights as an accused person would 
have during pre-trial proceedings.83 These rights include the right to legal representation, 
the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain silent and the right against self-
incrimination. A breach of the Judges’ Rules may, for example, influence the determination 
                                                          
76 Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution. 
77 Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330 at 338. 
78 Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330 at 337. 
79 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198. 
80 S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W). 
81 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 214. 
82 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 211-213. 
83 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 214. 
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whether an incriminating statement had been made voluntarily or not, even though these 
Rules are administrative.84 
 
4. UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
The question whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be admitted has 
received judicial attention in a number of cases in Namibia.85 Other questions that have 
been raised are: whether a conviction should be quashed if the trial court was guilty of a 
breach of the appellant’s fundamental right or prejudice the accused, whether the accused 
had a fair trial, and whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.86   
4.1 Nature of Exclusionary Rule 
The Namibian courts employ a discretionary exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court in 
Shikunga87 explained the rationale for adopting a discretionary exclusionary rule. The Court 
considered whether evidence obtained in conflict with the constitutional rights of an 
accused would vitiate the proceedings. Dealing with this vexed question the Court balanced 
two important competing considerations of public interest and policy.88 The first 
consideration is that a guilty person should not be allowed to escape punishment simply 
because some constitutional irregularity was committed (the so-called truth finding 
purpose). The second consideration is the public interest in ensuring that the procedures 
adopted in securing such punishment are fair and constitutional, in other words, that the 
integrity of the judicial process is upheld.89 The Court noted the tensions between these two 
different considerations and ruled that a constitutional irregularity would not per se vitiate 
legal proceedings.90 Shikunga is therefore authority that the courts in Namibia employ a 
                                                          
84 S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 at 212. 
85 S v Forbes 2005 NR 384 at 391; S v Shikunga 1997 NR 156 (SC); S v Kukame 2007 (2) NR 815; S v De Wee 1999  
    NR 122 (HC); S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198 (HC); S v Kapika (1) 1997 NR 285. 
86 S v Forbes 2005 NR 384 at 391-393. 
87 S v Shikunga 1997 NR 156. 
88 S v Shikunga 1997 NR 156 at 164; see also S v Forbes 2005 NR 384 at 393. 
89 S v Shikunga 1997 NR 156 at 164-165. 
90 S v Kukame 2007 (2) NR 815 at 838. 
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discretionary exclusionary rule to exclude or allow evidence obtained in conflict with the 
constitutional rights of an accused.91  
Following the approach by the Supreme Court in Shikunga the High Court in De Wee92 
expressly rejected the application of an absolute exclusionary rule. In casu the accused 
challenged the admissibility of a confession on the ground that the police had failed to 
inform him of his right to consult with a legal representative. The accused relied upon the 
earlier decision in Kapika93 where the court ruled that the prosecution had a duty to inform 
the accused of the right to consult with a legal practitioner during pre-trial procedures and 
to be informed of the right. The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the police 
officers were unaware at the relevant time of this duty. Referring to Shikunga the Court 
confirmed that it is vested with a discretion to determine whether or not those irregularities 
would result in a failure of justice, which would taint a conviction, prejudice the accused or 
are of such a fundamental nature that evidence should be excluded.94 In exercising its 
discretion the Court considered the fact that the accused was not aware of his right to 
consult a legal representative and observed that the accused would suffer a grave injustice 
if the evidence was included in the trial.95 There was no information before the court which 
satisfied it that it would be fair to admit the confession in the absence of informing the 
accused of his right to consult with a legal representative. The Court ruled that fairness 
requires that the confession be excluded.96  
4.2 Exclusionary Test 
In exercising its discretion to exclude or include unconstitutionally obtained evidence the 
courts proposed a test to guide this determination. The test prescribes that a court must 
consider the nature of the irregularity and its effect.97 Although the test may at times be 
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helpful to achieve the balance between the conflicting public interest and policy, each case 
must be determined on its own merits.98 
4.2.1 Nature of irregularity: fair trial requirement 
It is trite law that evidence obtained through a constitutional irregularity that is so 
fundamental that it can be said that there was in effect no trial, may be excluded.99 
Kandovazu100 is an example where the Supreme Court applied the principle. The appellant 
appealed against his conviction on a charge of corruption. He argued in the Supreme Court 
that the High Court had failed to hold that the magistrate’s refusal to order the prosecution 
to disclose the statements of witnesses in the police docket was an irregularity.101 He 
further submitted that the court a quo erred in finding that he had a fair trial based on the 
circumstances of the case. Central to the case is the meaning of a fair trial and whether or 
not it is reconcilable with a blanket docket privilege under the common law.102 The Court 
opined that the effect of refusing disclosure of the content of the docket without insisting 
on the prosecution to justify its objection to the production was to deprive the appellant of 
a fair trial within the meaning of the Constitution.103 The refusal, the Supreme Court held, 
amounted to a breach of the accused’s fundamental rights to a fair trial. The Court stated 
that if the irregularity is of such a fundamental nature that the accused has not been 
afforded a fair trial then a failure of justice per se has occurred.104 The Court held that the 
constitutional irregularity negated the core of a fair trial and acquitted the accused without 
investigating the merits.105 
Similarly the High Court has set aside the conviction of the accused in cases where evidence 
was obtained through the deliberate and conscious violation of the constitutional right to 
legal representation and the right against self-incrimination, as well as the right to remain 
silent;106 in cases where the accused’s express election to exercise his right to a lawyer was 
simply ignored, alternatively that there was no clear indication beyond a reasonable doubt 
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that the accused had changed his mind or waived his right to legal representation before 
making the confession.107 
4.2.2 Effect on verdict: bring administration of justice into disrepute 
The cases in Namibia unequivocally state that a conviction should either stand or be 
substituted with an acquittal on the merits if the irregularity adversely affects the verdict.108 
In Shikunga the Supreme Court adopted and applied this test. In casu the accused 
challenged the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. Under this section a confession is deemed to be the truth as long as it appears so ex 
facie the document even in circumstances where the prosecution fails to prove that it had 
been obtained freely and voluntarily, with the accused in his sound and sober senses and 
without being unduly influenced thereto.109 The effect of the section was to shift the onus 
to the accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the confession was made 
involuntary and freely while he was in his sound and sober senses and without being unduly 
influenced.110 The section permitted the court to convict an accused whose guilt had not 
been established beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction under such circumstances 
constituted a violation of the right to a fair trial in which an accused is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.111 The Court proceeded to analyse the evidence to determine whether, 
in the light of the irregularity, the conviction could be upheld.112 The appellant argued that 
constitutional irregularity was fatal and as such vitiated the conviction. The Court observed 
from the record of the proceedings that the court a quo admitted the confession but was 
able to convict on the objective facts (which were common cause) rather than relying on the 
content of the confession.113 Based on the evidence the Court concluded that the conviction 
could not be said to be unfair. The Court concluded that to overrule the conviction would 
not ensure a reinforcement of the constitutional right but would merely be a substitution of 
form for substance.114   
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Similarly convictions have been upheld in cases where the State violated the accused’s right 
to be informed of his right to legal representation but the court was satisfied that it did not 
amount to a failure of justice because of the level of education of the accused and 
assumption that he would have been aware of that right,115 and where the accused had 
been informed of his rights by the police at his arrest when taking of the statement.116 
 
5. REAL EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH COMPULSION 
The State may obtain real evidence from the accused through compulsion if authorised by 
legislation or law. For example, section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a 
policeman who requests a blood sample from the accused to be taken by a doctor, who may 
also use force should the suspect refuse.117 Laws, actions and rules of this nature infringe 
upon the fundamental rights of a person, for example, the right to protection of liberty,118 
respect for human dignity,119 privacy120 and property.121  
 The Namibian Constitution does not have a general limitation clause applicable to 
fundamental rights,122 in contrast with the situation in South Africa and Canada. In Namibia 
the courts have to establish limits to constitutional rights through a narrow interpretation of 
the rights themselves. The question whether a rule, legislation or action is constitutionally 
permissible has for that reason to be determined within the larger issue of the definition of 
the fundamental right.123  
The Namibian courts, as a starting point, look for the meaning, content and ambit of a right 
or freedom in the words used and their plain meaning.124 Where the constitutional 
provision is not precisely defined the Namibian courts employ a value-test based on the 
current values of the Namibian people to determine whether there is an infringement of a 
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particular right.125 In Vries126 the court supplemented the values test with the 
proportionality test, particularly in instances where the values test is inadequate. An Act of 
Parliament, promulgated after the independence of Namibia, is constitutionally permissible 
if permitted by the particular fundamental rights or freedoms.127 The law providing for the 
limitation shall be a law of general application, not negate the essential content thereof, not 
be aimed at a particular individual and shall specify the ascertainable extent of such 
limitation and identify the article on which authority to enact such limitation is claimed to 
rest.128 
5.1 Establishing meaning in the wording  
The content, meaning and ambit of a fundamental right may be determined by having 
regard to the dictionary meaning of the words and phrases contained in the fundamental 
right. The Supreme Court formulated the following basic approach to interpret provisions in 
the Constitution: 
“It must broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as to avoid the 
‘austerity of tabulated legalism’ and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative 
and dynamic role in the expression and achievement of the ideals and aspirations 
of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its people and in disciplining 
its Government.”129  
The guideline that the Constitution be interpreted broadly, liberally and purposively does 
not mean that the courts attribute a meaning whatever they might wish it to mean. The 
interpretation must be anchored inter alia in the language of the provisions of the 
Constitution.130 The reality is that the conclusion will not always be liberal and may be 
conservative or a mixture of the two.131 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board 
and Frank is an example of a case in which the Court applied these principles. The 
respondent conceded that reference to marriage in the Constitution refers to heterosexual 
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marriages but argued that the concept marriage is not limited to heterosexual unions only. 
The Court reasoned that it was never contemplated that a homosexual relationship could be 
regarded as the natural and fundamental group unit of society.132 The Court stated that 
marriage is between men and women – not men and men or women and women.   The 
Court further observed that the parties who agreed to the terms of the Constitution must at 
the time have been aware of the existence of homosexual relationships, but no provision 
was made for the recognition of such relationships as being equivalent to marriage or at all. 
This is a further indication that it was never intended to place homosexual relationships on 
an equal basis with heterosexual marital relationship.133 The Court concluded that the 
concept marriage does not create a new type of family and the protection extended is 
limited to the natural and fundamental group unit of society as known at the time as an 
institution of Namibian society.134 The Court rejected the respondents’ claim that their right 
to family life was being infringed.     
5.2 Values-Test 
The Constitution contains rights which are clearly defined and others which are undefined 
and indicate that the content of the right and its limits and boundaries be sought in the 
law.135 Apart from this, the rights are not further defined and it is for the courts to define 
their content and limitations.136 In this regard the courts have to determine the 
fundamental rights’ content and limitations by employing a value judgment based on the 
current values of the Namibian people.137 The question to be answered in each case where 
the court has to make a value judgment is whether or not the alleged infringement 
constitutionally violates the fundamental right or freedom and is therefore constitutionally 
impermissible.138 
The courts have to make a value judgment on the issue of rights infringement and 
constitutionality. The value judgment may or may not at times coincide with the subjective 
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norms of any particular judge.139 It is important that the subjective views of individual 
judges be informed by objective factors. Objective factors include, for example, the 
contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the Namibian people as 
expressed in its national institutions and its Constitution and further having a regard to the 
emerging consensus of values in the civilised international community which Namibians 
share.140 These values are not static, which means the value judgment could vary from time 
to time. What might have been acceptable in the past may appear to be manifestly 
unconstitutional today.141  
The Supreme Court in The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank held 
that the required information about the norms and values may be obtained, where 
appropriate, through an evidential enquiry. In the absence of an enquiry, the Court opined, 
the requirement to consider the Namibian norms and values will become a cliché to which 
mere lip service is paid.142 Methods which could be used to obtain the necessary facts for 
the purpose of the enquiry, include but is not limited to, taking judicial notice of notorious 
facts; testimony in viva voce form before the court deciding the issue; facts placed before 
the court by the interested parties as common cause; the compilation of special dossiers.143  
In Minnies144 the court determined the contemporary values at the hand of the right not to 
be compelled to give evidence against oneself.145 The State argued that section 218 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act confers a discretion upon the court to admit or exclude the evidence 
of a pointing out even when the pointing out forms part of an inadmissible confession or 
statement, on whatever grounds, even in circumstances where a self-incriminating 
statement had been beaten out of the accused.146 The Court found that the accused had 
indeed been subjected to unlawful methods of interrogation.147 Considering the 
admissibility of the evidence the Court observed that the Constitution provides that no 
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person shall be compelled to give testimony against him.148 This provision is peremptory 
and the court shall not admit into evidence testimony which has been obtained by 
torture.149 The Court held that section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 should be 
interpreted in terms of the inviolable right to dignity in the Constitution.  
 The Supreme Court in Namunjepo150 after a review of cases in Namibian courts held that 
the authorities generally agree that to determine whether the right to dignity has been 
violated, involves a value judgment based on the current values of the Namibian people 
reflected in its various institutions.  The Namibian people share basic values with all civilised 
countries and therefore it is useful to look at interpretations of other jurisdictions although 
the determining factor remains the values expressed by the Namibian people as reflected in 
its various institutions.151  
The Namibian parliament, courts, tribal authorities, common law, statute and tribal law, 
political parties, news media and trade unions, established Namibian churches, as well as  
other relevant community-based organisations can all be regarded as institutions for the 
purposes hereof.152 Parliament, being the chosen representatives of the people of Namibia, 
is one of the most important institutions to express the current day values of the people.153 
5.2.1 Public opinion as indicator of contemporary values 
In several judgments the Namibian High Court154 equated public interest to the interest of 
the public. In Vries155 the court held that evidence of current public opinion should be 
admissible as evidence of current values. In casu the Court explained that the contemporary 
values can be ascertained by taking judicial notice that Parliament passed the legislation for 
heavier sentences on the ground that the particular crime has escalated, farmers 
demanding protection from the State and the courts for their fundamental rights to life and 
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the security of their property.156 The Court emphasised that current public opinion should 
be considered as evidence of current values if the views are well-founded and not transient. 
The public opinion must be consistent and corroborative of the general trend in society that 
an increase in crime should be redressed through heavier sentences as means to counteract 
the crime phenomenon. Applying these principles the Court concluded that it was 
inconsistent with current public opinion to impose a heavy mandatory sentence (a minimum 
of three years’ imprisonment) in the case of the second conviction, because of a previous 
conviction in the distant past. This assumption of public opinion, the Court held, is 
consistent with the norms and values of the civilised community of nations of which 
Namibia is a part.157 
Public opinion should not be decisive and is definitely not a substitute for a duty vested in 
the courts to interpret the Constitution and uphold its norms. The court in Vries stated that 
the value of public opinion would differ from case to case, from fundamental right to 
fundamental right and from issue to issue.158 This means that in some cases public opinion 
should receive very little weight, in others it should receive considerable weight.  It is for the 
court to finally decide whether or not public opinion constitutes objective evidence of 
current community values.159 
In Nassar160 the High Court confirmed that public opinion should not be determinative of 
the court’s decision on the meaning of rights. In casu the Court held that the meaning of the 
right to a fair trial could not be determined through public opinion. The right to a fair trial 
concerns the rights of the individual and not the protection of the interest of the state. The 
ratio for the holding is that the state has an advantage in a criminal trial; it has access to 
police force, specialised prosecuting authority and expert witnesses. The state and the 
accused do therefore not stand on equal footing and the Court concluded that the right to a 
fair trial ensures that imbalance is redressed.161    
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The Supreme Court in The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank stated 
that public opinion could be established in properly conducted opinion polls; evidence 
placed before courts of law and judgments of court; referenda and publications by 
experts.162 
5.2.2 Exception to the value test: Absolute rights 
The value judgment test is not applicable if the constitutional provision is absolute. In The 
Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank the court explained that the 
concept “absolute” means that there is no general qualification to a freedom and also no 
specific qualification or exception contained in the right itself or in any part of the Namibian 
Constitution.163 Article 6 is an example of an “absolute” fundamental right where no value 
judgment is brought into the equation.164 It reads as follows: “No law may prescribe death 
as a competent sentence. No court or Tribunal shall have the power to impose a sentence of 
death upon any person. No execution shall take place in Namibia.”  
An example of the practical functioning of this principle is found in the Corporal Punishment 
case.165 In casu the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the legislative 
provisions for corporal punishment. The appellant argued that corporal punishment was in 
conflict with his fundamental right to dignity. The Court agreed.166 The Constitution does 
not permit any derogation from the right to dignity and accordingly the obligation of the 
state is absolute and unqualified.167 As a result the Court opined that no questions of 
justification can ever arise.168 This meant that even in the case where the provisions of the 
impugned legislation avoided torture or cruel treatment or punishment, it was still unlawful 
because it authorises inhuman treatment or punishment or degrading treatment or 
punishment.169 
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5.2.3 Proportionality test 
In Vries the court noted that even though minimum sentence provisions in legislation 
violates the right to dignity of the accused, the value test was not appropriate to assess the 
constitutionality of such legislation. The Court reasoned that if that was the test every 
arrest, the fact of being charged, convicted and of any punishment of imprisonment 
imposed, would be unconstitutional and constitutionally impermissible.170 The Court opined 
that a further test is required.171 A review of judgments in the United States of America 
revealed that the courts when they interpret and apply the prohibition “cruel and unusual 
punishment” make use of an “independent proportionality review.” This involves analysing 
whether a particular sentence amounts to an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offence.172 The court in Vries adopted and 
applied the proportionality test to determine whether minimum sentence legislation would 
be unconstitutional and constitutionally impermissible.173 
(a) Requirements of proportionality test 
Various factors have been considered when applying the test and as a result it has not been 
similarly worded.174 Notwithstanding, the effect of what is to be considered is clear.175 The 
test asks the question whether the limitation constitutes a disproportionate interference. In 
Alexander the court considered the following factors to determine whether the limitation is 
proportional: limitation must be rationally connected to the objective; the means chosen 
impair the right as little as possible and the limitation be such that its effect on the 
fundamental right is proportional to the objective.176 The South African cases regarding the 
proportionality test discussed in Chapter 3 are also relevant to Namibian law. These South 
African sources are not repeated here, but I will refer to them in what follows.   
 
                                                          
170 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 671. 
171 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) at 673. 
172 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 673; see also S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) in which the  
     Constitutional Court of South Africa accepted the proportionality test in part for the purposes of deciding  
     whether the death sentence was constitutionally cruel, and inhuman and/or degrading. 
173 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm); Africa Personnel Services v Government of Namibia 2009 (2) NR 596. 
174 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm). 
175 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 364. 
176 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 364. 
187 
 
(i) Rationally connected to objective  
The South African Constitutional Court considered the phrase “rationally connected to the 
objective” and held that a measure would serve a legitimate objective if it is rationally 
connected to the purpose of the limitation.177 The Namibian courts have endorsed this test. 
In Alexander the court held that the state under the Extradition Act has a duty to surrender 
a person to a requesting state after his committal and that it should take all reasonable 
measures to enable the fulfilling of its duty.178 The duty arises out of undertaking between 
states that they will surrender a requested person to the requesting state upon 
committal.179 Compliance may in appropriate cases be achieved by depriving the person of 
his liberty. The Court opined that such a measure would serve a legitimate objective which 
is rationally connected to the purpose of limitation.180 Similarly, the courts have held that 
there is a rational connection: between the enactments by Parliament of a minimum 
sentence in legislation to curb stock theft181 and between the prima facie evidence 
appearing ex lege a confession and the actual voluntariness thereof.182 On the other hand 
the courts have not found any rational connection if a court permits the chaining of a 
prisoner just because he had escaped.183 
(ii) Not negate the essential content  
The phrase “not negate the essential content” formed part of the interim Constitution of 
South Africa.184 The meaning implies that an ordinary law cannot effect what amounts to a 
suspension of a fundamental right or an amendment to the Constitution.185 The phrase does 
not form part of the final Constitution. The South African courts, unlike its counterparts in 
Namibia, do not consider the phrase a factor in the proportionality test. 
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Section 21 in the Extradition Act186 denies a person the right to apply for bail after his 
committal. In Alexander the prosecution justified the blanket prohibition by arguing that it 
had a duty to surrender a person to be extradited after his or her committal. The Court 
accepted that the person’s right to liberty might give way if circumstances require in order 
for the state to comply with its duty to surrender the person. The Court was of the view that 
the legislature did not consider that circumstances might differ between persons and that 
there might be instances when the state does not require incarceration of the person at 
least until the surrender is imminent.187 A blanket prohibition of bail left no scope for the 
Court to decide this issue on the evidence before it. In the circumstances the Court ruled 
that the duty of the state cannot override the constitutional right to liberty and it must 
therefore be rejected.188 The state’s duty to surrender the person after his committal 
completely trumped the fundamental right.189 The enactment of a blanket prohibition on 
the granting of bail set out in the legislation negates the essential content of the right to 
liberty (right to apply for bail). The court in Alexander held that section 21 of the Extradition 
Act was arbitrary and unfair and accordingly struck it down.190 
(iii)  Effects of rights should be proportionate 
In order to pass the test of proportionality the legislature must use means that impair the 
right as minimally and as reasonably possible.191 In the exercise of this judicial discretion the 
court balances the fundamental rights and interests of the accused with that of the State 
and the prosecution.192 Important factors that should be considered are whether evidence 
has been lawfully obtained and whether the methods used are reasonable. 
(aa) Balance of interest and rights  
The judicial discretion to be exercised involves a balance between the interest of the state 
and the fundamental rights of the accused. In Daniel the High court accepted the argument 
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of the applicant that the minimum sentence legislation is unconstitutional because the 
legislature has resorted to minimum sentences which are grossly disproportionate. The 
applicant alleged that Individuals caught and convicted are unfairly and unjustly punished. 
The sentence meted out is not because the crime deserves such a sentence, but rather to 
deter others from committing the same crime. Deterrence appears to be the cardinal 
feature of the minimum sentence regime. People sentenced under the minimum legislation 
are thus used as instruments of deterrence in violation of their right to dignity. The Court 
found that the minimum sentences are irrationally severe if compared to the sentences for 
other equally and more serious crimes.193 For these reasons the Court held that the 
proportionality between the period of imprisonment and the offence should not be 
sacrificed on the “altar of deterrence.”194 
Likewise in Hausiku195 the High Court held that although the test may be done in search of 
the truth, there is however a competing interest at stake such as the constitutional rights of 
the accused to a fair trial before an independent court to be concluded within a reasonable 
time.196 In exercising its discretion the Court considered the fact that the state had ample 
opportunity to secure the saliva samples prior to the application being brought. The Court 
accordingly dismissed the application.197 
(bb) Lawful and reasonable  
The principles of lawfulness and reasonableness set out in the South African judgments of 
Gaqa198 and Xaba199 has been reinforced by the Namibian courts. In Hausiku200 the state 
brought an application in terms of section 37(3) authorising the police to take a sample of 
the accused’s saliva for purposes of forensic analysis. The first question the Court 
considered was whether the police are empowered to take samples of the saliva of the 
accused. The Court concluded that the police with the assistance of a medical practitioner 
                                                          
193 Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330 at 354. 
194 Daniel v Attorney-General 2011 (1) NR 330 at 354-355; see also  S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at  
     para 15; S v Shipanga 2010 NAHC 46.  
195 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at para 15. 
196 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at para 15. 
197 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at para 15. 
198 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C).   
199 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
200 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158. 
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are empowered to take a sample of the saliva of the accused.201 In Shipanga202 the High 
Court confirmed that the taking of a blood sample is lawful and reasonable. The Court 
reasoned that the procedure for taking of blood samples is relatively painless, has become 
wide spread and also a vital tool in the administration of the criminal justice system.  
There are no decided cases in Namibia where applications were brought for an order to 
secure evidence from the accused through more serious medical procedures. Having regard 
to Shipanga and Hausiku the courts must when determining applications of this nature 
balance the interest of the accused against that of the state. Important factors that should 
be considered are: the evidence must be lawfully obtained and the procedure or method 
followed to obtain the evidence must be reasonable. Courts will not authorise a medical 
procedure that holds a risk to the well-being of the accused. 
(b) The so-called “Shocking test” 
In Vries the court applied the so-called shocking-test, some form of the proportionality test, 
to determine whether a sentence was shocking or startling or disturbingly inappropriate.203 
The test requires the court to ask whether the sentence is so excessive that no reasonable 
man would have imposed it. O’Linn J in a concurring judgment in Vries argues that the 
shocking test is an attempt to refine the proportionality test adopted by the courts in 
jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada and South Africa, including now 
the Namibian Supreme and High Courts.204 O‘Linn J has no objection to such further 
refinement but regards it as unnecessary.205 
(c)   Place of Proportionality test 
In Vries the court explained the place of the proportionality test in determining whether a 
law is unconstitutional. The proportionality test is to be regarded as part and parcel of the 
current values test.206 The proportionality test should be seen as flowing logically from the 
current values but is a more precise and practical yardstick to measure what is 
                                                          
201 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at para 15. 
202 S v Shipanga 2010 NAHC 46. 
203 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 643. 
204 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC); see also S v Tcoeib 1999 NR 24. 
205 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 674. 
206 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 674. 
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constitutionally permissible.207 In Vries it was applied to measure what is regarded as 
constitutionally cruel and unusual punishment or unconstitutionally cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment.208 The proportionality test can be applied as an independent 
exercise of the courts discretion in determining whether a law, rule or action is 
constitutionally permissible or if a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of an 
offence.209 
5.3. Requirements of Article 22 
Article 22 has been described as being unique to the Namibian Constitution because neither 
such a provision, nor anything resembling it is to be found in the Constitution of any other 
country.210 Article 22 states that any law that provides a limitation211 must under article 
22(a), be authorised by chapter 3 of the Constitution and must be of general application; 
may not negate the essential content of the right or freedom concerned; may not be aimed 
at a particular individual. The words any law refers to statutes and excludes the common 
law.212 The provisions of article 22(a) when interpreted broadly, liberally and purposively as 
laid down by the Supreme Court, is applicable to post and pre-independence statutes.213 
Van Wyk et al comments as follows on article 22: The words general application has the 
effect that no victimisation of or vendetta against persons or groups can take place. The 
authors further state that legislation which encroaches upon the essential content of a right 
is invalid.214  
Kauesa is an example of a case where the court had to determine whether legislation 
complied with the provisions of article 22(a). In casu the Court considered the 
constitutionality of Regulation 58(32) of Police Regulations which forbids comments 
unfavourably made in public upon the administration of the force or any other Government 
department. The question the Court had to determine was whether the regulation complied 
                                                          
207 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 674. 
208 Cilliers and Amoo The role of the court at 23. 
209 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 674; see also Cilliers and Amoo The role of the court at 24. 
210 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 65. 
211 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 65.   
212 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 65. 
213 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 100; see also Government of the Republic of  
    Namibia v Cultura 2000 [1994] (1) SA 407 (NmS) at 418F-G. 
214 Van Wyk, Wiechers and Hill Namibia Constitutional and International law issues at 39- 40; Smith v Attorney  
    General Bophutatswana 1984 1 SA 196 (BSC).   
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with the provisions of article 22(a) of the Constitution. In this regard the Court reviewed 
decisions which dealt with the interpretation of similar statutory regulations and 
constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions. The Court approved and applied the 
approaches adopted in the Supreme Court of the United States of America minority decision 
of Gasperinetti,215 the majority decision of Parker216 and the unanimous decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Engel.217 From the aforesaid authority, it is 
clear that there is a need within the police department for unity and obedience and an 
equally strong necessity for public confidence. Accordingly, it is important that subordinates 
respect their superior officers. In the absence of rules limiting public criticism morale and 
public confidence in the police, they would likely be undermined. It does not absolutely 
prohibit criticism. Private communications is permissible but criticism which publicly 
disparages police policy and superiors are not permitted. Based on these reasons the Court 
held that Regulation 58(32) complied with article 22(a) of the Constitution in that it is of 
general application does not negate the essential content of the freedom of speech of 
expression and is not aimed at a particular individual.218  
Article 22(b) requires that the legislation must specify the ascertainable extent of such 
limitation and must identify the provision on which authority to enact the limitation is 
based.219 The statutes contemplated in art 22(b) are those enacted subsequent to the 
coming into operation of the Namibian Constitution.220 Van Wyk et al state that the words 
“specify the ascertainable extent of the limitation and the article conferring the authority 
for the curtailment” ensures legal certainty which is an important factor in the achievement 
of both procedural and substantive justice.221  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Since the relevant constitutional provisions of South Africa and Namibia are not exactly the 
same, not all interpretations and applications of the exclusionary rule by the courts in 
Namibia are comparable. Both Namibian and South African courts generally consider the 
question of admissibility of all types of unconstitutionally obtained evidence by employing 
the so-called trial-within-a-trial procedure. The procedure ensures that the issues of 
admissibility and criminal liability of an accused are separated to ensure that the rights to be 
presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify during the trial proceedings are 
protected. The ruling is interlocutory but a court may on presentation of new evidence 
reconsider its previous decision. The South African courts have delivered diverse judgments 
on the question whether or not the accused bears the onus of showing that his rights have 
been infringed.222 Despite dissension the South African Courts have consistently applied a 
“two-phased” approach to determine where the onus lies in respect of both rights and 
freedoms. The question on who bears the onus under the provisions of the Namibian 
Constitution depends on whether the alleged violation involves a right or a freedom. In the 
case of a fundamental right the accused bears the onus throughout. In the case of a 
freedom the accused bears the initial onus and thereafter it shifts to the state to prove that 
the infringement was reasonable and justifiable.   
Courts in both jurisdictions hold that an applicant must establish the threshold 
requirements to succeed with an exclusionary remedy. Neither Constitution specifically 
mentions whether a suspect is entitled to rely on the fundamental rights. The Namibian 
courts adopted a generous and purposive approach as stated in the South African cases of 
Sebejan223 and Orrie224 by holding that a suspect is entitled to rely on the fundamental rights 
in the Constitution. It is not a requirement in Namibia for the applicant to show that the 
disputed evidence would not have been obtained “but for” the infringement. The Namibian 
courts adopted a narrow approach regarding the standing requirement. Article 25(2) is 
invoked only when a personal constitutional right of the accused is directly breached. This 
approach is contrary to the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Mthembu225 where the 
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court held that an accused may challenge the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence procured in violation of the rights of a third party.  
Namibian and South African courts apply a discretionary exclusionary rule. The exclusionary 
test by the Namibian courts involves a determination of whether admission or exclusion of 
evidence will affect the fairness of the trial or would be detrimental to the administration of 
justice. The concept trial fairness is determined by balancing the interest of the accused 
against the interest of society. In essence the exclusionary test in Namibia requires a 
determination of the nature of the irregularity and its effect.226 In Namibia 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence which is so fundamental that it can be said that there 
was in effect no trial must be excluded.227 The interpretation of the concept trial fairness in 
Namibia appears to be similar to the approach formulated in Tandwa228 as opposed to 
Pillay229 which advance a two-phased approach. The effect of the one stage approach is that 
once it is established that the exclusion or admission of evidence would affect trial fairness a 
further inquiry is unnecessary because the admission or exclusion of evidence of this nature 
would thus be detrimental to the administration of justice as well. The cases in Namibia 
unequivocally state that a conviction should either stand or be substituted with an acquittal 
on the merits if the irregularity brings the administration of justice into disrepute.230   
The obtainment of real evidence through compulsion must be procured lawfully and 
constitutionally. Laws, rules and conduct will be constitutional if it falls within meaning of 
the fundamental rights and freedoms. The fundamental rights are defined with limitations, 
meaning the courts are obliged to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow 
interpretation of the rights themselves. The South African Constitution deals with the 
limitation of rights through a general limitation clause. In Zuma231 the court stated that this 
calls for a "two-stage" approach, in which a broad rather than a narrow interpretation is 
given to the fundamental rights enshrined in chapter 3 and limitations have to be justified 
through the application of the limitation clause.  
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The rights and freedoms are defined by referring to the meaning of the words and 
employing a value test which was supplemented by the proportionality test. During the 
value test and the proportionality test the court exercise its discretion by means of 
balancing the interest of the accused against the public interest. Important factors are that 
the conduct, law or action must be lawful and reasonable. The courts will for example 
refuse to order the obtainment of evidence through compulsion from the body of a person 
in circumstances where no statutory authorisation exist as well as where the medical 
procedure involved pose a real risk to the well-being of the accused. 
In Chapter 7, I make conclusions and recommendations based on the comparative study 
undertaken of the exclusionary jurisprudence in South Africa, Canada, the United States of 
America and Namibia. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The constitutionalisation of South Africa started the process of transforming society and its 
political and legal systems.1 One of the more important changes brought about is the 
incorporation of fundamental principles of criminal procedures in the Constitution.2 The 
courts have a duty, as guardians of the Constitution, to safeguard fundamental rights and to 
prevent manipulation of the criminal justice system by the state.3 
 An important part of crime investigation is the obtainment of evidence, in the context of 
this thesis, the obtainment of real evidence. The Constitution imposes standards state 
agencies must adhere to when exercising powers for purposes of gathering evidence. 
Section 35(5) of the Constitution is a significant constitutional remedy for the infringement 
of the constitutional rights. The exclusionary provision does not provide for the automatic 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
must be excluded only if admission (a) renders the trial unfair, or (b) which is otherwise 
detrimental to the administration of justice.4 
In common law no person may be compelled to supply evidence that incriminates him, 
either before or during the trial. In this regard the focus in this thesis is to seek answers to 
the research questions set out in chapter 1 and repeated here: (1) whether our courts 
distinguish real evidence from other evidence in section 35(5) applications, (2) whether a 
clear distinction can be made between real evidence and testimonial or communicative 
statements?, (3) to what extent has the common law rule survived in the constitutional era- 
both with respect to its exclusionary and inclusionary aspects?, (4) whether compelled real 
evidence could be self-incriminating at all?, (5) whether section 35(5) judgments are always 
                                                          
1 Shabalala v Attorney- General of Transvaal 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) at para 18. 
2
 Basdeo Search and seizure at 1. 
3
 Basdeo Search and seizure at 135. 
4
 S v Mthembu 2008 (2) SACR 407 (SCA) at para 25. 
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consistent and predictable?, and lastly (6) whether the procedures in section 37 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 is constitutional. 
The Constitution allows a court when interpreting the Bill of Rights to consider foreign law.5 
In this regard I have undertaken a comparative study of the exclusionary rule jurisprudence 
of Canada, the United States of America and Namibia. The comparative analysis highlights 
the similarities and differences in the approach to the interpretation of the respective 
exclusionary provisions and also identifies principles which serve as a guide for the future 
development of section 35(5). 
This Chapter consists of conclusions followed by recommendations. I specifically make 
recommendations on how our courts should interpret section 35(5) and propose legislative 
amendments to section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
 
2. CONCLUSIONS    
In this part of the Chapter conclusions are made in respect of the following aspects: the 
rationale of the exclusionary rule, the procedural requirements, the essential threshold 
requirements of the exclusionary rule and the factors relevant to the two tests embodied in 
section 35(5), that is whether admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would 
render the trial unfair (first leg), or otherwise will have a detrimental effect on the 
administration of justice (second leg).    
2.1 Rationale of the exclusionary rule 
The scope and impact of the exclusionary rule is determined by its rationale. It is generally 
accepted that the applicable rationale provides the justification why the exclusionary 
remedy is applied or not in certain instances.6 The question arises whether the appropriate 
rationale for the exclusionary rule in section 35(5) is the deterrence- or remedial imperative- 
or judicial integrity rationale when determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. A comparative study reveals that the courts in the United States of 
America have exclusively elected the deterrence principle and the Canadian courts 
                                                          
5  Section 39(1)(c). 
6  Mellifont The derivative imperative at 17.   
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emphasised the judicial integrity rationale.  A review of the South African case law reveals 
that our courts do not favour any one of the rationales when determining the admissibility 
of evidence.  
In Pillay7 the court appears to suggest that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
police misconduct. The Court reasoned that inclusion of the derivative evidence might 
create an incentive for law enforcement agents to disregard constitutional rights.8  
In Tandwa9  the court declared that the objective of section 35(5) is to protect individuals 
from police conduct in breach of fundamental rights. The real evidence was obtained as a 
result of assault and torture by the police on the accused. The Court found the rights 
violations severe because they stemmed from the deliberate and flagrant conduct of the 
police. The remedial imperative or protective principle served to justify the application of 
the exclusionary rule.   
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu10  considered the question whether real evidence 
obtained as a result of torture must be excluded for that reason. Real evidence obtained 
through torture, would amount to involving the judicial process in moral defilement which 
would compromise the integrity of the judicial process and dishonour the administration of 
justice. Central to the judicial integrity rationale is the objective to protect the integrity of 
the justice system. The real evidence was for these reasons excluded.11 Similarly in Tandwa 
the Supreme Court of Appeal excluded real evidence because inclusion of the evidence 
would mean that the court is associating itself with barbarous and unacceptable conduct.12  
The Supreme Court of Appeal has clearly employed one or a combination of the deterrence-
remedial imperative- or judicial integrity rationale to justify the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence.13  Davies14 supports this approach when he 
argues that the focus should not be to select any specific rationale for the exclusionary rule 
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when determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.15 He submits 
that the proper approach should be to examine the common theme that runs through each 
of the three rationales, namely that of taking rights seriously. He argues that if rights are not 
taken seriously none of the above principles can justify the exclusion of evidence obtained 
in violation of the Constitution.16 
2.2 Procedural matters 
The appropriateness of the trial- within-a-trial procedure is examined, as well as the aspect 
of the location of the threshold burden. The argument in respect of the trial-within-a-trial 
procedure and the location of the onus is not affected when determining the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence.   
2.2.1 Procedure under section 35(5) 
In the South African and Namibian jurisdictions challenges to the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence are usually dealt with during a trial-within-a-trial 
procedure. In the USA and Canada admissibility is challenged by means of a motion to 
suppress or pre-trial motion which is launched at the start of the trial or once an indictment 
has been served. Our courts have in the past permitted the challenge to address the 
question of admissibility by means of pre-trial motion. The Constitutional Court has 
however discouraged pre-trial applications to determine the admissibility of evidence when 
it is aimed exclusively to circumvent the exclusionary rule or if it delays finalisation of 
criminal proceedings.17  
The proceedings share similar characteristics. During pre-trial motions and trial-within-a-trial 
proceedings courts would be asked to review the method by which the evidence was 
obtained and to determine whether the admission of the evidence is constitutional. The 
admissibility of evidence is challenged by means of the exclusionary rule. The procedure 
separates the admissibility issue from the assessment of the criminal liability to ensure that 
the rights to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify during the trial 
                                                          
15 Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21.  
16 Davies 2002 Criminal LQ 21 at 32. 
17 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions  
    2008 ZACC 13 at para 13; see also Ally 2012 PELJ 476 at 482. 
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proceedings are protected.18 As a result the testimony of an accused concerning 
admissibility could not be included when considering the issue of his guilt.19 A ruling on the 
admissibility or otherwise of evidence must follow at the conclusion of the trial-within-a-
trial or pre-trial motion before proceeding with evidence in the main trial.  
Different procedural rules are applicable to the proceedings. Because a trial-within-a-trial 
procedure is interlocutory a trial court may be called upon during any stage of the trial to 
reconsider the admissibility issue based on new facts that arose during the trial.20 An 
accused in a criminal trial may during the trial-within-a-trial refer to evidence already led in 
the main trial.21 A ruling, during a pre-trial motion, in respect of the admissibility of evidence 
is final.22 A party is however entitled to a redetermination of the admissibility of evidence at 
his trial, only if new evidence comes to light which was unavailable at the time of the 
original hearing through no fault of the movant.23 
2.2.2 The threshold onus 
In South Africa two dominant views exist on the questions of the incidence and nature of 
the threshold burden under section 35(5). The central question is whether the onus resorts 
with an applicant to prove a rights violation.  
In Viljoen24 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that an accused bears the burden of 
showing that the police violated his constitutional rights in the process of procuring the 
evidence. A comparative overview of the threshold burden requirements in Namiba,25 USA26 
and Canada27 reveal that the applicant also bears the onus of establishing a constitutional 
violation. In Namibia the onus resorts with the applicant who must persuade the court on a 
balance of probabilities that he is an aggrieved person and that his fundamental right or 
                                                          
18 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 175-176. 
19 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 259. 
20 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 407 and 535. 
21 S v Malumo 2010 (1) NR 35 at 40 referring to S v Muchindu 2000 (2) SACR 313 (W) at 317. 
22 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 407. 
23 LaFave and Isreal Criminal Procedure 515; see also Brinegar v US 338 US 160, 162-163 (1949).  
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25 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 55; Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR  
    328. 
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freedom has been infringed or threatened.28 The courts in Canada interpreted the phrase “if 
it is established” in section 24(2) that the accused bear the onus in showing on a balance of 
probabilities a Charter violation. In the USA the onus resorts with the applicant to prove the 
threshold requirements including rights infringements.   
The approach in Viljoen and the assessment of the comparative study does not accord with 
a generous and purposive interpretation of section 35(5). The words in section 35(5) do not 
support an interpretation that the accused should bear the onus and moreover the 
approach does not protect the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
incrimination.29 Accordingly, I support the following approach suggested by Mgcina30 and 
elaborated on by Schwikkard and Van der Merwe:31 
1. The accused should allege but need not prove a rights violation and that the 
evidence should be excluded;  
2. Failure by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt any factual matter will 
result in the accused receiving the benefit of the doubt; and 
3. When the court finds that evidence has been unconstitutionally obtained it is 
required to make a value judgment on whether the admission would result in one of 
the consequences identified in section 35(5). Based on this approach there can be no 
question of an onus in respect of this decision.  
2.3 Threshold requirements 
The threshold requirements explored are: the beneficiary of the exclusionary rule, the 
connection requirement, the aspect of standing and the violation of a constitutional right. 
The threshold requirements are not affected by the nature of the evidence, more 
specifically real evidence. 
  
                                                          
28 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1995 (1) SA 51 (NmHC) at 55; see also S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm)  
    665-667; S v Van Den Berg 1995 NR 23 at 40-41. 
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2.3.1 Beneficiaries 
The question posed under this heading is whether a “suspect” is entitled to rely on section 
35(5) given that section 35 does not explicitly mention that suspects may rely on the rights 
in the Bill of Rights.  
In Khan32 the court stated that section 35 rights are not applicable to suspects because 
suspects are sufficiently protected by the application of the provisions of the Judges' Rules. 
The literal and legalistic interpretation of the concepts “arrested” and “detained” in Khan 
should not be followed. The generous and purposive interpretation in the obiter decision in 
Sebejan33 is supported. In casu the court stated that section 35 should be interpreted to also 
include protection for a suspect. The courts in Namibia adopted a similar approach.34 This 
approach is aligned to the primary rationale of the exclusionary rule which is the protection 
of judicial integrity while also serving a deterrent effect by influencing future police conduct.  
A person is a suspect if the police, in the absence of certain proof, believe that he is guilty of 
a crime or he is suspected of a crime or offence.35 The High Court delivered conflicting 
judgments on the nature of the belief required by the police. In Sebejan36 the court stated 
that the belief can be “some apprehension” that a person might have committed an 
offence.37  
I agree with the approach in Khan.38 The Court held that the phrase “some apprehension” 
set the standard too low and suggested instead a “reasonable apprehension.”39 The 
question whether an individual is in fact a suspect is therefore answered by means of an 
objective inquiry.40  In this process the subjective (belief of the police) should be considered 
to ascertain whether the person is a suspect.41  
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The concept “suspect,” is not sufficiently broad to protect a suspect who incriminates 
himself because he feels obliged to respond to police questioning. The “suspect” in these 
situations should, like a detainee, be warned of his rights, even though he was strictly 
speaking not detained at the time of questioning.42 It is submitted the courts should in these 
situations employ the interpretation of the concepts “detained” in Canada43 and “seized” in 
the USA.44 Psychological restraint is manifested in Canada if the subject is legally obliged to 
comply with a restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the state conduct that he has no choice but to comply.45 In the USA a person is 
seized either by the application of physical force,46 however slight, or where that is absent, 
submission to an officer's show of authority to restrain the subject's liberty.47 In Canada and 
the USA the courts apply an objective test to determine if a reasonable person would have 
concluded that his right to choose how to interact with the police had been removed or 
whether a show of authority constitutes a seizure. The question is whether the police 
conduct taken as a whole supports a reasonable conclusion that the individual had no 
choice but to comply. The presence of detention should be determined by taking into 
account (1) the objective facts of such encounters; (2) the perception of the police in 
initiating the encounter, (3) whatever information the police possess at the time.48  
Legal commentators agree that “informational duties” should arise the moment the police 
embark on an adversarial relationship with suspects.49 An adversarial relationship will not 
necessarily emerge when an individual becomes a suspect but happens when an individual 
is required to establish or disprove the existence of evidence linking them to the crime.50 
The test is objective. A relevant factor would be the subjective belief of the person 
suspected of wrongdoing at the time of his or her interaction with the police.51  
 
                                                          
42 Naudé 2009 SAPL at 506 -507. 
43 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 490. 
44 See in general Naudé 2009 SAPL 506.   
45 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
46 California v Hodari 499 US 621, 624-625 (1991); Terry v Ohio 392 US 1, 19 n 1 (1968). 
47 US v Mendenhall 446 US 544 (1980); California v Hodari 499 US 621 (1991). 
48 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 at para 180; see also US v Mendenhall 446 US 544, 554 (1980). 
49 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 259; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 150; Naudé 2009 SAPL 506. 
50 Ally 2010 CILSA 239 at 259; Ally Constitutional exclusion at 150; Naudé 2009 SAPL 506. 
51 Naudé 2009 SAPL 506.      
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2.3.2 Connection requirement 
Section 35(5) implies that a link between the constitutional breach and the discovery of the 
evidence be established to satisfy the threshold requirement “obtained in a manner.” In the 
absence of such a link the accused would not be entitled to the exclusionary remedy.52 The 
courts have not been consistent on the nature of the link required to meet the connection 
requirement. 
The High Court in Orrie53 adopted a literal approach and held that a strict or direct causal 
link is required. The causal connection is satisfied when an applicant establish that the 
impugned evidence would not have been discovered “but for” the violation. The South 
African Supreme Court in Pillay54 rejected the notion that a causal connection requirement 
is determinative of the connection requirement. This approach is aligned to a purposive and 
generous approach when interpreting the phrase “obtained in a manner.” Based on these 
cases the court could either apply a temporal sequence or causal connection test, whichever 
is the stronger, to satisfy the threshold requirement. A temporal sequence implies that the 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was obtained after the rights violation. When the 
infringement forms part of a chain of events that leads to the discovery of evidence an 
important aspect of the threshold equation is whether the link is sufficient between the 
discovery and the violation.55 In other words the link between the breach of the 
fundamental right must not be “too remote” from the discovery of the evidence.  The 
strength of both the temporal and the causal connection is undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis.  
A comparative review of section 24(2) reveals that the “obtained in a manner” requirement 
could be satisfied by means of a strict causation test (obtained as a direct result of a Charter 
violation), a relationship of temporality (obtained in the course of a larger transaction in 
which a Charter violation occurred) or contextual circumstances (evidence linked through 
association).56 The contextual connection test involves an analysis of all the circumstances 
                                                          
52 Ally Constitutional exclusion at 163. 
53 S v Orrie 2005 (1) SACR 63 (C). 
54 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA); see also S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA); S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA   
159 (SCA). 
55 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA). 
56 R v Plaha (2004) 24 CR (6
th
) 360, 188 CCC (3d) 289; R v Wittwer [2008] 2 SCR 235; R v Flintoff (1998) 16 CR 
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relevant to the evidence gathering to determine the connection requirement.57 Ally 
suggests that the approach in the interpretation by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Pillay58 
and Mthembu59 of the connection requirement serves to achieve an analogous purpose as 
that of the Canadian contextual connection requirement.60 The courts in Canada employ a 
proximity analysis to determine the strength of the connection between the evidence 
obtained and the Charter breach.61  In situations where the connection is tenuous or too 
remote the evidence may not have been obtained in a manner that infringes or denies 
Charter rights.62 The issue of “strength” of the connection is a question of fact and should be 
determined on a case by case basis.63  
In the USA the attenuation doctrine recognises an exception to the exclusionary remedy if 
the connection between the constitutional breach and the discovery of the evidence 
becomes so attenuated (weak). The ratio for the exception is that the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule no longer justifies the social costs.64  There are two forms of attenuation.65 
The first is based on the nature of the causal link. Factors relevant to a determination of 
nature of the causal link: a constitutional violation was a “but-for-cause” of obtaining 
evidence, the temporal proximity of the illegality and the illegal evidence, the presence of 
intervening circumstances, the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct and the willingness 
of the witness to testify.66 Secondly, the discovery of evidence would be attenuated if 
exclusion of evidence would not further the purposes of the infringed fundamental right.67 
2.3.3 Standing threshold requirement  
The research question explored in this part of the thesis is whether a person may rely on the 
exclusionary remedy when the rights of an innocent third party (and not that of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
    (5
th
) 248 (Ont CA). 
57 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 379. 
58 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA). 
59 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA). 
60 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 395. 
61 R v Strachan [1988] 2 SCR 190.  
62 R v Strachan [1988] 2 SCR 190.  
63 R v Goldhart [1996] 2 SCR 463 at para 35-40.  
64 Nardone v US 302 US 379 (1937); see also Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 195. 
65 Hudson v Michigan 547 US 586, 593 (2006); Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631 at 645. 
66 Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 (1963); Brown v Illinois 422 US 590 (1975); US v Ceccolini 435 US 268, 276 (1978); 
Segura v US 468 US 796 (1984); USCA Const Amend 4 US v Gaines 668 F 3d 170 (4
th
 Cir 2012). 
67 Hudson v Michigan 547 US 586 (2006); Cammack 2010 American J Comp L 631 at 645. 
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accused) had been infringed and the state seeks to rely on this evidence at the trial to 
secure a conviction.   
The courts in Canada, USA and Namibia adopted a narrow interpretation to the standing 
requirement.68 The ratio is that constitutional rights are considered to be personal rights. 
Standing is usually inferred from the language of the infringed fundamental right and in 
cases where it does not confer standing on a person the court will dismiss the action on the 
ground that it is not justiciable.69 The exclusionary remedy therefore applies only to 
evidence obtained in contravention of the applicant’s rights and cannot be claimed in 
circumstances where the right of a third party is violated.  
The South African courts should not follow the decisions in Canada, USA and Namibia. The 
liberal approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu70 should be 
followed. The Court held that a person is entitled to the exclusionary remedy even in cases 
where evidence was obtained from a third party. 71 Legal commentators agree that the 
“standing” requirement should not be determinative of the threshold requirement in 
section 35(5)72 for the following reasons: the exclusionary remedy is not a personal 
remedy,73 the narrow interpretation of the threshold requirement has the potential to 
frustrate the efficiency of the exclusionary remedy provided by section 35(5);74 the words of 
the provision do not support such a restrictive interpretation,75 the liberal interpretation of 
standing is closely aligned to the primary rationales of the section 35(5),76 and the goal of 
protecting the fundamental rights of vulnerable members of society cannot be achieved 
should an accused not be able to satisfy the threshold requirement in section 35(5).77  
 
                                                          
68 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; Alderman v US 394 US 165, 171 (1969); S v Malumo (2) 2007 (1) NR 198. 
69 Hinz, Amoo and van Wyk The constitution at work at 123-124: Non-justiciability implies that the litigation 
    does not directly relate to the litigant or that none of his rights or interests are involved or the outcome of 
    which would not adversely affect his rights, interests or legitimate expectation.  
70 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA). 
71 S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA) at para 27. 
72 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 221; Naudé 2008 SAPL 166 at 177. 
73 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 222; Naudé 2008 SAPL 166 at 178.  
74 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 392. 
75 Zeffertt and Paizes Law of evidence at 739; Van der Merwe 1992 Stell LR 173 at 187. 
76 Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 391-392; S v Mthembu [2008] 3 All SA 159 (SCA) at para 26; Ally Constitutional  
    exclusion at 192-193; Steytler Constitutional criminal procedure at 38; Schwikkard and Van der Merwe  
    Principles of evidence at 221- 222; Ally 2011 Stell LR 376 at 391-392.  
77 See in general Ally Constitutional exclusion at 493. 
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2.3.4  Violation of the right 
Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 which authorises the compulsory 
ascertainment of bodily features, may violate the right to privacy, the right to dignity, not to 
be tortured and conceivably even the right to property. The South African and Canadian 
Constitution and Charter respectively deal with the limitation of rights through a general 
limitation clause. The courts apply a "two-stage" approach. The first-stage involves 
interpreting the right which involves a determination of the scope of the right and whether 
the law or conduct breached the right. A broad rather than a narrow interpretation is given 
to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The second stage is triggered only if 
there is an infringement. A court must then consider whether the law or conduct is 
justifiable under the limitation clause.78  
(a)  Objective reasonableness of a right 
In Canada and South Africa the “nature of the right” factor involves the determination of the 
scope of the fundamental right and whether it has been infringed. To determine whether a 
right has been breached a person must prove that he has a subjective expectation of privacy 
that society is prepared to recognise as objectively reasonable.79 The subjective expectation 
component recognises that the right interest cannot be claimed if the party consented to 
having his right invaded. The objective reasonableness is assessed on a case by case basis in 
which the individual’s rights interests are weighed against society’s interest in the conduct, 
law or rule.80 In this regard the reasonable expectation would be determined on an 
assessment of the totality of all circumstances.81  
The judgments of Gaqa and Xaba provide an example of how the courts applied this 
principle when determining the reasonable expectation where evidence is required only to 
                                                          
78 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) at para 100-102; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences  
     v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 (10) BCLR  
     1079 (CC) 437 at para 17-18; S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
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 Protea Technology Ltd v Wainer 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (W) 1239; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
     Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty)Ltd v Smit 2000 (10) 
  BCLR 1079 (CC) at 235; Basdeo Search and seizure at 41; see also R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265; R v Edwards  
     [1996] 1 SCR 126; Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145. 
80 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C); Winston v Lee 470 US 753 (1985). 
81
 See in general R v Buhay [2003] 1 SCR 631; R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Tessling [2004] 3 SCR 432; US 
     v Gomez 16 F3d 254 (8th Cir 1994); R v Krist (1995) 100 CCC (3d) 58 (BCCA); R v Evans [1996] 1 SCR 8; 
     Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C); Winston v Lee 470 US 753 (1985). 
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be discovered by surgery under section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. In Gaqa82 
the court held that the reasonableness of surgical procedures depended on a case by case 
approach in which the individual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against 
society’s interest in conducting the procedure.83 The Court assessed the individual’s interest 
by considering the following factors: the bullet was lodged in the respondent’s leg (thigh), 
according to the orthopeadic surgeon, the bullet could be removed through a simple 
procedure under general anaesthetic and the police alleged that in the absence of the bullet 
there would be no other evidence against the respondent.84 These factors were weighed 
against the following public interests: The Court observed that a refusal of an order would 
result in serious crime remaining unsolved, law enforcement would be stymied and justice 
diminished in the eyes of the public who have a direct and substantial interest in the 
resolution of such crime. Although the intrusion was substantial, the Court concluded that 
the community interest must prevail in this case. The Court found that the interest of 
society overshadowed the interest of the respondent and ordered the removal of the 
bullet.85 On the other hand the court in Xaba86  refused to give a similar order. Although the 
facts in Xaba were similar to Gaqa the court did not consider itself bound by the Gaqa. The 
Court did not comment on Gaqa’s analysis of reaching a balance between the interests of 
the individual and the interests of the community. However, the Court emphasised that the 
answer to this complex problem of reaching a balance between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of the community, in having crimes solved by using surgical 
intervention posed by similar cases like this should be dealt with by the legislature.87 
In the USA “reasonableness” is determined on a case-by-case basis.  In Schmerber88 the 
court considered the question whether the means and procedures employed during the 
taking of a blood sample respected the relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.89 To determine if the procedure meets the reasonableness standard the 
individual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in 
                                                          
82 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C).  
83 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C). 
84 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 659. 
85 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 659. 
86 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
87 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D) at 714-715. 
88 Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966); see also Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of evidence at 
     135-136, 238-239. 
89 Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 768 (1966). 
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conducting the procedure. Considering the privacy interest the Court held that the test was 
reasonable in the sense that such tests are common place and involve virtually no risk, 
trauma or pain and that the blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment 
according to accepted medical practices.90 Weighed against the privacy interest is the 
community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. The evidence 
revealed that a blood test is effective to determine the degree to which an accused is under 
the influence, there had been a clear indication that the extraction would produce evidence 
of crime (defendant was intoxicated while driving), and the blood test was of vital 
importance to prove the crime.91 The Court concluded that the compelled blood test was 
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.92 The Court extended the Schmerber 
framework to the context of court-ordered surgical intrusions.93 In Winston94 the 
prosecution brought an application for an order directing the accused to undergo surgery 
using local anaesthetic to remove the bullet. The Court reasoned that the competing 
interests that arise in extracting blood from a suspect (Schmerber) are similarly raised when 
a suspect undergoes surgery for the removal of bullets. The following personal 
circumstances were taken into account: the extent to which the procedure threatens the 
individual’s safety or health and the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity. Considering the community’s interest the 
Court observed that the evidence was not important to the prosecution’s case and the state 
had available substantial evidence to prove its case.95 The Court ruled that to compel 
surgery would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and would violate 
the accused right to be secure in his person.96  
In Namibia the courts have to establish limits to constitutional rights through a narrow 
interpretation of the rights themselves. The question whether a rule, legislation or action is 
constitutionally permissible has for that reason to be determined within the larger question 
                                                          
90 Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 771 (1966). 
91 Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 771 (1966); see also Minton 1978 Missouri LR 133 at 136. 
92 Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 771 (1966). 
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94 Winston v Lee 470 US 753 (1985). 
95 Winston v Lee 470 US 753, 761-764 (1985). 
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of the definition of the fundamental right.97 The rights and freedoms are defined by 
referring to the meaning of the words98 or through a value test99 which is supplemented by 
the proportionality test. During the value test and the proportionality test the court exercise 
its discretion by means of balancing the interest of the accused against the public interest. 
The principles of lawfulness and reasonableness set out in the South African judgments of 
Gaqa100 and Xaba101 has been reinforced by the Namibian courts. In Hausiku102 the state 
brought an application in terms of section 37(3) authorising the police to take a sample of 
the accused’s saliva for purposes of forensic analysis. The Court concluded that the police 
with the assistance of a medical practitioner are empowered to take a sample of the saliva 
of the accused.103 In Shipanga104 the High court confirmed that the taking of a blood sample 
is lawful and reasonable. The Court reasoned that the procedure for taking of blood samples 
is relatively painless, has become wide spread and also a vital tool in the administration of 
the criminal justice system. There are no decided cases in Namibia where applications were 
brought for an order to secure evidence from the accused through more serious medical 
procedures. Having a regard to Shipanga and Hausiku the courts must balance the interest 
of the accused against that of the state. Important factors that should be considered are: 
the evidence must be lawfully obtained and the procedure or method followed to obtain 
the evidence must be reasonable. Courts will not authorise a medical procedure that holds a 
risk to the well-being of the accused. 
The Supreme Court in Canada, in Edwards105 held that courts examine all the circumstances 
in deciding whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.106 In casu the 
court held that a reasonable expectation of privacy would be determined on an assessment 
of the totality of circumstances which would include, circumstances such as the accused’s 
presence at the time of the search, possession or control of the property or place searched, 
ownership of the property or place, historical use of the property or item, ability to regulate 
                                                          
97 S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm) 663.    
98 The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board and Frank and Another 2001 NASC 1 at 102. 
99 Ex Parte Attorney-General: In Re Corporal Punishment 1991 NR 178. 
100 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C).   
101 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
102 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158. 
103 S v Hausiku and Others 2011 NAHC 158 at para 15. 
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105 R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; see also R v Plant [1993] 3 SCR 281.  
106 R v Edwards [1996] SCR 128; Pink and Perrier Crime to punishment at 471. 
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access, existence of a subjective expectation of privacy and the objective reasonableness of 
the expectation.107  
(b) Limitation of rights 
During the second stage a court must consider whether the violation of the right is 
justifiable in terms of the limitation clause of the Constitution. In Canada and South Africa 
the limitation must meet two requirements: (1) it must constitute a law of general application 
and must be, (2) reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.108 
(i) “Law of general application”   
The “law of general application” requirement arises from an important principle of the rule 
of law, namely, that rules should be stated in a clear and accessible manner.109 The 
limitation must be authorised by a law that must be of general application. A law of general 
application could be legislation or the common law.110  Conduct is unreasonable if not 
authorised by specific statute or common law; if not carried out in accordance with the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the law; or if the scope of the conduct exceeds 
the limits for which the law granted authority.111  
The discussion of the cases in Gaqa112 and Xaba113 above casts light on the current issue. In 
Gaqa114 the applicant sought an order to have a bullet surgically removed for the purpose of 
ballistic tests. The respondent contended that there was no statutory or common-law 
authorisation for the relief sought. The Court opined that both sections 27 and section 
37(1)(c ) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, permit the violence necessary to remove the 
bullet.115 The Court found that section 27 permitted police to use any reasonable force to 
conduct a search. The Court further stated that section 37(1)( c) authorises  a police official 
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 See in general R v Buhay [2003] 1 SCR 631; R v Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; R v Tessling [2004] 3 SCR 432; US 
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114 Minister of Safety and Security  v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C).  
115 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) at 658. 
212 
 
to take such steps as he may deem necessary in order to ascertain whether the body of any 
person has any mark, characteristic or distinguishing feature or shows any condition or 
appearance. The Court accepted that a bullet was clearly not a mark, characteristic or 
distinguishing feature of the body but a policeman may take the necessary steps to 
determine whether the body shows the bullet- a condition or appearance- which may be 
linked to the murder weapon. The Court held that sections 27 and 37 were laws of general 
application as required by the limitation clause.  
The court in Xaba,116 in similar circumstances to those in Gaqa, opined that the conclusions 
reached there are clearly wrong and declined to follow them. The Court, in Xaba, concluded 
that section 27 and 37(1)(c ) did not permit a police official to use the necessary violence to 
obtain the surgical removal of a bullet. The Court held that a search of a person in section 27 
was not meant to include an operation under general anaesthetic to remove an object from 
the body of a person. The Court concluded that since the police may not search a person by 
operating on his body the police cannot use the reasonable force authorised by section 27. 
Since the police may not delegate the power to search a person, the police may also not ask 
a doctor to do this in his stead. The Court considered the provisions of section 37(1)(c) by 
stating that its construction must be read in the context of section 37(2)(a). Section 37(1)(c) 
was not meant to empower a police official to himself engage in surgery neither to take a 
blood sample.117 Section 37(1)(c) was also not intended to give the police the power to 
delegate to a medical practitioner to perform an operation on the accused as it is section 
37(2)(a) which deals with police empowerment of a medically qualified person and not 
section 37(1)(c). Section 37(2)(a) empowers any registered medical practitioner to do things 
specifically set out in section 37(1)(c) if requested thereto by any police official. The Court 
concluded that the legislature indicated that only the limited surgery involved in taking 
blood sample was to be included and not the steps which could be deemed to include the 
more far reaching surgery contemplated in this case.118   
The Supreme Court of Canada considered this principle (law of general application) in 
Stillman.119 In casu the police forcibly obtained bodily samples and teeth impressions from 
                                                          
116 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
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the accused whilst in detention. The Court agreed with applicant that the evidence obtained 
should be excluded because the search and seizure was unreasonable as it was not 
authorised by statute or the common law. The Court observed that the investigative 
warrants under section 487120 of the Criminal Code only provided authority to search places. 
The Court also held that the common law search and seizure incident to arrest did not 
extend to the obtainment of bodily samples. Accordingly the Court held that the search and 
seizure of the accused was unreasonable. Indicators of reasonableness are: compliance with 
the law and where scope of the search exceeds the limits for which the law granted 
authority. The Canadian courts do not have the power, unless specifically authorised, to 
enforce or order accused to subject themselves to a search and seizure not provided for in 
any statutory or common law. The rationale is that it is up to the legislature and not the 
courts to balance the accused’s Charter rights against society’s interest in effectively 
monitoring their conduct.121  
 (ii)  “Reasonable and justifiable” 
If an applicant establishes that the rule limiting the right is a law of general application  a 
court must  determine whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all 
relevant factors, including those listed in limitation clause. 
What is “reasonable and justifiable” involves a determination on the facts.122 In Canada and 
South Africa the courts apply the proportionality test against which limitations on rights and 
freedoms must be measured.123 The factors in the proportionality test include:  
(1) The nature of the right: an enquiry of how important it is to protect this right 
from infringement given its nature,124    
(2) The importance of the purpose of the limitation: a court must carefully review 
the public interest served by the statutory provision,125  
                                                          
120 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46. 
121 R v Shoker [2006] 2 SCR 399 at para 25; Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145; R v Golden [2001] 3 SCR 679 
at para 103; Schmitz 2006 The lawyers weekly; Anand 2009 CR 25.  
122 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC).  
123 Alexander v Minister of Justice 2010 (1) NR 328 at 360: The proportionality test in Namibia is similar except 
that it is applied to determine the meaning of the fundamental right. 
124 Iles 2007 SAJHR 69. 
214 
 
(3) The nature and extent of the limitation:  an assessment of how the conduct or 
law limits the right,126  
(4) Rational connection: this element requires the law to be rationally connected to 
the objective of the law,127 and 
(5) The presence of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose: whether some or 
other formulation would achieve the same purpose but infringe the right less.128 
Once the assessment is done of all these factors, the factors must be weighed, but 
ultimately the “reasonableness analysis” is one of proportionality which involves an 
assessment of competing values on a case-by-case basis.129  
2.4 Substantive phase 
South African courts relied on Canadian law to interpret section 35(5), more specifically the 
elements: whether admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair (first leg test)130 
or whether admission would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice 
(second leg test). 131 Although there is overlapping of the tests, they are, in this study, kept 
separate.132  
The Collins133 framework and the factors formulated to interpret section 24(2) were 
grouped into three categories: (1) considerations relevant in determining the effect of the 
admission of the evidence on the fairness of the trial, (2) considerations relevant to the 
seriousness of the Charter- violation and thus to the disrepute that will result from judicial 
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acceptance of evidence obtained through that violation, and (3) considerations that relate 
to the effect of excluding the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice. 
In Grant134 the court reviewed the Collins framework. The Court discarded the trial fairness 
test and formulated the following categories of factors to be considered: (1) the seriousness 
of the Charter-infringing state conduct, (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
on its merits. Grant does not track the categories set out in Collins but capture the factors 
relevant to the section 24(2) determination as enunciated in Collins and subsequent 
jurisprudence.135  The new test in Canada, like section 35(5), emphasises the main 
motivation behind the exclusionary rule: to exclude evidence if its admission would be 
detrimental to the administration of justice.  
2.4.1 The first leg of the test in section 35(5): trial fairness 
In Namibia unconstitutionally obtained evidence which adversely affects trial fairness must 
be excluded.136 In executing its discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
the courts consider the nature of the irregularity and its effect.137 Although the test may at 
times be helpful to achieve the balance between the conflicting public interest and policy, 
each case must be clearly determined on its own merits.138 In the USA the courts apply a 
costs benefit analysis before applying the exclusionary remedy. The courts weigh the costs 
of application of the rule against the benefits of its application to help determine whether 
exclusion of the evidence is warranted.  
The South African courts adopted the Collins139 conscription analysis (fair trial framework) 
when determining whether admission of unconstitutionally obtained real evidence would 
render the trial unfair.140 The following Collins-factors are relevant to the fair trial 
assessment:  the “nature of the evidence,” “discoverability analysis” and the “nature of the 
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right.”  For now, though, I consider only the “nature of the evidence” and “discoverability 
analysis” factors.   
(a) “Nature of the evidence” 
(i) Real evidence and trial fairness 
In S v M141 the Supreme Court of Appeal determined the trial fairness requirement based on 
the real evidence divide when the Court held that unconstitutionally obtained, real evidence 
would more readily be admitted than testimonial evidence.142 The ratio is that real evidence 
does not incriminate a person against him in the manner of testimonial evidence. The Court 
in Pillay143 ruled that “the nature of the evidence” is not determinative of the trial fairness 
enquiry but is a factor when determining whether evidence should be classified as 
“conscriptive” or “non-conscriptive.”144 Evidence is conscriptive when the accused in 
violation of his constitutional rights, is compelled to incriminate himself at the behest of the 
state by means of a statement, or the use of the body or the production of bodily 
samples.145  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Tandwa146 and Mthembu147 qualified the impact of Pillay. In 
these decisions the courts rejected the notion that the fair trial requirement had a specific 
meaning and content. The Courts ruled that the fair trial requirement in section 35(5) is 
more flexible. In Tandwa the court stated that considering section 35(5) applications the 
relevant factors for purposes of determining trial fairness would include: the severity of the 
rights violations and the degree of prejudice to the accused, weighed against the public 
policy interest in bringing criminals to book.148 The Supreme Court of Appeal in both 
decisions held that the admissibility of derivative real evidence will attract fair trial 
considerations on account of the manner in which it was obtained, specifically in the case of 
torture. The trial is rendered unfair because it introduces into the process of proof against 
the accused evidence obtained by means that violated basic civilised injunctions against 
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assault and compulsion.149 Based on Tandwa and Mthembu there can be no automatic 
exclusion of evidence because the court retains a discretion and must make a value 
judgment based on the facts of each case. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in Grant,150 stated that the assumption that the use of 
conscriptive evidence always or almost always renders the trial unfair was open for 
challenge.151 The Court also observed that in previous decisions it held that a fair trial is one 
which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural 
fairness of the accused.152 The Court reasoned that it was “difficult to reconcile trial fairness 
as a multifaceted and contextual concept with a near-automatic presumption that 
admission of a broad class of evidence will render a trial unfair, regardless of the 
circumstances in which it was obtained.153 The Court stated that trial fairness is better 
conceived as an overarching systemic goal than as a distinct stage of section 24(2) 
analysis.154  As a result the Court stated that it is no longer concerned about whether the 
evidence in question is conscriptive or non-conscriptive.155 I agree with Naudé that, since 
trial fairness is not the cornerstone of the Canadian section 24(2) jurisprudence, Grant has 
brought the application of the Canadian test closer to that of the South African test.156   
In terms of Grant157 the “nature of the evidence” factor is now a key consideration in 
assessing the degree of intrusion on the Charter interest.158 The nature and degree of 
statements by the accused are assessed in the context of the principle against self-
incrimination. Unconstitutionally obtained real evidence is assessed as follows: (1) bodily 
samples are addressed by reference to the interest in privacy, bodily integrity and human 
dignity,159 (2) non-bodily physical evidence are addressed with reference to the manner in 
which the evidence was obtained and the degree that the manner of discovery undermines 
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the Charter protected privacy interest of the accused,160  (3) derivative evidence are 
addressed with reference to the self-incriminatory origin of the evidence as well as its status 
as real evidence. The infringement is less intrusive and exclusion is less likely to follow if the 
prosecution would have discovered the evidence without the Charter breach.161  
The court in Grant also elaborated on the content of the new test (three lines of inquiry) in 
the context of statements, bodily evidence, non-bodily evidence and derivative evidence. 
The Court, in Grant, noted that the three lines of inquiry support the presumptive general, 
although not automatic, exclusion of statements by the accused. The Court reasoned that 
the  heightened concern with proper police conduct in obtaining statements from suspects 
and the centrality of the protected interests (right against self-incrimination) affected will in 
most cases favour exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained statements. In addition the court 
reasoned that the third factor may be attenuated by a lack of reliability and that this, 
together with the historic tendency to treat statements differently from other evidence, 
explains why such evidence tends to be excluded.162 The courts must apply the three lines of 
inquiry to unconstitutionally obtained bodily evidence,163 non-bodily physical evidence164 
and derivative real evidence.165 Despite this distinction the court emphasised that the same 
three lines of inquiry must be pursued in case of each type of evidence.   
The South African courts clearly distinguish between testimonial and real evidence in the 
context of the privilege against self-incrimination, but the same cannot be said about the 
enquiry into the fairness of the trial in terms of section 35(5) of the Constitution.166 The 
courts generally do not under section 35(5) determinations, distinguish real evidence from 
other evidence such as testimonial evidence, nor considered why it might or should be 
different.167 The comparative analysis reveals that neither in Namibia, United States of 
America nor Canada do the courts distinguish real evidence (nature of the evidence) as a 
factor when employing the exclusionary remedy. The South African courts should follow the 
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Canadian approach set out in Grant and must consider the “nature of the evidence” when 
assessing the degree of intrusion on the constitutional right interest.168 
 (ii) Real evidence emanating from the accused and the right against self-
incrimination 
A question which is crucial under the fair trial enquiry is whether the manner in which the 
evidence was obtained violated the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination. Our courts 
have consistently since Matemba169 held that the privilege against self-incrimination is 
confined to testimonial evidence (utterances or conduct with a communicative element 
such as pointing out) and does not extend to real evidence emanating from an accused.170 
However, in the dissenting judgment in Pillay171 the court observed that the Canadian courts 
equate the compelled production of bodily parts with compelled statements. Stillman172 
changed the approach laid down in Collins173 when the court ruled that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is not confined to testimonial utterances or communications, but that it 
extends to real evidence emanating from an accused, such as hair and blood samples.174 
This development eliminates the well-settled distinction between self-incriminating 
testimonial communications and incriminating real evidence obtained from the body of the 
accused.175 The question is whether the South African courts should adopt Stillman.176 Legal 
commentators argue that the incorporation of the Stillman modification into our law would 
be totally unnecessary and somewhat artificial.177 The majority and minority opinion in 
Pillay found it difficult to see how real evidence, having an independent existence, can ever 
be said to render the trial unfair. The Canadian Supreme Court recently in Grant held that 
Stillman erroneously equated bodily evidence with statements. The Court reasoned that 
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bodily samples are not communicative and therefore not self-incriminatory in the way 
statements are.178 
(b) “Discoverability analysis” 
The Collins/ Stillman framework prescribe that the admission of conscriptive evidence, as a 
general rule, would render the trial unfair. However conscriptive evidence (real or 
testimonial) will not render the trial unfair if the prosecution on a balance of probabilities 
demonstrate that discovery of the evidence was inevitable 179 or that the police would have 
availed themselves of an independent source to obtain the evidence.180 The courts have 
applied both the discovery doctrine and the independent source doctrine when considering 
whether real evidence would- but for the unconstitutional conduct- have been discovered 
by lawful means. 
In Pillay181 the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted the doctrine of inevitable discovery by 
relying on Canadian jurisprudence.182 The doctrine of inevitable discovery was also adopted 
by the Supreme Court of USA183 as an exception to the exclusionary rule.184 The rationale 
underlying this doctrine is that the state gains an unfair advantage it would not have had 
were it not for the unconstitutional infringement. Because of the rationale the police are 
put in the same, not a worse position that they would have been in if no police error or 
misconduct had occurred.185 The inevitable discovery doctrine requires that the prosecution 
show by a preponderance of evidence that the police would have discovered the evidence 
by lawful means.186 The Court found that the illegal monitoring did not constitute 
conscriptive evidence and the money would have been found even in the absence of a 
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.187 In the circumstances the Court held 
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that admission of evidence would not render the trial unfair because the real evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered.188 The doctrine has been criticised and problems in 
its application have been identified. Some of the criticisms are: The rigid application of the 
discoverability doctrine might lead to astonishing consequences because of its 
inflexibility,189 the inherent speculative nature of the doctrine, that the courts should 
demand a higher standard of proof, especially because a constitutional breach has been 
perpetrated.190  
In Lachman191 the Supreme Court of Appeal applied the independent source doctrine by 
holding that the retrieval of the incriminating evidence (a cell phone) would have been the 
“inevitable result” of a search, after the issue of a proper search warrant.192 Under the 
independent source doctrine, unconstitutionally discovered real evidence would be 
admissible, if subsequent to such discovery, the real evidence is seized through sources 
independent from the initial unconstitutional discovery.193 The independent source doctrine 
continues to balance protecting constitutional rights while also avoiding a situation where 
the police are placed in a worse position than before a tainted search.194 The independent 
source doctrine does not require the prosecution to establish the existence of a separate or 
distinct line of inquiry leading to the same evidence.195  
In Grant196 and subsequent decisions, the Court ruled that discoverability should no longer 
be determinative of admissibility.197 This approach is in line with the opinions of local and 
international scholars.198 An approach that avoids dogmatic rules and takes into account all 
the circumstances in addressing the two questions raised in section 35(5) is preferred.199 In 
Canada the discoverability doctrine continues to play a useful role in the section 24(2) 
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analysis. Discovery analysis retains a role in assessing the actual impact of the breach on the 
protected interest of the accused.200 If the Crown would have discovered the evidence 
without the Charter breach the intrusion is less intrusive and exclusion is less likely to 
follow.201  
2.4.2 The second leg of the test in section 35(5): Admission would be detrimental to the 
administration of justice 
If the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would not render the trial unfair, 
such evidence must be excluded if inclusion would be detrimental to the administration of 
justice. In Mphala202 the court stated that the administration of justice is concerned about 
balancing, on the one hand, respect (particularly by law enforcement agencies) for the Bill of 
Rights and on the other hand, respect (particularly by the man on the street) for the judicial 
process. In striking the balance the South African courts answered the question whether 
admission would be detrimental to integrity of the administration of justice by taking into 
account the categories identified in Collins:203 the “seriousness of the violation” and “the 
effect admission would have on the integrity of the justice system.”  
(a) Seriousness of the violation 
A serious infringement is a factor that could justify the exclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. The presence or absence of “good faith” is an indicator of whether rights 
violation should be termed serious, flagrant, deliberate or trivial, inadvertent or of a 
technical nature.204 In Motloutsi,205 a case decided under the interim Constitution, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal discouraged the application of a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule.206 On the other hand the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu207 held 
that constitutional violations classified as “good faith” would weigh heavily in favour of the 
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reception of evidence obtained as a result thereof.208 It follows that a finding of “good faith” 
may in certain cases deny the accused access to an exclusionary remedy. Good faith must be 
reasonable and an objective test must be applied.209 Our courts have in judgments 
considered both objective and subjective factors to determine if police conduct could be 
termed as good faith. It appears that unconstitutional conduct of the police is mitigated if 
reasonable and justifiable;210 bona fide;211 and subjectively honest conduct.212  
In Canada the “seriousness of the Charter infringing state conduct” group of factors forms 
part of the first avenue of inquiry in terms of the Grant213 decision. The “good faith” conduct 
by a police officer reduces the need for the court to dissociate itself from the police 
conduct.214 The bona fides of police officers who commit a Charter violation is a relevant 
factor in determining the seriousness of the breach. The presence or absence of good faith 
is determined by means of an objective test.215 Factors relevant to the assessment include 
the subjective honesty of the mistaken belief and the objective question of the 
reasonableness of that belief.216 The police conduct in the entire evidence gathering process 
must be evaluated.217 It is not only evidence regarding the breach that a court may consider 
but also evidence later obtained during the trial.218  
The Supreme Court of the United States of America recognises good faith as an exception to 
the exclusionary rule.219 The doctrine permits the inclusion of evidence illegally obtained 
through police conduct that was objectively reasonable and pursued in good faith.220 Good 
faith is determined by means of an objective test which is confined to the question whether 
a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the conduct was illegal in light of 
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all of the circumstances.221 The prosecution must establish not only that the officer had a 
subjective good-faith belief that his actions were lawful, but also that it was objectively 
reasonable for the officer to hold that belief.  
(b) The effect admission would have on the integrity of the justice system 
Under this group of factors the courts take into account the following considerations:  the 
current mood of society, the seriousness of the charges and the importance of the evidence 
to secure a conviction. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Grant,222 substituted this category 
with the so-called “society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits” group of 
factors. The ratio is that a court should not only consider the negative impact of admission 
of the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice, but also the impact of failing 
to admit the impugned evidence.  
(i) Seriousness of the charges 
Relevant under this group of factors is the seriousness of the offence charged and not the 
seriousness of the crime committed.223 Our courts have delivered judgments with different 
outcomes because of the weight attributed to this factor.224 In Shongwe225 the court 
emphasised the seriousness of the charges factor and admitted the evidence.226 In Melani227 
the court considered the seriousness of the charge factor but it was not considered 
determinative to its decision.228  A court should have a discretion to exclude evidence which 
links an accused to serious charges.229  An inflexible line of reasoning should therefore not 
be determinative of the admissibility assessment.230 
In earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada   “the seriousness of the offence” factor 
was an important pro-inclusionary consideration.231 The more serious is the offence, the 
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greater likelihood that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by its 
exclusion.232 Recently in Grant233 the court neutralised the impact of this factor by stating 
that it has the potential to “cut both ways” and will not always weigh in favour of admission. 
The ratio was that the public has an interest in seeing a determination on the merits where 
the offence is serious and on the other hand, also has an interest in having a justice system 
that is above reproach especially in cases where the penalties can be severe.234 The shift 
means that the seriousness of the offence will not be the focus to measure the public’s 
reaction to the exclusion of evidence. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court in Harrison235  
considered the seriousness of the offence factor but cautioned that it should not weigh 
heavily in the analysis. The Court however failed to clarify what degree of reliance is 
permissible.236 The approach is in essence acknowledgment that the factor is not neutral in 
the analysis relating to the maintenance of the repute of the administration of justice.  
The approach in Melani, and the Canadian decisions in Grant and Harrison is supported. 
Seriousness of the offense should be considered a factor in this line of the inquiry. The 
degree of reliance must however not be weighty or determinative of the outcome of this 
line of the inquiry. This approach would be in line with the prescribed wording in section 
24(2) and section 35(5) that all circumstances be considered when the court exercises its 
judicial discretion. The approach will be consistent with the flexibility principle that is 
advocated by legal authorities.237  
(ii) Importance of the evidence to secure conviction 
The “importance of the evidence to secure a conviction” is recognised as a factor to 
determine the effect admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would have on the 
administration of justice.238 The courts delivered conflicting judgments on the nature of the 
inquiry. In the minority judgment of Pillay239 the court linked the admissibility assessment to 
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criminal culpability thereby effectively encroaching upon the presumption of innocence.240 
The concern with such an analysis (taking into account the importance of evidence for a 
conviction) is that our courts must consider what impact exclusion would have on the 
outcomes of the case. Conversely the majority in Pillay emphasised the court’s duty to 
protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.241 As a result real evidence important to 
secure a conviction was excluded. The Court confirmed that the costs of exclusion should 
not determine the outcome of the admissibility assessment. The opposite approach implies 
that real evidence essential for a conviction on serious charges would be readily 
admitted.242 This approach is strongly associated with the common law inclusionary rule 
which was overruled by section 35(5). 
 Ally suggests that the court may overcome the conflicting judgments by rather focussing on 
the “reliability of the evidence (nature of the evidence).”243 Support for this approach is 
found in Canadian case law. In Grant244 the court ruled that the reliability of evidence is 
relevant in determining the impact exclusion will have on the public interest in truth finding. 
The Court emphasised that the reliability factor is not a return to the common law approach 
as formulated in Wray.245 Consistent with this caution the court in Harrison246 excluded 
reliable real evidence after a finding that the Charter breach was serious and the impact 
significant. The reliability of the evidence is a key factor when determining the importance 
of the evidence for a successful prosecution. The ratio is that exclusion of reliable evidence 
may impact negatively on the truth seeking role of the criminal justice system, especially 
when the exclusion destroys the prosecution’s case.247 Reliability should be a key 
consideration for the following reasons: the implicit erosion of the presumption of 
innocence will be avoided, reliability of evidence is not in conflict with an assessment of the 
public interest in crime control and the integrity of the criminal justice system, and an 
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assessment of the reliability of evidence is strongly aligned to the values in section 35(5), 
namely ensuring trial fairness and preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system.248  
 (iii)  Public opinion  
South Africa suffers from a high crime rate which in turn makes it difficult for courts to 
maintain the balance set out in Mphala.249 The question is whether public opinion should 
play a role in the admissibility assessment (determining whether the admission of evidence 
could result in detriment to the administration of justice) and if so what weight should be 
attached to it.250   
The Constitutional Court in Makwanyane251 stated that public opinion could be utilised 
when a value judgement is required, but courts should not be slaves to the “current mood” 
of society.252 The minority in Pillay253 distinguished the approach followed in Makwanyane 
from the interpretation of section 35(5). Scott JA held that public opinion is a relevant factor 
in the admissibility assessment and should be a prominent consideration when the third 
group of factors (integrity of criminal justice system) is assessed.254 Although “detriment” 
involves the making of a value judgment while taking into account the contemporary view 
of the public, the assessment should not be equated with a consideration of public 
opinion.255 The Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with values that underlie 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, freedom and equality, instead of 
contemporary values (Namibia) or standards of decency (USA). In Namibia the courts 
equated public interest to the interest of the public. The courts in Namibia held that current 
public opinion should be considered as evidence of current values if the views are well-
founded and not transient.256 
The majority in Pillay articulated the parameters within which a court should assess the 
community views or public opinion. Courts should take into account the views of the 
                                                          
248 Ally 2012 PELJ 476 at 504. 
249 S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 388 (W). 
250 Ally 2012 PELJ 476 at 482-483.   
251 S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC). 
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253 S v Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA). 
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256 S v Van den Berg 1995 NR 23; S v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (Nm); S v Strowitski 1994 NR 265; S v Nassar 1994  
      NR 233.  
228 
 
reasonable person, who is usually the average person in the community whose current 
mood is reasonable.257  
I support the view that South African courts should not allow public opinion to dictate its 
decision but should rather seek to educate the public about our constitutional values. Public 
opinion should occupy a subsidiary role in relation to the long term values sought to be 
achieved by the Constitution.258 This interpretation of the scope and function of public 
opinion is in harmony with the case law in Canada.259 If public opinion is in conflict with the 
provisions and objectives sought to be advanced by the Constitution, the latter must 
prevail.260 There are several undesirable consequences that may follow the overemphasis of 
the “current mood” of society. Firstly, it may become determinative of the admissibility 
assessment and may result in the regular inclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
especially where evidence is essential for conviction on serious charges. Secondly, an 
overemphasis of the current mood of society would unduly infringe upon the fundamental 
rights for example the presumption of innocence of an accused.261 
 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Constitution contains a discretionary exclusionary rule which prohibits the automatic 
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
must be excluded only if admission renders the trial unfair, or is otherwise detrimental to 
the administration of justice. In this part of the thesis, I recommend a different approach 
that our courts should follow when interpreting section 35(5) and propose legislative 
amendments to section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.  
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3.1 How should the court interpret section 35(5)? 
3.1.1 Procedural phase 
The courts should employ one or a combination of the deterrence-, remedial imperative- or 
judicial integrity rationale to justify the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained real 
evidence.  The admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be challenged 
during a trial-within-a-trial procedure. The onus to show a right infringement should not 
resort with a beneficiary of fundamental rights. The accused should only allege but need not 
prove a rights violation.  
An accused should be permitted to challenge the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained real evidence against him when he was a “suspect.”  A person is a suspect if the 
police, in the absence of certain proof, have a “reasonable apprehension” that he is guilty of 
a crime or he is suspected of a crime or offence.262 In situations where an individual had no 
choice but to comply in interactions between the police and a person, the courts should like 
the courts in Canada and the USA attach a broad interpretation to the concepts “detained” 
and “seize” respectively. The courts should apply an objective test to determine if a 
reasonable person would have concluded that his right to choose how to interact with the 
police had been removed or whether a show of authority constitutes a seizure. 
A temporal sequence, causal connection test, or a contextuality test (evidence linked 
through association) could satisfy the connection requirement under section 35(5). The link 
between the breach of the fundamental right and the discovery of the evidence must not be 
“too remote.”  
Standing is not a requirement under section 35(5). Accordingly an accused should be 
entitled to challenge the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence even in cases 
where evidence was obtained from a third party. 263  
The constitutional validity of laws empowering the compelled ascertainment of evidence 
may be challenged by an accused. In this regard the court should consider: Firstly whether 
the person has a subjective expectation of the right that society is prepared to recognise as 
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objectively reasonable.264 Secondly, whether the law or conduct is justifiable under the 
limitation clause. The court must consider whether the violation of the right is justifiable in 
terms of the limitation clause of the Constitution. The limitation must meet two requirements:  it 
must constitute a law of general application and must be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.265 
3.1.2 Substantive phase 
A court must under section 35(5) apply the two-legged test when determining the 
admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Under the first leg the court should 
consider whether admission would affect trial fairness. Under the second leg the court must 
consider whether the admission of evidence obtained through a serious violation of rights 
would be tantamount to a judicial condonation of an unconstitutional conduct and what 
effect admission would have on the integrity of the justice system. The second leg inquiry is 
the over-arching test under section 35(5). It follows that factors taken into account in the 
first leg inquiry should be considered in the second leg inquiry.        
(a) First leg of test: trial fairness 
It is recommended that our courts discard the trial fairness factors identified in Collins266 
and adopt the trial fairness approach adopted in Grant267 and Tandwa.268 The fair trial 
requirement in section 35(5) is flexible enough to permit a discretion which has to be 
exercised on the basis of the facts of the case.269 The “nature of the evidence,” 
“discoverability analysis” and the “nature of the right” should not be taken into account. In 
Tandwa the court stated that the following considerations should be taken into account:  
(a) the nature and extent of the constitutional breach (severity of the rights 
violation) also referred to as the “seriousness of the Charter infringing state 
                                                          
264
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conduct” group of factors. This inquiry involves an evaluation of the seriousness of 
the conduct that caused the violation. The preservation of the public confidence in 
the rule of law must be weighed against the seriousness of the conduct by the 
authorities, which the rule of law requires to uphold constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.270 Good faith conduct by the police will reduce the need for the court to 
distance itself from the police conduct;  
(b) the absence of prejudice to the accused: The question of prejudice is inseparable 
from the question of fairness in that a trial cannot be fair if an accused is prejudiced 
and a trial can hardly be unfair if there is an absence of prejudice;271  
(c) the need to ensure that exclusion of evidence does not tilt “the balance too far in 
favour of due process against crime control”;  
(d) the interest of society and the public policy interest in bringing criminals to 
book.272 
 Even though trial fairness is closely linked to the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination it (self-incriminating evidence) would not be subject to automatic exclusion. 
Moreover the courts have a discretion and will make a value judgment that depends on the 
facts of the case when determining the admissibility of statements, bodily evidence, non-
bodily evidence physical evidence and derivative (real) evidence.    
(b) Second leg of test: Detriment caused to the administration of justice  
The second leg of the test should involve an inquiry into “the impact of the breach on the 
Charter protected interests of the accused” and “society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits.”  
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(i) “The impact on the Charter–protected interests of the accused” 
The Grant second line of inquiry should be considered under this heading. The inquiry 
involves an assessment of the extent to which the violation actually undermined the 
interests protected by the right violated. Factors that should be taken into account are: 
(aa)  The “nature of the evidence” factor is a key consideration in assessing the 
degree of intrusion on the rights interest.273  
(bb) The discoverability analysis could be applied to assess the actual impact of the 
breach on the protected interest of the accused.274 An infringement should not 
be termed serious if the prosecution would have discovered the real evidence 
without the rights infringement. 
(ii) Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits  
As was the previous position in Canada our courts employed the group of factors relevant to 
“the effect exclusion or admission would have on the repute of the administration of 
justice.” This group of factors should be substituted with the category of factors relevant to 
determine “society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits,” identified in 
Grant. The inquiry asks whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process 
would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion.275 Factors that 
should be considered are: public opinion, the seriousness of the charge and the importance 
of the evidence to secure a conviction. It is submitted that the reliability of the evidence is a 
key factor when determining the importance of the evidence for a successful prosecution.    
3.2 Proposed amendments to section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
The constitutionality of the procedures in section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 
sanctioning the solving of crimes by means of surgery is questionable. I recommend that the 
legislature amends the provisions in section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 as 
follows:  
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1. An accused can only be compelled to subject him to surgery or any medical 
procedures to remove evidence from his body in terms of a valid court order 
authorised by a competent court. 
2. The courts should specifically be authorised and given the power to order an accused 
to subject himself to surgery.  
3. Section 37 should be amended by not only referring to the expression “including the 
taking of a blood sample” but incorporating the phrase “including the surgical 
removal of evidence from the body of the accused.”  
4. Section 37 must empower a registered qualified medical doctor or paramedic to 
operate on the body of the accused to remove the evidence.  
5. In applications under section 37 a court must consider whether the proposed 
medical intervention is reasonable. The inquiry must focus on the extent of the 
intrusion on the respondent’s privacy interests and on the state’s need for evidence.  
6. The Court must assess the individual’s interest and all relevant factors including: 
where the evidence is located on the body of the accused, whether the medical 
procedure is complicated or simple, whether there is any other evidence against the 
accused. These factors must be weighed against the following public interests: 
whether a refusal by the court would result in serious crime remaining unsolved, law 
enforcement would be stymied and justice diminished in the eyes of the public who 
have a direct and substantial interest in the resolution of such crime.  
7. A court should make an order under section 37 if the interest of society overshadows 
the interest of the accused. In this regard the court must be satisfied: that the 
evidence would be relevant, of the probative value of the evidence, that the 
seriousness of the crime justify the medical intervention, that the intervention is not 
serious, that the medical procedures to be performed is in terms of acceptable 
medical practice and procedures and of the risks associated with the medical 
procedure and whether the state had available substantial evidence to prove its 
case. 
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